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from the root _nî_ is sometimes explained as that by which sentences
and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning
and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of
words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing
out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered
into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the
strength of Kautilya's enumeration of the _vidyâ_ (sciences) as Ânvîksikî
(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge
by further scrutiny), _trayî_ (the three Vedas), _vârttâ_ (the sciences
of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and _dandanîti_ (polity), and the
enumeration of the philosophies as Sâmkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata
and Ânvîksikî, supposes that the _Nyâya sûtra_ was not in existence
in Kautilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kautilya's reference to
Nyâya as Ânvîksikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar
name for Ânvîksikî in Kautilya's time. He seems to misunderstand
Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya
from the Ânvîksikî in holding that while the latter only means
the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics.
What appears from Vâtsyâyana's statement in _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 1
is this that he points out that the science which was known in his
time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîksikî by
Kautilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîksikî,
but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories
such as _sams'aya_ (doubt) etc., though these were already contained
within the first two terms _pramâna_ (means of cognition) and
_prameya_ (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its
special and separate branches (_prthakprasthâna_) were treated,
Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (_adhyâtmavidyâ_)
like the Upanisads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining
the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon
by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in his
_Nyâyavârttikatâtparyatîkâ_ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the
word Nyâya (_pramânairarthaparîksanam_--to scrutinize an object by
means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word
ânvîksikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception
and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as
this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for
[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa's _Kumârasambhava "Udghâto pranavayâsâm
nyâyaistribhirudîranam_," also Mallinâtha's gloss on it.]
[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "_The early history of Indian
Philosophy,"
Indian Antiquary_, 1918.]
itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences
[Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kautilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya
is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its
capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the
way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that
the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this
seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself
designates the logical portion as a prthakprasthâna (separate
branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or
Kautilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made
after Kautilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the
importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that
seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or
_adhyâtmavidyâ_ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of
the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of
the dharmas'âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend
any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of
Kautilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kautilya
was not satisfied by counting Ânvîksikî as one of the four
vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side
with Sâmkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably
even in Kautilya's time Nyâya was composed of two branches,
one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather
of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external,
and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added
to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might
not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda
S'âstrî in an article in the _Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society_
1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect the
_Nyâya sûtras_, one as _Nyâyasûci_ and the other as _Nyâyasûtroddhâra_,
it seems that even in Vâcaspati's time he was not certain as to
the authenticity of many of the _Nyâya sûtras_. He further points
out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras
were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China
and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also
[Footnote 1: _Yena prayuktah pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by which
one is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan
vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâninah sarvâni karmâni sarvâs'ca
vidyâh vyâptâh tadâs'rayâs'ca nyâyah pravarttate_ (all those which
one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all
beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana,
and all these depend on Nyâya). _Vâtsyâyana bhâs'ya_, I.i. 1.]
thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands
of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who
put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These
suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but
we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such
additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs
of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of
the date of the original part of the _Nyâya sûtras_ still more difficult,
for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and
Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the _Nyâya sûtras_ on the
basis of references to S'ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except
on the supposition that all references to S'ûnyavâda must be later
than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since the _Mahâyâna sûtras_
written before Nâgârjuna also held the S'ûnyavâda doctrine.
The late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhûsana in _J.R.A.S._ 1918 thinks
that the earlier part of Nyâya was written by Gautama about
550 B.C. whereas the _Nyâya sûtras_ of Aksapâda were written
about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyâya in the
sense of logic in _Mahâbhârata_ I.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be
regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any
reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment
of the subject that the fixing of the date of Aksapâda was made
to fit in somehow with his idea that Aksapâda wrote his _Nyâya
sûtras_ under the influence of Aristotle--a supposition which does
not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyâbhûsana
has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced
a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part
of the Nyâya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.)
and Kâtyâyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the _Nyâya sûtras_ [Footnote ref
1]. We know that Kautilya knew the Nyâya in some form as Ânvîksikî
in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say
that the Nyâya existed in some form as early as the fourth
century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think
that at least some of the present sûtras were written some time
in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bâdarâyana's
sûtras make allusions to the Vais'esika doctrines and not to Nyâya.
On this ground he thinks that _Vais'esika sûtras_ were written before
Bâdarâyana's _Brahma-sûtras_, whereas the Nyâya sûtras were
written later. Candrakânta Tarkâlamkâra also contends in his
[Footnote 1: Goldstücker's _Pânini_, p. 157.]
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edition of Vais'esika that the _Vais'esika sûtras_ were earlier than the
Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the _Vais'esika
sûtras_ were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes
one of the _Vais'esika sûtras_, but the whole foundation of his medical
physics is based on the Vais`esika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The
_Lankâvatâra sûtra_ (which as it was quoted by As'vaghosa is earlier
than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are
other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing
that the _Vais'esika sûtras_ are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].
It is certain that even the logical part of the present _Nyâya
sûtras_ was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by
thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which
the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_)
Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views
of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The
_Vais'esika sûtras_ also give us some of the earliest types of inference,
which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya
doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].
Does Vais'esika represent an Old School of Mîmâmsâ?
The Vais'esika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition
that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed
to represent an old school of Mîmâmsâ, older than that represented
in the _Mîmâmsâ sûtras._ But a closer inspection of the _Vais'esika
sûtras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable
way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes
a _Vais'esika sûtra._ An examination of Caraka's _Sûtrasthâna_ (I.35-38)
leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some
compendium of Vais'esika such as that of the _Bhâsâpariccheda_
before him. _Caraka sûtra_ or _kârikâ_ (I.i. 36) says that the gunas
are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc.,
cognition, and those which begin with the guna "_para_"
(universality)
and end with "_prayatna_" (effort) together with the sense-qualities
(_sârthâ_). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known
enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found
in the _Vais'esika sûtra_ (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gunas,
[Footnote 1: _Caraka, S'ârîra_, 39.]
[Footnote 2: See the next section.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâsya on the _Nyâya sûtras,_ I.i.32. This is
undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in
_Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ as noted before.]
[Footnote 4: _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 5, and _Vais'esika sûtras_ IX. ii. 1-2,
4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]
heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_),
elasticity (_samskâra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_);
in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para"
(universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition)
comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in
prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list
and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's
sûtra was written at a time when the six gunas left out in the
Vais'esika enumeration had come to be counted as gunas, and
compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.
_Bhâsâpariccheda_ (a later Vais'esika compendium), is a compilation
from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha
as being collected from "_atisamksiptacirantanoktibhih_"--(from
very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya
and vis'esa shows that they had not then been counted as separate
categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'esika doctrines; but though
slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition
one finds in the _Vais'esika sûtra_ that sâmânya (generality) and
vi'sesa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were
therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'esika doctrines were
undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning
to be written on them.
The _Vais'esika sûtras_ seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist
doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is
no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the
argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an
object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There
is also no other reference to any other systems except to some
Mîmâmsâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâmkhya. There is no
reason to suppose that the Mîmâmsâ doctrines referred to allude
to the _Mîmâmsâ sûtras_ of Jaimini. The manner in which the
nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya
phraseology of "_pûrvavat_" and "_s'esavat_" was not
known. _Vais'esika
sûtras_ in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate
cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upanisad refers to
those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the
[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article in _J.A.S.B._,
1908.]
[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces
unity and vis'esa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and
vis'esa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]
[Footnote 3: _Vais'esika sûtra_ (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]
systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient
view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of
the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these
sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability
are pre-Buddhistic.
The _Vais'esika sûtra_ begins with the statement that its object
is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty
of Mîmâmsâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini
begins his _Mîmâmsâ sûtras_ by defining "dharma". This at first
seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'esika, viz, the description
of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as
that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) and
says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate
this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions
(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives
bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us
through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must
be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3].
The fact that the Vais'esika begins with a promise to describe dharma
and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions
and also the _adrsta_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit
accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many
of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book
by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce
any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows
that Kanâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing
that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and
actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a
good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption
of adrsta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The
[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]
[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kalâpa
Vyâkarana_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories
by Kanâda in his _Vais'esika sûtras_, after having proposed to describe
the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while
intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).
"_Dnarmam vyâkhyâtukâmasya satpadârthopavarnanam
Himavadgantukâmasya
sâgaragamanopamam_."]
[Footnote 3: The sutra "_Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmânyam_ (I.i.3
and
X.ii.9) has been explained by _Upaskâra_ as meaning "The Veda being the
word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no
mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later
Nyâya ideas into the Vais'esika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of
VI.ii.1.]
description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but
is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these
cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on
the supposition of adrsta proceeding out of the performance
of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards
magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies,
V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion
of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations
have taken place), and the original movement of the
mind are said to be due to adrsta. In V. ii. 17 the movement
of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the
assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the
movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in
_Upaskara_) are said to be due to adrsta. Salvation (moksa) is
said to be produced by the annihilation of adrsta leading to the
annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths
Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced)
and the adrsta. All the categories that he describes are founded
on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience
are due to adrsta These are the acts on which depend all
life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or
the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air,
death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena
by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2),
in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.
Kanâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding
substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of
metaphysics to adrsta But what leads to adrsta? In answer to
this, Kanâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or
sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_),
fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house
of the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_),
sacrifice (_yajña_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial
sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the
prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras)
(VI. ii. 2).
He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure
food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary
being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food
leads to prosperity through adrsta. He also described how
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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adrsta.
Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Kanâda is busy in showing
the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference
to our chapter on Mîmâmsâ will show that the later Mîmâmsâ
writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`esika doctrines in most of their
views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points
in which Mîmâmsâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`esika are (1) self-validity
of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief
in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according
to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.
Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject
of discussion in the Vais'esika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned,
and as all adrsta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we
may assume that Vais'esika had no dispute with Mîmâmsâ. The
fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due
to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the
_Vais`esika sûtras._ It is probable that Kanâda believed that the
Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.
1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with
Mîmâmsâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never
written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in
the days of the _Vais'esika sûtras,_ the view was probably what is
represented in the _Vais'esika sûtras._ As there is no reference to
Îs`vara and as adrsta proceeding out of the performance of actions
in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all
atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'esika was
as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâmsâ philosophers.
As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one
of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'esika and
the Mîmâmsâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kanâda gives reasons
in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33
till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the
eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâmsâ view as we know
from the later Mîmâmsâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question
of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is
[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my
opinion wrongly interpreted by S'ankara Mis'ra in his _Upaskâra_ (II. ii.
36 by adding an "_api_" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue,
and
II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as
sâmkhya and bhava instead of sâmkhya and abhava, which in my opinion
is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound
as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'esika view.]
that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the
seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally
this is regarded as the Vais'esika view as well. But in Vais'esika
III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its
activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this
inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the
activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no
certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is
suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted
on the authority of the scriptures (_âgama_). To this the final
Vais'esika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self
in our feeling as "I" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend
on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus
the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional
proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (_aham_) (III. ii.
10-18, also IX. i. 11).
These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'esika
represented a school of Mîmâmsâ thought which supplemented
a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.
Philosophy in the Vais'esika sûtras.
The _Vais'esika sûtras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining
virtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is
that by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_nihs'reyasa_)
are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the
Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and
salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that
salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special
excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of
substance (_dravya_), quality (_guna_), class concept (_sâmdânya_),
particularity (_vis'esa_), and inherence (_samavâyay_) [Footnote ref 1].
The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and
mind. The gunas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure,
separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to
species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement
[Footnote 1: _Upaskâra_ notes that vis'esa here refers to the ultimate
differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this
system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same
element has specific features of difference.]
[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_),
liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_samskâra_),
merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted.
These are all counted in later Vais'esika commentaries and compendiums.
It must be noted that "_guna_" in Vas'esika means qualities and not
subtle reals or substances as in Sâmkhya Yoga. Guna in Vas'esika would
be akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_.]
downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal
movement. The three common qualities of dravya, guna and karma
are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause,
and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other
dravyas and the gunas other gunas. But karma is not necessarily
produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or
its effect but the gunas are destroyed both by the cause and by
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses
karma and guna and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause.
Gunas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gunas, and are
not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is
devoid of guna, cannot remain at one time in more than one
object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of
contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)
of (derivative) dravyas, guna, and karma, guna is also the non-material
cause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, guna and karma. Karma
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion
(_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be
produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect
of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to guna in this that it does not produce
karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact
and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma
not being connected with more than one thing is not produced
by more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many
contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many
colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and
contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In
denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the
cause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].
In the second chapter of the first book Kanâda first says that
if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause
even though there may not be the effect. He next says that
genus (_samanya_) and species (_visesa_) are relative to the understanding;
[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See
_Upaskara_ I.i. 22.]
[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the
movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]
[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different
from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action
which is the cause of rebirth.]
being (_bhâva_) indicates continuity only and is hence
only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action
maybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate
differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).
In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being
(_sattâ_) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other
genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or
species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it
is different from dravya, guna and karma, and yet exists in them,
and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something
is and must be regarded as a category existing as one
identical entity in all dravya, guna, and karma, for in its universal
nature as being it has no special characteristics in the
different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of
thingness (_dravyatva_) qualitiness (_gunatva_) or actionness (_karmatva_)
are also categories which are separate from universal being
(_bhâva_ or _sattâ_) for they also have no separate genus or species
and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhâva or
being was the same in all.
In the first chapter of the second book Kanâda deals with
substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water,
colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (_snigdha_), fire,
colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be
found in ether (_âkâs'a_). Liquidity is a special quality of water
because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids
only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote
ref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by
touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred
from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred
from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not
itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya)
and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of
inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics
called _sâmânyato drsta_. The name of air "_vâyu_" is derived
from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us
has (_asmadvis'istânâm_) to be admitted for accounting for the
[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is
important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]
[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It
should be noted that the word "_adravyatvena_" in II. i. 13 has been
interpreted by me as "_adravyavattvena_."]
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giving of names to things (_samjñâkarma_). Because we find
that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented
by us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in
one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied
space, would not lead us to infer the existence of âkâs'a
(ether). Âkâs'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance
in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a
quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched,
there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this
substance is âkâs'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As
being is one so âkâs'a is one [Footnote ref 2].
In the second chapter of the second book Kanâda tries to
prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire,
and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the
notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is
one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because
the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space
supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much
nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have
diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the
sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound
is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises
when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features
coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered,
or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some
other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way
but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely
grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question
whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons
to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with
a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.
The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the
inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must
be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact
of the senses and their object inheres.
The knowledge of sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) is the reason by
[Footnote 1: I have differed from _Upaskâra_ in interpreting
"_samjñâkarma_" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while
_Upaskâra_ makes it a _dvandva_ compound. Upaskâra's interpretation
seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for
the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'ankara Mis'ra's
_Upaskâra._]
which we can infer the existence of something different from the
senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The
types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of
some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence
of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the
existence of some things from the existence of others. In all
these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to
be connected with each other (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_) [Footnote
ref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have
_anapades'a_ (fallacious middle) and _sandigdha_ (doubtful middle);
thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it
has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of
soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses
and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of
the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way
in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e.
by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In
the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity
of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).
The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vâyu. An objector
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _sâmânyatodrsta_
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition
to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But
the Vais'esika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But
[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the
methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear.
There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference
are only pointed out as the basis.]
[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Kanâda was probably not
aware of Gautama's terminology.]
then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences
as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction.
When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes,
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think
that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else.
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on
the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].
In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that
which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered
eternal (_nitya_). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can
only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything
as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that
also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal
is ignorance (_avidyâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing
which is great (_mahat_) and compounded. Air (_vâyu_) is not perceived to
have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not
the actuality of colour (_rûpasamskâra_--i.e. in air there is only
colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only
when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote
ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also
explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the
quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they
abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The
number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the
eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)
[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upaskâra_. I
think the three sûtras "_Sukhaduhkhajñananispattyavis'esadekatmyam,"
"vyavasthato nana,"_ and _"vastrasâmarthyat ca"_ originally
meant that
the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also
because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures,
they are regarded as many.]
[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the _Upaskâra,_
which regards this sûtra "_avidya_" to mean that we do not know of
any
reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]
[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of
_udbhûtarûpavattva_ and _anudbhûtarûpavattva_. The word _samskâra_ in
Vais'esika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection
(_samavaya_), production (_udbhava_) and not being overcome
(_anabhibhava_). For the last three senses see _Upaskâra_ IV. i. 7.]
are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch,
and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain,
etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile
sense) [Footnote ref 1].
In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the
earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There
cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the
three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one
of them acts as the central radicle (_upastambhaka_). Bodies are of
two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise
produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance
with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due
to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to
be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been
given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and
also on account of the authority of the Vedas.
In the first chapter of the fifth book action (_karma_) is discussed.
Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said
that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the
soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due
to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of
the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is
not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the
hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the
soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of
heaviness (_gurutva_) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.
Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed
motions (_nodanavis'esa_) which are generated by special kinds of
efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.
The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown
cause (_adrstakâranaka_). The arrow first acquires motion by
specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia
(_vegasamskâra_) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls
down through heaviness.
The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations
[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the _Upaskâra_ of S'ankara
Mis'ra on the _Vais'esika sûtras_ of Kanâda. It must be noted here
that the notion of number according to Vais'esika is due to mental
relativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mental
relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or
touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend
on the visual or the tactual sense.]
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of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical
importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained
as being due to unknown cause (_adrstakâritam_) and no explanation
is given as to the nature of this unknown (_adrsta_).
It is however said that with the absence of _adrsta_ there is no contact
of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore
moksa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the
self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind
is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes
steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs'a are
regarded as inactive.
The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts
are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account
of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain
Vedic performances, which brings in adrsta, purification and impurities
of things, how passions are often generated by adrsta,
how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how moksa
takes place as a result of the work of the soul.
In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal
things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The
change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning
in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size
is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many
causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those
that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small
relatively at the same time. In accordance with anutva (atomic) and
mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The
eternal size of _parimandala_ (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a
and âtman are called _mahân_ or _paramamahân_ (the supremely
great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure
it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being
of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size
(parimandala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and
the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether
(âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.
In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity
and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from
other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;
the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are
[Footnote 1: I have differed from the _Upaskâra_ in the interpretation of
this sûtra.]
neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (_ekaprthaktva_).
The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.
Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the
effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither
contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist
independently (_yutasiddhyabhâvât_). In the eighth book it is said
that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension
of qualities, action, generality, and particularity
perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the
cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the
cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book
negation is described; non-existence (_asat_) is defined as that to
which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things
may become non-existent and that which is existent in one
way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind
of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of
existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly
perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the
mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also
made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the
yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the
middle term is described. It is said that anything connected
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary
or as inseparably connected, will serve as linga (reason).
The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or
"these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may
also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism
from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal
cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidyâ_) is
due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation
due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite
of this is true knowledge (_vidyâ_). In the tenth it is said that
pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to
doubt and certainty.
[Footnote 1: _Upaskâra_ here explains that it is intended that the senses
are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the
sûtras.]
[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, _prâgabhâva_
(negation before production), _dhvamsâbhâva_ (negation after destruction),
and _anyonyabhava_ (mutual negation of each other in each other), have
been described. The fourth one is _sâmânyâbhâva_ (general negation).]
A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for
because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced.
Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact
is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which
inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production
of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of
fire is also a cause.
Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they
have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the
Vedas direct them, they have validity.
Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref 1].
The _Nyâya sûtras_ begin with an enumeration of the sixteen
subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (_pramâna_), object of right
knowledge (_prameya_), doubt (_sams'aya_), purpose (_prayojana_),
illustrative instances (_drstânta_), accepted conclusions (_siddhânta_),
premisses (_avayava_), argumentation (_tarka_), ascertainment (_nirnaya_),
debates (_vâda_), disputations (_jalpa_), destructive criticisms
(_vitandâ_), fallacy (_hetvâbhâsa_), quibble (_chala_), refutations
(_jâti_), points of opponent's defeat (_nigrahasthâna_), and hold that
by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (_nihs'reyasa_), is
attained. In the second sûtra it is said that salvation (_apavarga_)
is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge
(_mithyâjñâna_), defects (_dosa_), endeavours (_pravrtti_, birth
(_janma_), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said
to be of four kinds, perception (_pratyaksa_), inference (_anumâna_),
analogy (_upamana_), and testimony (_s'abda_). Perception is defined
as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names
proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three
kinds, from cause to effect (_pûrvavat_), effect to cause (_s'esavat_),
and inference from common characteristics (_sâmânyato drsta_).
Upamâna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known
thing.
S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (âpta)
[Footnote ref 2].
[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in _Nyâya
sûtras_, supplemented here and there with the views of Vâtsyâyana, the
commentator. This follows the order of the sûtras, and tries to present
their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyâya as
possible. The general treatment of Nyâya-Vais'esika expounds the two
systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]
[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vâtsyâyana says that an ârya, a
rsi or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an âpta (reliable authority).]
Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced
and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge
are said to be self (_âtman_), body, senses, sense-objects,
understanding (_buddhi_), mind (_manas_}, endeavour (pravrtti), rebirths,
enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and
salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (_prayatna_), pleasure, pain, and
knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which
upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain
as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l];
the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap,
tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are
the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the
objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot
occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (_manas_).
Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and
body. Dosas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead
men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref
2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called _apavarga_ [Footnote ref 3].
Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting
opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That
for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work
is called _prayojana_.
Illustrative example (_drstânta_) is that on which both the
common man and the expert (_parîksaka_) hold the same opinion.
Established texts or conclusions (_siddhânta_) are of four kinds,
viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called
the _sarvatantrasiddhânta_; (2) those which are held by one school
or similar schools but opposed by others called the _pratitantrasiddhânta_;
(3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally
follow called _adhikaranasiddhânta_; (4) those of the opponent's views
which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute
the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and
bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (_abhyupagamasiddhânta_)
[Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:
[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]
[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full
of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated
with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in
salvation, but only cessation from pain.]
[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]
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(1) _pratijñâ_ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);
(2) _hetu_ (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the
strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples
or negative instances); (3) _udâharana_ (positive or negative
illustrative instances); (4) _upanaya_ (corroboration by the instance);
(5) _nigamana_ (to reach the conclusion which has been proved).
Then come the definitions of tarka, nirnaya, vâda, jalpa, vitandâ,
the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which
have been enumerated in the first sûtra.
The second book deals with the refutations of objections
against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation
of certain objections against the possibility of the happening
of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there
was always a difference between the two things regarding which
doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating
characteristics between the two things are not noted.
Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object
to the validity of the pramâna in general and particularly of
perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before
the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter,
and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they
could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two
happened together then there would be no notion of succession
in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were
no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of
knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all
means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any
means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no
means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds
of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous
existence of those different kinds of musical instruments,
so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence
of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as
instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition
of other things may themselves be the objects of right
[Footnote 1: _Yathâpas'câtsiddhena s'abdena pûrvasiddham
âtodyamanumîyate
sâdhyam ca âtodyam sâdhanam ca s'abdah antarhite hyâtodye svanatah
anumânam bhavatîti, vînâ vâdyate venuh pûryyate iti svanavis'esena
âtodyavis'esam pratipadyate tathâ pûrvasiddham upalabdhivisayam
pas'câtsiddhena upalabdhihetunâ pratipadyate. Vâtsyâyana bhâsya,_ II.
i. 15.]
knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which
are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere
instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge.
The means of right knowledge (pramâna) do not require
other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of
a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves
as well.
Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition
of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact
of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we
perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception
of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we
can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not
merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could
say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2].
Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is
wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this
the Nyáya answer is that there is always such a difference in the
specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular
effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular
cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of
time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time
did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible.
The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have
perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be
done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamána) as a
means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved.
The four pramânas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture
[Footnote 1: Here the sûtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later
interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyâya doctrine
of perception, but against the wording of the definition
of perception as given in the,_Nyâya sûtra_, II. i. 4.]
[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who
rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later
Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.),
_Avayavinirâkarana_ in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, may be referred
to.]
[Footnote 3: _Pûrvodakavis'istam khalu varsodakan s'îghrataram srotasâ
bahutaraphenaphalaparnakâsthâdivahanañcopalabhamânah pûrnatvena,
nadya upari vrsto deva ityanuminoti nodakabrddhimâtrena. Vatsyâyana
bhâsya_, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river
is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater
augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current
large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics,
associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of
water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].
are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication),
aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood
in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is
also understood--if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere
we understand that the same contains eight gallons of
corn as well) and abhâva (non-existence) as separate pramânas
for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti,
sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.
The validity of these as pramânas is recognized, but they are
said to be included in the four pramânas mentioned before. The
theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity
proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to
refer to class-notions (_jâti_), individuals (_vyakti_), and the specific
position of the limbs (_âkrti_), by which the class notion is manifested.
Class (_jâti_} is defined as that which produces the notion
of sameness (_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâtih_).
The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of
the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated
with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity
in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and
produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from
the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there
would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there
were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize
things as having seen them before; the two images produced by
the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united
together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover
if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour
fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness
belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition,
for the experience of one could not be recognized by another.
If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected
by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose
as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this
entity the knower would require some instrument by which it
would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is
admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the
sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the
[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different
senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which
works in both eyes.]
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senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.
Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy
and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in
previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires,
and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments
and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is
argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in
previous existences.
The body is made up of the ksiti element. The visual sense
is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally
the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation
is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three,
fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye,
and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of
earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements
of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made
by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive
quality of earth, viz. smell.
Against the Sâmkhya distinction of _buddhi_ (cognition) and
_cit_ (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between
the _buddhi_ and _cit_. We do not find in our consciousness two
elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness,
but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâmkhya
epistemology that the antahkarana assumes diverse forms in
cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition
of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external
objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâmkhya explanation
that the antahkaranas catch reflection from the external
world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may
lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of
crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at
different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be
said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to
in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced.
In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no
coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but
[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâmkhya did not believe that the
senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâmkhya-Yoga view
represented in _Âtreya-samhitâ_ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika
or constituted of the gross elements.]
the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The
contact of manas with soul (_âtman_) takes place within the body
and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge
belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for
even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions
destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous.
Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of
these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas).
Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again
if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be
borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of
another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given
as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign,
(5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor
and the possessed or master and servant, or things which
are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of
husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition,
(11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover
and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that
which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such
as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection,
(19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does
not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body
as due to adrsta is described. Salvation (_apavarga_) is effected by
the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman)
through the destruction of karma.
In the fourth book in course of the examination of dosa
(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all
other defects such as râga (attachment) and dvesa (antipathy).
As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by
destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the
process of origination. Îs'vara is regarded as the cause of the
production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for
man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts.
A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all
things have come into being by no-cause (_animitta_), for then
no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.
The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted
on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.
[Footnote 1: _Nyâya sûtra_ III. ii. 44.]
The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ûnyavâdin Bauddhas)
that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to
other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are
merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are
then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like
the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen.
Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means
sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented
by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for
pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless
sleep, so there is no affliction (_kles'a_) in the man who attains
apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all
efforts (_pravrtti_) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless
with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then
there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism
(_ahamkâra_) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects
(_dosa_); about the nature of whole and parts and about the
nature of atoms (_anus_) which cannot further be divided. A discussion
is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins
that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when
separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as
leading to right knowledge.
The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition
is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations
(_nigrahasthâna_) and futilities (_jâti_).
Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais'esika sûtras.
When we compare the _Nyâya sûtras_ with the _Vais'esika sûtras_
we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes
have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large
amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art
for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was
probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises
which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering
themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their
opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has
known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]
[Footnote 2: A reference to the _Suvarnaprabhâsa sûtra_ shows that the
Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving
their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to
the worship of Sarasvatî (goddess of learning), who they supposed would
help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information
and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]
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we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to
disputations as found in the _Nyâya sûtra_ with those that are
found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There
are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the
_Nyâya sûtra_ and _Caraka-samhitâ_ which have treated of these
matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g.
drstânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vitandâ) follows very closely
the definitions given of those in the _Nyâya sûtras_. There are
others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc.,
where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are
some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. _pratisthâpanâ,
jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyadosa, vâkyapras'amsâ, upalambha,
parihâra, abhyanujñâ_, etc.) which are not found in the
_Nyâya sûtra_ [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities
(jâti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in
the _Nyâya sûtra_ are not found in _Caraka_. There are some terms which
are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. _aupamya_ in
_Caraka, upamâna_ in _Nyâya sûtra, arthâpatti_ in _Nyâya sûtra_ and
_arthaprâpti_ in _Caraka_. Caraka does not seem to know anything
about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the
treatment of these terms of disputations in the _Caraka_ is much
simpler and less technical than what we find in the _Nyâya sûtras_.
If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the
fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the
treatment of Caraka and that of the _Nyâya sûtras_. It seems therefore
in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the _Nyâya
sûtras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation
to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation
was earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Nyâya sûtras_ represents
a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had
necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied
in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.
It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have
been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing
through the _Nyâya sûtras_ is that of a polemic against the doctrines
which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the
Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâmkhya, the Cârvâka,
and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no
[Footnote 1: Like Vais'esika, Caraka does not know the threefold division
of inference (_anumâna_) as _pûrvavat, s'esavat and sâmânyatodrsta_.]
further allusion elsewhere. The _Vais'esika sûtras_ as we have already
seen had argued only against the Mîmâmsâ, and ultimately agreed
with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâmsâ in the
_Nyâya sûtras_ is the same as in the Vais'esika over the question
of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the
self-validity of knowledge (_svatah prâmânyavâda_)and the akhyâti
doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâmsists, which form the two chief
points of discussion between later Mîmâmsâ and later Nyâya,
are never alluded to in the _Nyâya sûtras_. The advocacy of Yoga
methods (_Nyâya sûtras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be
an alien element; these are not found in Vais'esika and are not in
keeping with the general tendency of the _Nyâya sûtras_, and the
Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya
Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.
The _Vais'esika sûtras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional
knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the
self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they
also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived
under special conditions of samskâra (conglomeration etc.).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity
(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost
the same with Vais'esika as with Nyâya. The _Nyâya sûtras_
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring
in the questions of samskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'esika
does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three
classifications as pûrvavat, s'esavat and samânyatodrsta, but no
definition. The _Vais'esika sûtras_ do not know of these classifications,
and give only particular types or instances of inference
(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference
without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti
(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sâdhya_ (probandum)) which became
so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated
either in the _Nyâya sûtras_ or in the Vais'esika. _Vais'esika
sutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance
between hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_),
[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]
but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of
the term _prasiddhipûrvakatva_ of Vais'esika seems to be more
loose than the term _vyâpti_ as we know it in the later Nyâya. The
_Vais'esika sûtras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate
pramâna, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.
With _Nyâya sûtras_ s'abda as a pramâna applies not only to the
Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and
Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three
kinds _rsi, ârya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamâna which is
regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even
referred to in the _Vais'esika sûtras_. The _Nyâya sûtras_ know of
other pramânas, such as _arthâpatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but
include them within the pramânas admitted by them, but the
_Vais'esika sûtras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The
_Vais'esika sûtras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through
the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.
1-10). The _Nyâya sûtras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as
non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another
to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks
are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that
absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though
there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the _Vais'esika
sûtras_ about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception,
yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyâya
sûtras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, guna, karma,
vis'esa_ and _samavâya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'eska
discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyâya sûtras_ take much pains to prove
the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have
been important with Vais'esika. The slight reference to this
question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.
The _Vais'esika sûtras_ do not mention the name of "Îs'vara,"
whereas
the _Nyâya sûtras_ try to prove his existence on eschatological
grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self
in the _Nyâya sûtras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity of
sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the
[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramânas is Caraka.
But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from
Nyâya and calls _arthâpatti arthaprâpti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]
[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's
commentary.]
[Footnote 3: The _Nyâya sûtra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of
jâti as "_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâtih_" (II. ii. 71).]
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Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact
of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the _Vais'esika sûtras_ admit
the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of
atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'esika are absent there. The
Vai'sesika calls salvation _nihs'reyasa_ or _moksa_ and the Nyâya
_apavarga_. Moksa with Vais'esika is the permanent cessation of
connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of
pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between
the Vais'esika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the
notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.
Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which
cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment
there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness,
then from a sense of relativeness--apeksâbuddhi--notion
of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two
things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by
heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held)
was held by Vais'esika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref
2]. But as the _Nyâya sûtras_ are silent on these points, it is not
possible to say that such were really the differences between early
Nyâya and early Vaisesika. These differences may be said to hold between
the later interpreters of Vais'esika and the later interpreters of
Nyâya. The Vais'esika as we find it in the commentary of
Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from
the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost
the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore
preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the
Nyâya-Vais'esika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found
from the sixth century onwards.
The Vais'esika and Nyâya Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'esika
sûtras_ by Kanâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though
there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It
[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from
_Samksepas'ankarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another
passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914,
to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element
of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the
Vais'esikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found
in the Nyâya or the _Vais'esika sûtras_, unless the cessation of pain
with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss
or happiness.]
[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava's _Sarvadars'anasamgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana_.]
appears from the _Vâyu purâna_ that he was born in Prabhâsa near
Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of
Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâsya (commentary) of the _Vais'esika
sûtras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity
of Pras'astapâda's bhâsya is this that unlike other bhâsyas
(which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and
then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining
the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but
is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote
ref 1]. There were two other bhâsyas on the _Vais'esika sûtras_,
namely _Râvana-bhâsya_ and _Bharâdvâja-vrtti_, but these are now
probably lost. References to the former are found in
_Kiranâvalîbhâskara_ of Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabhâ_
2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâsya, namely
_Vyomavatî_ by Vyomas'ekharâcârya, _Nyâyakandalî_ by S'ridhara,
_Kiranâvalî_ by Udayana (984 A.D.) and _Lîlâvatî_ S'rîvatsâcârya.
In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bhattâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'ankara
Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astapâda-bhâsya_,
namely _Bhâsyasûkti_ and _Kanâda-rahasya_. S'ankara Mis'ra (1425
A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the _Vais'esika sûtras_ called the
_Upaskâra_. Of these _Nyâya-kandalî_ of S'rîdhara on account of its
simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably
the best for a modern student of Vais'esika. Its author was a
native of the village of Bhûrisrsti in Bengal (Râdha). His father's
name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he
wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes
at the end of his work.
The _Nyâya sûtra_ was written by Aksapâda or Gautama, and
the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known
as the _Vâtsyâyana-bhâsya_. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not
[Footnote 1: The bhâsya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a
bhâsya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and
calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories
(_Padârthadharmasamgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya,
guna, karma, sâmânya, vis'esa_ and _samavâya_ in order and without
raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on
them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later
Nyâya-Vais'esika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and
dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms
contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of
pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat
occur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'esika sûtras_
are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date
definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'esika available to us
after Kanâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th
century A.D.]
been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he
lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi
places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a
_Vârttika_ on Vâtsyâyana's bhâsya to establish the Nyâya views
and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Dinnâga
(about 500 A.D.) in his _Pramânasamuccaya_. Vâcaspatimis'ra
(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Nyâyavârttika_ of
Udyotakara called _Nyâyavârttikatâtparyatîkâ_ in order to make
clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ which was sinking
in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings
(_dustarakunibandhapankamagnânâm_). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote
a sub-commentary on the _Tâtparyatîkâ_ called
_Tâtparyatîkâparis'uddhi_. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a
sub-commentary on that called the _Nyâyanibandhaprakâs'a_. Padmanâbha
wrote a sub-commentary on that called _Varddhamânendu_ and S'ankara
Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the
_Nyâyatâtparyamandana_. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha
wrote an independent short commentary known as _Vis'vanâthavrtti_,
on the _Nyâya sûtra_, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate
commentary on the _Nyâya sûtras_ known as _Nyâyasûtravivarana_.
In addition to these works on the _Nyâya sûtras_ many other
independent works of great philosophical value have been written
on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval
times is the _Nyâyamañjari_ of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished
shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the _Nyâya
sûtras_ for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite
independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian
thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati's
_Tâtparyatîkâ_, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another
important work is Udayana's _Kusumâñjali_ in which he tries to
prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read
with its commentary _Prakâs'a_ by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its
sub-commentary _Makaranda_ by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's
_Âtmatattvaviveka_ is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in
which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition
to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later
times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection
with the present work. _Bhâsâpariccheda_ by Vis'vanâtha with
its commentaries _Muktâvalî, Dinakarî_ and _Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha_
with _Nyâyanirnaya, Tarkabkâsâ_ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with the commentary _Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî_ of S'ivâditya,
_Târkikaraksâ_ of Varadarâja with the commentary _Niskantaka_
of Mallinâtha, _Nyâyasâra_ of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and
_Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî_ of Jânakinâtha Bhattâcarya with the
_Nyâyamanjarisara_ by Yâdavâcârya, and _Nyâyasiddhântadîpa_ of
S'asadhara with _Prabhâ_ by S'esânantâcârya.
The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya
began with Ganges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about
1200 A.D. Ganges'a wrote only on the four pramânas admitted by the
Nyâya, viz. pratyaksa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of
the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his
discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention
in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and
commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna
portion of his work _Tattvacintâmani, and many independent
treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars
of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home
of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iromani
(1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bhattâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bhattâcârya
(1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bhattâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries
on S'iromani's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been
very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the
most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series
of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject
[Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of
metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly
in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately
and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote
ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the
nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke
and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature
of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there
should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic
thinking and the development of a system of highly technical
[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third
quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started
in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century
Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr
Cakravarttî's paper, _J. A.S.B._ 1915. I am indebted to it for some
of the dates mentioned in this section.]
[Footnote 2: _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunatha as well as his
_Padârthatattvanirûpana_ are, however, notable exceptions.]
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expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical
expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted
even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate
and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit
ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the
importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it
can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by
attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.
I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that
so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned,
though Aksapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account
of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently
worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account
of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic
_Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti's
_Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra_, _Nyâyâvatâra_ of Siddhasena Divâkara
(533 A.D.) Mânikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) _Parîksâmukha sûtra_, and
_Pramânanayatattvâlokâlamkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and
_Prameyakamalamârtanda_ of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice.
_Pramânasamuccaya_ and _Nyâyapraves'a_ of Dinnâga (500 A.D.),
_Pramânayârttika kârikâ_ and _Nyâyabindu_ of Dharmakîrtti
(650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most
interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].
The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and
Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on
Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the
present volume.
It is interesting to notice that between the _Vâtsyâyana
bhâsya_ and the Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ no Hindu work on logic
of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the
science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and
the Buddhists; and it was Dinnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya
that roused Udyotakara to write the _Vârttika_. The Buddhist and
the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics
as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we
come to Ganges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of
importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely _Nyâyasâra_
of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of
[Footnote 1: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhûsana,
for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]
inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya
interest [Footnote ref 1].
The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'esika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].
The Nyâya-Vais'esika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness
took a common-sense view of things, and held that
things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange
themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues
to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by
the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce
an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or
through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence
is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver
did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same.
Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding
environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general
characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things
are testified by experience to be existing.
As the Nyâya-Vais'esikas depended solely on experience and
on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâmkhya cosmology, but
accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (_bhûtas_), earth
(_ksiti_), water (_ap_), fire (_tejas_), and air (_marut_). These atoms
are eternal; the fifth substance (_âkâs'a_) is all pervasive and eternal.
It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading
and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests
sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows
itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves
to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf
man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear
on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense
organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence
of time (_kâla_) as extending from the past through the present to the
[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'esika referred to
have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be
acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should
refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by
Mr.
Cakravarttî in _J.A.S.B._ 1915.]
[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'esika as the same system.
Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded
since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some
minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those
of the other. The original character of the two systems has already
been treated.]
[Footnote 3: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 59-64.]
endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could
have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account
for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâmkhya
did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit
of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its
own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms
and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity
is a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirmâna) as it represents the
order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But
kâla in Nyâya-Vais'esika is regarded as a substance existing by
itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself
as past, present, and future. Sâmkhya regarded it as past, present,
and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things
in its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. The
astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets.
These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'esika conception
of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless
substance which appears as many in association with the changes
related to it [Footnote ref l].
The seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substance
by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the
right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is
also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight
directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth
substance is the soul _(âtman)_ which is all-pervading. There are
separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings
of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to _âtman_. Manas (mind) is
the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory;
all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are
generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the
objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with
the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling,
or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have
a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience
is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not
simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 64-66, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp.
136-139. The _Vais'esika sûtras_ regarded time as the cause of things
which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]
[Footnote 2: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 66-69, and _Nyayamañjarî_, p. 140.]
of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas
the other things such as quality (_guna_), action (_karma_), sameness
or generality (_sâmânya_), speciality or specific individuality
(_vis'esa_) and the relation of inherence (_samavâya_) cannot show
themselves without the help of substance (_dravya_). Dravya is thus the
place of rest (_âs'rayâ_) on which all the others depend (_âs'rta_).
Dravya, guna, karma, sâmânya, vis'esa, and samavâya are the six original
entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1].
When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and
a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way
of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics
and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any
passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and
attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref
2]. The Nyâya-Vais'esika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to
reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor
dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands
of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The
entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying
principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there
must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the
percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types
or categories (_padârtha_), and held that the notion of each type
was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in
number--dravya, guna, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red
book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which
rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus
call the
book a substance (_dravya_); dravya is thus defined as that which
has the characteristic of a dravya (_dravyatva_). So also guna and
karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the
same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with
Sâmkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say
[Footnote 1: _Abhâva_ (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is
mentioned in the _Vais'esika sûtras_. Later Nyâya writers such as
Udayana include _abhâva_ as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a
contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not
counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva--"_abhâvasya
prthaganupades'ah bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât_." _Nyâyakandalî_,
p. 6, and _Laksanâvalî_, p. 2.]
[Footnote 2: "_Tattvato jñâtesu bâhyâdhyâtmikesu visayesu
dosadars'anât viraktasya samîhânivrttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni
karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutismrtyuditâni
asankalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyatah
prakrstanivarttakadharmopacaye sati
paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât._" _Ibid._ p.
7.]
whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but
Nyâya-Vais'esika would collect "all whiteness" under the name
of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote
ref l].
They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate
mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions
could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or
not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences
which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate
entities or categories.
The six Padârthas: Dravya, Guna, Karma, Sâmânya,
Vis'esa, Samavâya.
Of the six classes of entities or categories (_padârtha_) we have
already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to
the others. Of the qualities (_guna_) the first one called _rûpa_
(colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone
and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue,
yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours are
found only in ksiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are
permanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of ksiti changes when heat
is applied, and this, S'rîdhara holds, is due to the fact that
heat changes the atomic structure of ksiti (earth) and thus the
old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour
is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rûpa is the general
name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _rûpatva_
(colourness), and the rûpa guna (quality) is that on which
rests this genus; rûpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended
by the eye.
The second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can be
apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent
(_katu_), astringent (kasâya) and bitter (tikta). Only ksiti and ap
have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like
rûpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must
be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are
apprehended by the tongue.
The third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can be
apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to ksiti alone. Water
[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrântika Buddhism, "yo yo
vruddhâdhyâsavân nâsâvekah." See Panditâs'oka's _Avayavinirâkarana,
Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts_.
[Footnote 2: The word "padârtha" literally means denotations of
words.]
or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence
of earth materials.
The fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehended
only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold,
hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to ksiti; ap, tejas, and
vâyu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of âkâs'a. Had there
been no âkâs'a there would have been no sound.
The sixth is samkhyâ (number), that entity of quality belonging
to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three,
etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative
oscillatory state of the mind (_apeksâbuddhi_); thus when there are
two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug and
that is another jug. This is called apeksâbuddhi; then in the
two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then an
indeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-guna_) of dvitva in us
and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs.
The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a
similar manner [Footnote ref 1].
The seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality in
things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and
speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is
called _parimandala parimâna_; it is eternal, and it cannot generate
the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely;
when two atoms generate a dyad (_dvyanuka_) it is not
the measure of the atom that generates the anu (atomic) and
the _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvyanuka_),
for then the size (_parimâna_) of it would have been still smaller
than the measure of the atom (_parimandala_), whereas the
measure of the dyanuka is of a different kind, namely the
small (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but
then the number (samkhyâ) of the atom should be regarded as
bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_)
measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dyanuka)
compose a tryanuka the number and not the measure "small"
[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'esika view introduced by
Pras'astapâda. Nyâya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'ankara
Mis'ra's _Upaskâra_, VII. ii. 8.]
[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms
as eternal as in "paramânus" and non-eternal as in the dvyanuka.
The
parimandala parimâna is thus a variety of anuparimâna. The
anuparimâna and the hrasvaparimâna represent the two dimensions of
the measure of dvyanukas as mahat and dîrgha are with reference
to tryanukas. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 133.]
(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (_mahat_)
of the tryanuka. But when we come to the region of these gross
tryanukas we find that the "great" measure of the tryanukas is
the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by
them. For as many tryanukas constitute a gross body, so much
bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the tryanukas
of mahat parimâna makes things of still more mahat parimâna.
The measure of tryanukas is not only regarded as mahat
but also as dîrgha (long) and this dîrgha parimâna has to be admitted
as coexisting with mahat parimâna but not identical, for
things not only appear as great but also as long (_dîrgha_). Here
we find that the accumulation of tryanukas means the accumulation
of "great" (_mahat_) and "long" (_dîrgha_) parimâna, and
hence
the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater
and longer than the individual atoms which composed them.
Now the hrasva parimâna of the dyads is not regarded as having
a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct
type of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulation
of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness,
grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the
hrasva (small) parim_ana ought to generate still more hrasva
parim_ana, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of
the dyads was the cause of the measure of the tryanukas, the
tryanukas should be even smaller than the dyanukas. So also if
the atomic and circular (_parimandala_) size of the atoms is regarded
as generating by their measure the measure of the dyanukas,
then the measure of the dyanukas ought to be more atomic
than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should
not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced
by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be
regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign
to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the
cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness
and the parimandala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to
generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect.
But since the dyads and the tryanuka molecules are seen to
be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are
not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued
that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the
measure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause
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of the measure of the latter. This explains anuparimâna, hrasva
parimâna, mahat parimâna, and dîrgha parimâna. The parimâna
of âkâs'a, kâla, dik and âtman which are regarded as all-pervasive,
is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimânas
of the atoms, âkâs'a, kâla, dik, manas, and âtman are regarded
as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimânas as belonging to
non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.
The eighth is _prthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness of
things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things
appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is
perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation
such as this jug is not this pot.
The ninth is _samyoga_ (connection), that entity of guna by
virtue of which things appear to us as connected.
The tenth is _vibhâga_ (separation), that entity of guna which
destroys the connection or contact of things.
The eleventh and twelfth gunas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give
rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote
and near.
The other gunas such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness),
_duhkha_ (sorrow), _icchâ_ (will), _dvesa_ (antipathy or hatred) and
_yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.
The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of
which things fall to the ground. The guna of _sneha_ (oiliness)
belongs to water. The guna of _samskâra_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_
(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,
(2) _sthiti-sthâpaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing
tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhâvanâ_
is that quality of âtman by which things are constantly practised or by
which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l].
_Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy
happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is
[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda says that bhâvanâ is a special characteristic
of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which
things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through
unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India),
repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the
samskâra becomes particularly strong. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 167.
Kanâda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a
special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the samskâra,
memory (smrti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]
[Footnote 2: Pras'astapâda speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality
of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit
that dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasâmarthyam_). Sacrifice etc.
cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate
the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action
is destroyed its power (_sâmarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be
admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct
which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions
of time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddhâ_), non-injury, doing good to all
beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of
anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods,
fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of
duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by
Pras'astapâda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to
these duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patañjali's Yoga) and
attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padârthas attains a dharma
which brings liberation (_moksa_). S'rîdhara refers to the Sâmkhya-Yoga
account of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 272-280).
See also Vallabha's _Nyâyalilâvatî_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]
the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a
man to suffer. _Adrsta_ or destiny is that unknown quality of
things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and
arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with
their merits or demerits.
_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must
be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or guna. There
are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction,
(4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of
karmas rest on substances just, as the gunas do, and cause the
things to which they belong to move.
_Sâmânya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect
of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite
of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of
them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.
In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all
perceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness,
which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, guna,
and karma. This sameness is called _sâmânya_ or _jâti_, and it is
regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, guna, or
karma. This highest genus _sattâ_ (being) is called _parajâti_ (highest
universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower
universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of guna, or
still more intermediate jâtis such as _gotvâjâti_ (the genus cow),
_nîlatvajâti_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera
sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as
_pas'utva_ (animal jâti) and _gotva_ (the cow jâti); here however
gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti.
The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which
from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.
This jâti or _sâmânya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate
independent reality though it is existent in dravya, guna and
karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent
reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow
was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception
of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this
is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who
should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent
reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns
on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais'esika said that negation
of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived
as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained
by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has
thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as
sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that
object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even
with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the
latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].
Through _vis'esa_ things are perceived as diverse. No single
sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees
with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the
existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves.
The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated
souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it
[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditâs'oka says that there is no single thing
running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the
sâmânya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have
known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action
of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If
there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish
jâti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the
action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should
require one common factor to hold them together, then these should
require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum.
Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent
(_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Sâmânya is
such, therefore sâmânya is non existent. No sâmânya can be admitted to
exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past
experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and
transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sâmânya
can be pointed out as being externally perceptible
--_Sâmânyadûsanadikprasaritâ_--in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_. The Vedanta
also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know
jâti as a separate substance. So it discards jâti. See _Vedântaparibhâsâ_,
_Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabhâ_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's
_Khandanakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]
[Footnote 2: Similarity (sâdrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category,
for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati
tadgatabhûyodharmavattvam_).]
is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the
yogins who can perceive them.
_Samavâya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation
by virtue of which two different things such as substance and
attribute, substance and karma, substance and sâmânya, karana
(cause) and kârya (effect), atoms and vis'esa, appear so unified
that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.
This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why
substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jâti in substance
and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they
are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place
between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected
and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put
my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances
and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the guna by
virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavâya
however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and
guna and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as
one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a
separate and independent category. This is not regarded as
many like samyogas (contact) but as one and eternal because
it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed
but the samavâya relation which was never brought into being
by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].
These six things are called the six padârthas or independent
realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.
The Theory of Causation.
The Nyâya-Vais'esika in most of its speculations took that
view of things which finds expression in our language, and which
we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus
[Footnote 1: The Vedânta does not admit the existence of the relation of
samavâya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance
and qualities). Thus S'ankara says (_Brahma-sûtrabhâsya II. ii. 13_)
that if a samavâya relation is to be admitted to connect two different
things, then another samavâya would be necessary to connect it with
either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that
another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavasthâ_).
Nyâya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to
remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of
_anavasthâ_--_prâmânikî_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question
of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyâ and the passions), and another
_aprâmânikî anavasthâ_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of
anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]
they admitted dravya, guna, karma and sâmânya, Vis'esa they
had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did
not admit that things were continually changing their qualities,
and that everything could be produced out of everything by a
change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.
In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the
effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that
the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the
accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the
wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed
the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent
before but was newly produced. This is what is called the
doctrine of _asatkâryavâda_. This is just the opposite of the
Sâmkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nâbhâvo
vidyate satah_) and that the non-existent could never be
produced (_nâsato vidyate bhâvah_). The objection to this view is
that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible
things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The
Nyâya-Vais'esika answer is that the view is not that anything
that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced
was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].
It is held by Mîmâmsâ that an unseen power resides in the
cause which produces the effect. To this Nyâya objects that this
is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for
there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental
operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained
by molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothing
except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence)
between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of
an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what
succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well
(_anyathâsiddhis'ûnyasya niyatâpûrvavarttitâ_). Unconditionality
and invariability are indispensable for _kâryakârana-bhâva_ or
cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or
adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also
be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only
collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional
upon something else (_na svâtantryena_). The potter's stick is an
unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour
[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamuñjari_, p. 494.]
of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment
or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is
not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be
regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable
antecedents or what enters into the production of their
co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they
are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those
of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the
sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably
precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and âkâs'a (ether) as the
substrate and vâyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into
the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional
antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration
of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the
conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent
of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar),
the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the
potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be
unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally
all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with
or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded
as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly
remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to
complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral,
secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the
irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of
energy. This test the Nyâya would accept only in the sense of
an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispanda
eva bhautiko vyâpârah karotyarthah atîndriyastu vyâparo
nâsti._ Jayanta's Mañjari Âhnika I), but would emphatically
reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious
causal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyâya all
energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyâya--its
insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations
of the different causal conditions--that these operations are of
the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds
to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy,
i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely
repudiates the Sâmkhya conception of power or productive
[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]
efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_atîndriya_) and finds
nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements
of operative conditions (_kârana-sâmagrî_), and nothing
in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results
from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1].
Certain general conditions such as relative space (_dik_), time
(_kâla_), the will of Îs'vara, destiny (_adrsta_) are regarded
as the common cause of all effects (_kâryatva-prayojaka_). Those are
called _sâdhârana-kârana_ (common cause) as distinguished from the
specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called
_sâdhârana kârana_. It may not be out of place here to notice that
Nyâya while repudiating transcendental power (_s'akti_) in the mechanism
of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of
metaphysical conditions like merit (_dharma_), which constitutes a
system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical
systems and order of nature.
The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species,
is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained
only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in
presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from
a certain _a priori_ principle like that of causality or identity of
essence [Footnote ref 2].
The material cause such as the clay is technically called the
_samavâyi-kârana_ of the jug. _Samavâya_ means as we have seen
an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kârana is called
_samavâyi_ when its materials are found inseparably connected
with the materials of the effect. Asamavâyi-kârana is that which
produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of
the samavâyi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of
the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the
colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay
in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This
colour of the clay is thus called the asamavâyi cause of the jug.
Any quality (_guna_) or movement which existing in the samavâya
cause in the samavâya relation determines the characteristics of
the effect is called the asamavâyi-kârana. The instrumental
[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]
[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the
Ancient Hindus_, pp. 263-266. _Sarvadars'anasamgraha_ on Buddhism.
_Nyâyamañjarî Bhâsâ-pariccheda_, with _Muktâvalî_ and _Dinakarî_, and
_Tarkasmgraha_. The doctrine of Anyathâsiddhi was systematically
developed from the time of Ganges'a.]
_nimitta_ and accessory (_sahakâri_) causes are those which help the
material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel
and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakãri
causes of the effect.
We know that the Nyâya-Vais'esika regards the effect as nonexistent,
before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it
holds that the gunas in the cause are the causes of the gunas in
the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the
black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an
extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay
jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the
colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important
exception is to be found in the case of the production of
the parimânas of dvyanukas and trasarenus which are not produced
by the parimânas of an anu or a dyanuka, but by their
number as we have already seen.
Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Srsti).
The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems
except the Mîmâmsâ [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyâya-Vais'esika
view Îs'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings
desires to bring about dissolution (_samhâreccho bhavati_). Simultaneously
with it the adrsta force residing in all the souls and
forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act
(_s'akti-pratibandha_). As a result of this no further bodies, senses,
or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about
of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Îs'vara)
the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations
as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to
the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then
all vâyu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated
with dharma, adharma and past impressions (_samskâra_) remain
suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that
souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless,
non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected
with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of
manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the adrsta of souls the
[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and srsti is found only in later
Nyâya-Vais'esika works, but the sûtras of both the systems seem to be
silent on the matter.]
atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the
part of Îs'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to
give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.
At the time of creation, Îs'vara wishes to create and this desire
of Îs'vara works in all the souls as adrsta. This one eternal
desire of Îs'vara under certain
conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya)
as accessory causes (_sahakâri_) helps the disintegration of atoms
and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process
of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation.
When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called
adrsta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this
adrsta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play.
At the time of creation action first begins in the vâyu atoms by
the kinetic function of this adrsta, by the contact of the souls
with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact
with one another and the dvyanukas are formed and then in a
similar way the tryanukas are formed, and thus vâyu originates.
After vâyu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water
atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth
atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the
gross form, the god Brahmâ and all the worlds are created by
Îs'vara and Brahmâ is directed by Îs'vara to do the rest of the
work. Brahmâ thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of
the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Îs'vara brings
about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good
of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they
may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for
the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Îs'vara
arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of
pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in
our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes
or punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyâya
books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahmâ as deputy
for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma
according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and
creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of
men, or that it may be due to a mere play (_lîlâ_) of Îs'vara.
Îs'vara is one, for if there were many Îs'varas they might quarrel.
The will of Îs'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 48-54.]
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but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it
our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of
pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the
exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen.
The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions.
Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications
take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire
(_icchâ_) of Îs'vara may thus be compared with the _icchâ_ of Îs'vara
as we find it in the Yoga system.
Proof of the Existence of Îs'vara.
Sâmkhya asserts that the teleology of the prakrti is sufficient
to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The
Mîmâmsakas, the Cârvâkas, the Buddhists and the Jains all
deny the existence of Îs'vara (God). Nyâya believes that Îs'vara
has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing
atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If
this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement
must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is
Îs'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose,
but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a
collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual
objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world
being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any
other effect. The objection made against this view is that such
effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents
as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers,
oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects
that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have
a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The
answer that Nyâya gives is that the concomitance between two
things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific
peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had
seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had
thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is
fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small
fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead
us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large
volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be
sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?
Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects
are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably
and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore
being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is
Îs'vara. This cause we cannot see, because Îs'vara has no visible
body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that
we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are
not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyâya
answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also
effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not
because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot
be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was
no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point
to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done
it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate
for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots
as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause.
This cause is Îs'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful.
At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our
father who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1].
The Nyâya-Vais'esika Physics.
The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms.
These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity
(or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour,
taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of
heat. Âkâs'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being
only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel
wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination
is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot
exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric
air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.
Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (_dvyanuka_). Two,
three, four, or five dvyanukas form themselves into grosser molecules
of tryanuka, caturanuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was the
generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed
out by Dr B.N. Seal in his _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, that
the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that
[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's _Nyâyamañjarî,_ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's
_Kusumâñjali_ with _Prakâs'a_ and _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunâtha.]
[Footnote 2: _Kadâcit tribhirârabhyate iti tryanukamityucyate, kadâcit
caturbhirârabhyate kadâcit pañcabhiriti yathestam kalpanâ.
Nyâyakandalî_, p. 32.]
they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into
groups of threes, fours, etc., directly, or by the successive addition
of one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l]." Of course the
atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It
must however be noted in this connection that behind this
physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the adrsta, the
will of Îs'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony
with the principle of a "moral government of the universe,"
so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the
due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance
thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer
qualitative changes under the influence of heat (_pâkajotpatti_)"
The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvyanuka into the
atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining
them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge
reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other
molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for
the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'esika
holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then
change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination,
under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine
of _pîlupâka_ (heating of atoms). Nyâya on the other hand thinks
that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities,
but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the
influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyâya directly affects
the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without
effecting a change in the atoms. Nyâya holds that the
heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and
thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is
not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for
such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is
called the doctrine of _pitharapâka_ (heating of molecules). This
is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyâya
and Vais'esika systems [Footnote ref 2].
Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the
[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on _Brhatsamhitâ_ I. 7.]
[Footnote 2: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, pp. 190-191,
_Nyâyamañjarî_, p 438, and Udyotakara's _Vârttika_. There is very little
indication in the Nyâya and _Vais'esika sûtras_ that they had any of
those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of
these matters in the _Vais'esika sûtras_ (VII. 1), the _Nyâya sûtras_ are
almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory
of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after
Vâtsyâyana.]
atoms of the same bhûta or of many bhûtas. According to the
Nyâya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same
bhûta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the
compound of the same bhûta are due only to diverse collocations
of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no
difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed,
since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact
of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and
heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes
etc. in the original bhûta atoms. The change of these physical
characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances
in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the
species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks
bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms
separate bodies with them.
Pras'astapâda (the commentator of Vais'esika) holds that in
the higher compounds of the same bhûta the transformation takes
place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound
molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound
and not in the original atoms of the bhûta entering into the composition
of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd,
the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined
as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the
milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the
original bhûta of which the milk is a modification. The change
as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule
has not to be disintegrated into ksiti or ap atoms. So again in
the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in
the Vais'esika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments
of other bhûtas) are broken up into homogeneous earth
atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal
heat and biomotor force vâyu to form the germ (_kalala_). But
when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the
blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of
the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically
determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm.
These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of
the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1].
This atomic contact is called _ârambhaka-samyoga_.
[Footnote 1: See Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences,_ pp. 104-108, and
_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 33-34, "_S'arîrârambhe paramânava eva kâranam na
s'ukra-s'onitasannipâtah kriyâvibhâgâdinyâyena tayorvinâs'e sati
utpannapâkajaih paramânubhirârambhât, na ca s'ukras'onitaparamânûnâm
kas'cidvis'esah pârthivatvâvis'esât....Pituh s'ukram mâtuh s'onitam
tayos sannipâtânantaram jatharânalasambandhât s'ukra-s'onitârambhakesu
paramânusu pûrvarûpâdivinâs'e samânagunântarotpattau
dvyanukâdikramena kalalas'arirotpattih tatrântahkaranapraves'o...tatra
mâturâhâraraso mâtrayâ samkrâmate, adrstavas'âttatra
punarjatharânalasambandhât kalalârambhakaparamânusu
kriyâvibhâgadinyâyena kalalas'arîre naste samutpannapâkajaih
kalalârambhakaparamânubhiradrstavas'âd
upajâtakriyairâhâraparamânitbhih saha sambhûya
s'arîrântaramârakkyate."_.]
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In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is
another kind of contact called _upastambha_. Thus in the case of
such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms
cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by
the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the
infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar
qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds
are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vâyu atoms form the
inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g.
gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding
upastambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap)
are regarded as physical mixtures.
Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the
stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are
differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of
contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical
action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what
transforms flavour or taste.
Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely
small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally
with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through
the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as
when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency
light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with _parispanda_
of the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-gamana_).
In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound
back--which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the
atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform
the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine
them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable
velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical
combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyâya writer says that
pâka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that
[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_.]
changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates
or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the
same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When
grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of
heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into
such forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].
In the Nyâya-Vais`esika system all action of matter on matter
is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (_prayatna_) is
distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sâmkhya
doctrine which considered everything other than purusa (intelligence)
to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore
to be subject to vibratory motion.
The Origin of Knowledge (Pramâna).
The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the
most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We
have already seen that Sâmkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing
that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the
object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was
then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusa.
The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to
a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence
of the self.
Nyâya-Vais`esika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage
of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably,
and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (_sâmagrî_)
which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well
as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted
and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus
called pramâna or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge
[Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing
[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Nyâyabodhinî_ on _Tarkasamgraha_, pp. 9, 10.]
[Footnote 2: "_Avyabhicârinîmasandigdhârthopalabdhim vidadhatî
bodhâbodhasvabhâvâ sâmagrî pramânam._" _Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 12.
Udyotakara however defined "pramâna" as upalabdhihetu (cause of
knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have
followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyâpâra or movement of
the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with
them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vâcaspati says: "_siddhamindriyâdi,
asiddhañca tatsannikarsâdi vyâpârayannutpâdayan karana eva caritârthah
karnam tvindriyâdi tatsannikarsâdi vâ nânyatra caritarthamiti
sâksâdupalabdhâveva phale vyâprîyate._" _Tâtparyatîkâ_, p. 15.
Thus it
is the action of the senses as pramâna which is the direct cause of
the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken
place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as
causes in some sense. _"Pramâtrprameyayoh. pramâne
caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetuh.
Pramâtrprameye tu phaloddes'ena pravrtte iti taddhetû kathañcit."
Ibid._ p. 16.]
the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only
their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for
sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal
collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of
course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated
from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the
preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.
These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate
cognition as qualification (vis'esana) in determinate perceptions,
the knowledge of linga in inference, the seeing of similar things in
upamâna, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage
of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception,
capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for
the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements
all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce
further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations
that is called pramâna.
Nyâya argues that in the Sâmkhya view knowledge originates
by the transcendent influence of purusa on a particular
state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does
not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains
within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept
(knowledge). The purusa to whom the knowledge belongs, however,
neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as
it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental
contact of the purusa with buddhi is but a mere semblance
or appearance or illusion, then the Sâmkhya has to admit
that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge
is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sâmkhyists have
precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.
There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine
that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the
knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the
rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither
is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the
knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is
evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are
both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes
this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the
object. The doctrine of the Vijñâna vâdins, that it is knowledge
alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also
irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object
in such a manner that knowledge as object should require
the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we
might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also
require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on
_ad infinitum_. Again if pramâna be defined as _prâpana_ (capacity
of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being
momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot
be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called
pramâna. These views moreover do not explain the origin of
knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like
any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same
way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes
intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent
element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production
on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena
are produced [Footnote ref 2].
The four Pramânas of Nyâya.
We know that the Carvâkas admitted perception (_pratyaksa_)
alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the
Vais'esika admitted two sources, pratyaksa and inference (_anumâna_);
Sâmkhya added _s'abda_ (testimony) as the third source;
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 12-26.]
[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gañges'a,
a later naiyâyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of
our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with
the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to
successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure
that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be
successful, I call it valid knowledge. _Tattvacintâmani_, K.
Tarkavâgîs'a's edition, _Prâmânyavâda_.
"The _Vais'esika sûtras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramâna. The
view
that Vais'esika only admitted two pramânas, perception and inference, is
traditionally accepted, _"pratyaksamekamcârvâkâh kanâdasugatau punah
anumânañca taccâpi,_ etc." Pras'astapâda divides all cognition
(_buddhi_)
as _vidyâ_ (right knowledge) and _avidyâ_ (ignorance). Under _avidyâ_ he
counts _sams'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or
error), _anadhyavasâya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who
had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it
may be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidyâ_) is of four kinds,
perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages
(_ârsa_). Interpreting the _Vais'esika sûtras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.
i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy
character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in
themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the
trustworthy character of their author. _Arthâpatti_ (implication) and
_anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also classed as inference and _upamâna_
(analogy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as
faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]
Nyâya adds a fourth, _upamâna_ (analogy). The principle on which
the four-fold division of pramânas depends is that the causal
collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature
or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is
different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of
our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda
(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge
being different in each case, and the manner or conditions
producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be
admitted that inference and s'abda are different pramânas, though
they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyâya
thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamâna
within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production
of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different
pramânas [Footnote ref 1].
Perception (Pratyaksa).
The naiyâyikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which
they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.
These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic
of that element of which they were composed. Thus the
ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of
âkâs'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The
eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.
Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects
by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.
The cognitive senses (_vâk, pâni, pâda, pâyu_, and _upastha_) recognized
in Sâmkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such
for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the
general motor functions of the body.
Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the
contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error
not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such
[Footnote 1: _Sâmagrîbhedâi phalabhedâcca pramânabhedah
Anye eva hi sâmagrîphale pratyaksalingayoh
Anye eva ca sâmagrîphale s'abdopamânayoh. Nyâyamañjari_, p. 33.]
as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just
at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate
[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow,
the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be
counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (_s'abda-pramâna_).
That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact
of the senses with the object is said to be the product of
the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate
(_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perception
is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of
perception in which it appears without any association with name.
Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage
is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics
and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete
experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their
characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no
association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the
names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate
perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyaksa. If at the time
of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known
to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should
be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that
product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results
from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with
the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is
held by the later naiyâyikas that we are not conscious of it
directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first
stage without which the determinate consciousness could not
arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage
in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the
other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.
The contact of the sense with the object is regarded
as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called
samyoga, (2) contact with the gunas (qualities) through the thing
(_samyukta-samavâya_) in which they inhere in samavâya (inseparable)
relation, (3) contact with the gunas (such as colour etc.) in
the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness
(rûpatva), which inhere in the gunas in the samavâya relation.
[Footnote 1: Gañges'a, a later naiyâyika of great reputation, describes
perception as immediate awareness (_pratyaksasya sâksâtkâritvam
laksanam_).]
This species of contact is called samyukta-samaveta-samavâya,
for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour
is in samavâya relation, and in the specific colour there is the
colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavâya
relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavâya
by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory
sense is âkâs'a and the sound exists in âkâs'a in the samavâya
relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar
kind of contact called samaveta-samavâya. (5) The generic
character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived
by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavâya. (6) There is
another kind of contact by which negation (_abhâva_) is perceived,
namely samyukta vis'esana (as qualifying contact). This is so
called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is
qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.
Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in
this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug
is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along
with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen
that Nyâya admits not only the substances and qualities but all
kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly
apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).
The most important thing about the Nyâya-Vais'esika theory
of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the
contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception
of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its
usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception
and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and
the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact
between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge
is indeed _arthaprakâs'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called
perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its
production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with
which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with
the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not
only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with
the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.
The senses according to Nyâya-Vais`esika are material and we have
seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental
(_atîndriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].
The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence,
but is one which is similar to the effects produced by
the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When
I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch
not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the
universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also
with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The
result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _âlocanajñâna_
(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the
memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character
(_sukhasâdhanatvasmrti_) and as a result of that I perceive the
orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref
2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable
object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception
through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant
cause (sahakâri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand
the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon
understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though
this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind,
yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact,
it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and
hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive
intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact
and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is
in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.
Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable
condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses
be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals
associated with them but also with negation. A perception is
erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does
not possess (_atasmimstaditi_) and right knowledge (_pramâ_) is that
which presents an object with a character which it really has
[Footnote 1: _Na khalvatîndriyâ s'aktirasmâbhirupagamyate
yayâ saha na kâryyasya sambandhajñânasambhavah.
Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 69.]
[Footnote 2:
_Sukhâdi manasâ buddhvâ kapitthâdi ca caksusâ
tasya karanatâ tatra manasaivâvagamyate...
...Sambandhagrahanakâle yattatkapitthâdivisayamaksajam
jñânam tadupâdeyâdijñânaphalamiti bhâsyakrtas'cetasi sthitam
sukhasâdhanatvajñânamupâdeyajñânam.
_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]
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(_tadvati tatprakârakânubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of
perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object,
but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions
that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as
a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a
desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate
stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus
far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is
concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the
similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream
that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes
that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing
of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense
is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the
characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by
illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is
no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant
memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This
doctrine of illusion is known as _viparîtakhyâti_ or _anyathâkhyâti._ What
existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (_hrdaye
parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhâsanam_) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'esika
as interpreted by Pras'astapâda and S'rîdhara is in full agreement
with Nyâya in this doctrine of illusion (_bhrama_ or as Vais'esika
calls it _viparyaya_) that the object of illusion is always the right
thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion
consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].
I have pointed out above that Nyâya divided perception into
two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate)
according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vâcaspati
says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a
particular; the perception of an orange at this _avikalpika_ or
_nirvikalpika_ stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the
universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal
[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's _Nyâyavârttika_, p. 37, and Ganges'a's
_Tattvacintâmani,_ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_.]
[Footnote 2: "_Indriyenâlocya marîcîn uccâvacamuccalato
nirvikalpena
grhîtvâ pas'câttatropaghâtadosât viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo
bhrânto jâyate tasmâdvijñânasya uvabhicâro nârthasya,_ Vâcaspati's
_Tâtparyatîkâ_," p. 87.]
[Footnote 3: _Nyâyamañjarî,_ p. 88.]
[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 89 and 184.]
[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 184.]
[Footnote 6: _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 177-181, "_S'uktisamyuktenendriyena
dosasahakârinâ rajatasamskârasacivena sâdrs'yamanurundhatâ
s'uktikâvisayo rajatâdhyavasâyah krtah._"]
it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an
orange."
The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with
the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage,
the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not
as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and
attribute (_jâtyâdisvarûpâvagâhi na tu jâtyâdînâm mitho
vis'esanavis'esyabhâvâvagâhîti yâvat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks
that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated
with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in
perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do
not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary
persons, for the association of the names and relations could be
distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2].
S'rîdhara, in explaining the Vais'esika view, seems to be largely
in agreement with the above view of Vâcaspati. Thus S'rîdhara says
that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived
but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory
of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification
such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the
universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not
consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to
this,"
which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3].
Vâcaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others,
but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite
subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyâya
writers however, following Ganges'a, hold an altogether different
opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge
means the knowledge of mere predication without any association
with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers.
But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa
stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual
cognition and not a psychological stage. They would
[Footnote 1: _Tâtparyatikâ_, p. 81, also _ibid._ p. 91,
"_prathamamâlocito'rthah sâmânyavis'esavân._"]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p.84, "_tasmâdvyutpannasyâpi nâmadheyasmaranâya
pûrvamesitavyo vinaiva nâmadheyamarthapratyayah._"]
[Footnote 3: _Nyâyakandalî,_p. 189 ff., "_atah savikalpakamicchatâ
nirvikalpakamapyesitavyam, tacca na sâmânyamâtram grhnâti bhedasyâpi
pratibhâsanât nâpi svalaksanamâtram sâmânyâkârasyâpi samvedanât
vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhânâcca, kintu sâmânyam
vis'esañcobhayamapi grhnâti yadi paramidam sâmânyamayam vis'esah
ityevam vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarânusandhânavirahât,
pindântarânuvrttigrahanâddhi sâmânyam vivicyate,
vyâvrttigrahanâdvis'esoyamiti vivekah._"]
not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible
to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a
quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate
(_vis'istavais'istyajñânam prati hi vis'esanatâvacchedakaprakâram
jñânam kâranam_) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge
such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow"
can arise it must
be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the
indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected
with universality or any other relations (_jâtyâdiyojanârahitam
vais'istyânavagâhi nisprakârakam nirvikalpakam_) [Footnote ref 2].
But this stage is never psychologically experienced (_atîndriya_)
and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic
conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate
with a subject. Thus Vis'vanâtha says in his Siddhântamuktâvalî,
"the cognition which does not involve relationing
cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know
the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower,
the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of
jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the
predicative quality (_vis'esanatâvacchedaka_) of the predicate 'jug'
which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the
knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative
quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge
of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at
which the universal or the pure predication should be known
and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though
not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably
necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an
universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be
related to the particular with which it is associated.
But both the old and the new schools of Nyâya and Vais'esika
admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which
the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary
particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals
and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the
perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced
by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception
consists in the attribution of jâti (universal), guna (quality),
[Footnote 1: _Tattvacintâmani_ p. 812.]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 809.]
[Footnote 3: _Siddhântamuktâvalî_ on _Bhâsâpariccheda kârikâ_, 58.]
kriyâ (action), nâma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref
1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are
not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication
of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the
false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the
quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a
thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The
same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different
from that which moves. But name is completely different
from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified,
and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it
was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick"
are
altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now
as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference
of the Nyâya ontological position with that of the Buddhists,
for we know that Nyâya and Vais'esika believe jâti, guna
and kriyâ to be different from substance and therefore the predicating
of them of substance as different categories related to it
at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as
erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vâcaspati replies that the
memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make
the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot
in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated
until the second stage through the joint action of memory
is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in
order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in
mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated
with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there
cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the
Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should
identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which
was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual
perception. To this Vâcaspati says that through the help of
memory or past impressions (_samskâra_) this can be considered
as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be
the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is
[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 93-100, "_Pañca caite kalpanâ
bhavanti
jâtikalpanâ, gunakalpanâ, kriyâkalpanâ, nâmakalpanâ dravyakalpanâ ceti,
tâs'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanât kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanât
kalpanâ ucyante._" See Dharmakîrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4.
See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]
present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an
effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an
object of past experience refers to a past time and place and
is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with
an object which is experienced at the present moment. It
has to be admitted that Vâcaspati's answer is not very satisfactory
for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception
which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see
that early Nyâya-Vais'esika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception
as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and
differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with
the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual
development of perception as the progressive effects of causal
operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the
self and the object under the influence of various intellectual
(e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes,
it does not, like Vedânta, require that right perception should only
give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation
as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon
the variety of causal collocations.
Mind according to Nyâya is regarded as a separate sense
and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy
and will. The later Nyâya writers speak of three other kinds
of contact of a transcendental nature called _sâmânyalaksana,
jñânalaksana_ and _yogaja_ (miraculous). The contact sâmânyalaksana
is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a
particular we are transcendentally (_alaukika_) in contact with all
the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding
universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and
through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated
with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all
smoke in general. Jñânalaksana contact is that by virtue of which
we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving
by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of
sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only,
but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact
of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental
contact (_alaukika sannikarsa_) by virtue of which this is rendered
[Footnote 1: _Tâtparyatîkâ_, pp. 88-95.]
possible is called jñânalaksana. But the knowledge acquired by
these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].
Pleasures and pains (_sukha_ and _duhkha_) are held by Nyâya
to be different from knowledge (jñâna). For knowledge interprets,
conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to
appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel
that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot
be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then
that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated
the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should
have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not
happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might
not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's
sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,
it is evident that there must be some differences between the
pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,
and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case
was associated with sukha and in another case with duhkha,
This shows that sukha and duhkha are not themselves knowledge.
Such is the course of things that sukha and duhkha are generated
by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through
or in association with other objects either in direct perception or
in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in
the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be
remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes
in their production.
The yogins are believed to have the pratyaksa of the most
distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power
by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive
the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their
mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions
of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may
have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"
[Footnote 1:_Siddhântamuktâvalî_ on _Kârikâ_ 63 and 64. We must remember
that Ganges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the
_Nyâya sûtra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception
should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character
of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception
as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle
(_Tattvacintâmani_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him
as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the
definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by
Udyotakara as mentioned above.]
and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhânajñâna,
which is also to be regarded as a pratyaksa directly
by the mind. This is of course different from the other form
of perception called mânasa-pratyaksa, by which memories of
past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept
visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive
that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the
eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual
percept with it. According to Vedânta this acquired perception
is only a case of inference. The prâtibha-pratyaksa however is
that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.
When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective
cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to
the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by
the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition
which had already been generated in the soul. This second
reperception is called anuvyavasâya, and all practical work can
proceed as a result of this anuvyavasâya [Footnote ref. l].
Inference.
Inference (_anumâna_) is the second means of proof (prâmâna)
and the most valuable contribution that Nyâya has made has
been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a
thing on the strength of the mark or liñga which is associated
with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember
that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire
in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically
called liñga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been
made (the hill in this example) is called paksa, and the term
"fire" is called sâdhya. To make a correct inference it is
necessary that the hetu or liñga must be present in the paksa,
[Footnote 1: This later Nyâya doctrine that the cognition of self in
association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be
contrasted with the _triputîpratyaksa_ doctrine of Prabhâkara, which
holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously
in knowledge. Vyavasâya (determinate cognition), according to Ganges'a,
gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am
aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding
the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasâya (cognition), "_idamaham
jânâmîti vyavasâye na bhâsate taddhakendriyasannikarsâbhâvât
kintvidamvisayakajñânatvavis'istasya jñânasya vais'istyamâtmani
bhâsate; na ca svaprakâs'e vyavasâya tâdrs'am svasya vais'istyam
bhâsitumarhati, pûrvam vis'esanasya tasyâjñânât, tasmâdidamaham
jânâmiti na vyavasâyah kintu anuvyavasâyah." _Tattvacintâmani_, p.
795.]
and in all other known objects similar to the paksa in having the
sâdhya in it (sapaksa-sattâ), i.e., which are known to possess the
sâdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liñga must
not be present in any such object as does not possess the
sâdhya (_vipaksa-vyâvrtti_ absent from vipaksa or that which does
not possess the sâdhya). The inferred assertion should not be
such that it is invalidated by direct perception {_pratyaksa_) or
the testimony of the s'âstra (_abâdhita-visayatva_). The liñga
should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way
could also be possible (_asat-pratipaksa_). The violation of any
one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu
as determining the inference, and thus would only make the
hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvâbhâsa or
seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made.
Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible
is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the
paksa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvâbhâsa is technically
called _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvâbhâsa of the second type,
technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the case
that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being
created" is present in the opposite of sâdhya {_vipaksa_), namely
non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality
which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type,
technically called _anaikântika-hetu_, is found in the case that
sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being
an object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is
present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sâdhya), as well
as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the
sâdhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the
sâdhya is not absolute (_anaikântika_). A fallacy of the fourth
type, technically called _kâlâtyayâpadista_, may be found in the
example--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc.
Here pratyaksa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is
fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called _prakaranasama_, is to be
found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same
time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,
[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyâya did not believe in the
doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mîmâmsâ did. Eternality
of sound meant with Mîmâmsâ the theory that sounds existed as eternal
indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under
certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of
movement of the vocal muscles.]
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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like
âkâs'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.
The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against
inference by the Cârvâkas, that inferential arguments are
valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity
of nature in two relations, viz. _tâdâtmya_ (essential
identity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and
effect). Tâdâtmya is a relation of genus and species and not
of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer
that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related
to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of
the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a
pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity
(_tâdâtmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of
succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.
Nyâya holds that inference is made because of the invariable
association (_niyama_) of the linga or hetu (the concomitance of
which with the sâdhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions
noted above) with the sâdhya, and not because of such specific
relations as tâdâtmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the
inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the
essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument
that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;
for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both
ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a
pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with
those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential
identity, but to the invariable association of the linga (mark)
with the lingin (the possessor of linga), otherwise called niyama.
The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)
is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the
case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of
other types of inference, where the association as cause and
effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is
inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the
linga with the lingin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted
above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].
We perceived in many cases that a linga (e.g. smoke) was
associated with a lingin (fire), and had thence formed the notion
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjari_ on anumâna.]
that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we
perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered
the concomitance (_vyâpti_) of smoke and fire which we had
observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill,
which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we
concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the
linga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its
concomitance with fire (_trtîya-linga-parâmars'a) is thus the cause
(_anumitikarana_ or _anumâna_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The
concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyâpti._ When
this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with
those having fire, it is called _bahirvyâpti_; and when it refers to the
conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any
relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was
observed, it is called _antarvyâpti._ The Buddhists since they did
not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyâpti
view of concomitance to bahirvyâpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref
1].
Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference
will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign
(_hetu_) with the signate (_sâdhya_), how are we to assure ourselves in
each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyâptigraha_)
had been correct, and the observation of concomitance
had been valid. The Mîmâmsâ school held, as we shall see in
the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case
in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases
I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there
was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.
But Nyâya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where
there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in
all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any
smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should
be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire
should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically
called _anvayavyâpti_ and the latter _vyatirekavyâpti._ But even this
is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a
hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have
been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but
it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,
[Footnote 1: See _Antarvyâptisamarthana,_ by Ratnâkaras'ânti in the _Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]
or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It
may be that one might never have observed smoke without an
antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even
that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in
a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass
produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained
the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately
followed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanam
yato vinâ na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'anam, Nyâyamañjarî,_
p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of
concomitance (_vyâpti_} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But
of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the
above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu,
and there might be some other condition (_upâdhi_) associated
with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire
in green wood (_ârdrendhana_) produced smoke, but one might
doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced
smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it.
But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged
in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would
have to be dispensed with (_vyâghâta_). Thus such doubts as
lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or
unsettle the notion of vyâpti or concomitance at which we
had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The
Buddhists and the naiyâyikas generally agreed as to the method
of forming the notion of concomitance or vyâpti (_vyâptigraha_),
but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance
always depended on a relation of cause and effect
or of identity of essence, whereas Nyâya held that neither the
relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of
genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was
quite a number of other types of inference which could not be
brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the
tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening
other things would happen could certainly exist, even
without the supposition of an identity of essence.
But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often
have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to
[Footnote 1: See _Tâtparyatîkâ_ on anumâna and vyâptigraha.]
[Footnote 2: _Tâtparyatîkâ_ on vyâptigraha, and _Tattvacintâmani_ of
Ganges'a on vyâptigraha.]
infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyâya holds however
that though different causes are often found to produce
the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one
effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its
other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found
that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other
effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy
downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water
of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of
the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits
that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the
rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street
of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances,
the special manner in which the water flows by small
rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was
due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we
see that Nyâya relied on empirical induction based on uniform
and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists
assumed _a priori_ principles of causality or identity of essence.
It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyâya
works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves
assured that there was no such upâdhi (condition) associated with
the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but
that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sâdhya in
a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce
smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to
produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition
(_upâdhi_) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on
account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and
so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in
the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so
in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the
validity of vyâpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that
there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned
the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide
experience (_bhûyodars'ana_).
Pras'astapâda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that
(e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of
the reason" described a valid reason (_linga_) as that which is connected
with the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which exists
wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyâya
qualifications of _paksasattva, sapaksasattva and _vipaksâsattva_ of
a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapâda further quotes a verse to say
that this is the same as what Kâs'yapa (believed to be the family
name of Kanâda) said. Kanâda says that we can infer a cause
from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one
thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition
or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We
can infer by a reason because it is duly associated
(_prasiddhipûrvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this
association was according to Kanâda can also be understood for
he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association,
the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred
or it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful
existence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has
horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns.
Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for
there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though
a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The
first fallacy is a combination of paksâsattva and sapaksâsattva,
for not only the present paksa (the ass) had no horns, but no
horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipaksasattva,
for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus,
it seems that when Pras'astapâda says that he is giving us the view
of Kanâda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapâda says that wherever
there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.
When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the
smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that
there is fire. But with regard to Kanâda's enumeration of types of
inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect
from the cause," etc., Pras'astapâda holds that these are not the
only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing
the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection
such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides
inference into two classes, drsta (from the experienced characteristics
of one member of a class to another member of the same
class), and sâmânyato drsta. Drsta (perceived resemblance) is
that where the previously known case and the inferred case is
exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point
out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of
flesh on its neck (_sâsnâ_), I can whenever I see the same hanging mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But
when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended
to a different class of objects, it is called sâmânyato drsta.
Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded
with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests,
namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with
the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of
heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'citârtha_)
is expressed in five premisses for convincing others
who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then
the inference is called parârthânumâna. We know that the distinction
of svârthânumâna (inference for oneself) and parârthânumâna
(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.
Pras'astapâda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes
of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be
conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is
called parârthânumâna. But this need not be considered as an
entirely new innovation of Pras'astapâda, for in IX. 2, Kanâda
himself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyedam
kâryyakâranasambandhas'câvayavâdbhavati_). The five premisses which are
called in Nyâya _pratijñâ, hetu drstânta, upanaya,_ and _nigamana_
are called in Vais'esika _pratijñâ, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhâna_,
and _pratyâmnâya_. Kanâda however does not mention the name
of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijñâ
is
of course the same as we have in Nyâya, and the term nidars'ana is
very similar to Nyâya drstânta, but the last two are entirely
different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence
(e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of
an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has
no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]).
He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example
{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyâbhûsana says that "An example before the time
of
Dignâga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the
understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has
smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asanga made the example more serviceable
to reasoning, but Dignâga converted it into a universal proposition, that
is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection
between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because
it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (_Indian Logic_,
pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vâtsyâyana had an imperfect example
as "like a kitchen" (_s'abdah utpatvidharmakatvâdanuyah
sthâlyâdivat_,
I.i. 36), but Pras'astapâda has it in the proper form. Whether
Pras'astapâda borrowed it from Dignnâga or Dignnâga from Pras'astapâda
cannot be easily settled.]
(_nidars'anâbhâsa_). Pras'astapâda's contribution thus seems to consist
of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of
the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so
different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable
to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional
Vais'esika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely
indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being
pursued in Vais'esika circles independently of Nyâya. There is
no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapâda borrowed anything
from Dinnâga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes,
for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapâda's apparent innovations
are all definitely alluded to by Kanâda himself, and
Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the
question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved
that Dinnâga preceded Pras'astapâda, there is no reason whatever
to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].
The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most
important part of inference. Vâtsyâyana says that an inference
can be made by the sight of the linga (reason or middle) through
the memory of the connection between the middle and the major
previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it
is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the
connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded
as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to
inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is
_lingaparâmars'a_, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the
minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major,
for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection,
but the present perception of the middle associated with
the memory of the connection (_smrtyanugrhîto lingaparâmars'o_).
But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.
Udyotakara's criticisms of Dinnâga as shown by Vâcaspati have
no reference to this point The doctrine of _tâdâtmya_ and _tadutpatti_
was therefore in all probability a new contribution to
Buddhist logic by Dharmakîrtti. Dharmakîrtti's contention was
that the root principle of the connection between the middle and
the major was that the former was either identical in essence
with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a
mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us
[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda's bhâsya with _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 200-255.]
the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vâcaspati in his refutation of
this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a
separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence
such that there being fire there is smoke and there being
no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with
perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the
smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless
it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated,
it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately
preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of
argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is
known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke
can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time
and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many
cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause
and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this
morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of
identity of essence (_tâdâtmya_ as in the case of the pine and the
tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be
inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any
inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described
in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are
naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when
such is the case, though we may not know any further about the
nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former
and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under
certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there
may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate
the validity of inference. To this Vâcaspati's answer is that if
even after observing a large number of cases and careful search
such conditions (_upâdhi_) cannot be discovered, we have to take
it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural
connection between the middle and the major. The later
Buddhists introduced the method of _Pañcakâranî_ in order to
determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions
determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the
effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate
succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in
[Footnote 1: _Kâryyakâranubhâvâdvâ svabhâvâdva niyâmakât
avinâbhâvaniyamo'
dars'anânna na dars'anât. Tâtparyatîkâ_, p. 105.]
immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method
cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause
and effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect
relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better
to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect
relation [Footnote ref 1].
In early Nyâya books three kinds of inference are described,
namely pûrvavat, s'esavat, and sâmânyato-drsta. Pûrvavat is the
inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from
heavy dark clouds; s'esavat is the inference of causes from effects,
e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; sâmânyato-drsta
refers to the inference in all cases other than those of
cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the
tamarind from its form and colour. _Nyâyamañjarî_ mentions
another form of anumâna, namely paris'esamâna (_reductio ad
absurdum_), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness)
of any other thing (e.g. âtman), because it was already
definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any
other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to
anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of
these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely
that of the inference of the probandum (_sâdhya_) by virtue of the
unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called
the vyâpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyâya (Navya-Nyâya)
a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an
important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalânvayi, and
kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the
vyâpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of
instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence,
as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever
there is smoke there is fire (_anvaya_), and where there is no fire,
there is no smoke (_vyatireka_)). An inference could be for one's
own self (_svârthânumâna_) or for the sake of convincing others
(_parârthânumâna_). In the latter case, when it was necessary that
an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner,
live propositions (_avayavas_) were regarded as necessary, namely
pratijña (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udâharana
(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),
upanaya (this hill has smoke), nigamana (therefore it has got
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana's bhâsya, Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ and
_Tâtparyyatîkâ,_ I.i. 5.]
fire). Kevalânvayi is that type of inference, the vyâpti of which
could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case
"this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge
(_idam, vâcyam prameyatvât_)." Now no such case is known which
is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any
case where there was no object of knowledge (_prameyatva_) and
no name (_vâcyatva_); the vyâpti here has therefore to be based
necessarily on cases of agreement--wherever there is prameyatva
or an object of knowledge, there is vâcyatva or name.
The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances
in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the
inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing
the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from
other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident
that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the
concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There
is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our
inference--earth differs from other elements, since it has the
special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in
those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such
special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.
Upamâna and S'abda.
The third pramâna, which is admitted by Nyâya and not by
Vais'esika, is _upamâna_, and consists in associating a thing unknown
before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some
other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never
seen a wild ox (_gavaya_) goes to the forest, asks a forester--"what
is gavaya?" and the forester replies--"oh, you do not
know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the
forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to
be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya.
This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its
similarity to a known thing is called _upamâna_. If some forester
had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him
that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have
known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would
have been due to testimony (_s'abda-pramana). The knowledge is
said to be generated by the upamâna process when the association
of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer
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on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown
animal to a known one. The naiyâyikas are thorough
realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of
similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind.
Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the
association of the name in accordance with the perception of
similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is
called _upamâna_ [Footnote ref 1].
S'abda-pramâna or testimony is the right knowledge which
we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful
persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the
Vedas were uttered by Îs'vara himself. The Vedas give us
right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the
utterances of the infallible Îs'vara. The Vais'esikas did not admit
s'abda as a separate pramâna, but they sought to establish the
validity of testimony (_s'abda_) on the strength of inference (_anumiti_)
on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible
person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly
corroborated by the Vais'esika sûtras, which tacitly admit the
validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this
was how Vais'esika was interpreted in later times.
Negation in Nyâya-Vais'esika.
The problem of negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) is of great interest
in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only
from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumârila [Footnote ref 2]
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_ on upamâna. The oldest Nyâya view was
that
the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association
of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself
"upamâna." When Pras'astapâda held that upamâna should be treated
as a
case of testimony (_âptavacana_), he had probably this interpretation
in view. But Udyotakara and Vâcaspati hold that it was not by the
instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name
"wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and
the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the
perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories
that lead us to this association called upamâna. What Vâtsyâyana
meant is not very clear, but Dinnâga supposes that according to
him the result of upamâna was the knowledge of similarity or the
knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vâcaspati of course holds that
he has correctly interpreted Vâtsyâyana's intention. It is however
definite that upamâna means the associating of a name to a new object
(_samâkhyâsambandhapratipattirupamânârthah_, Vâtsyâyana). Jayanta
points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly
leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of
the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently
it cannot be classed under testimony (_s'abda_). See Pras'astapâda
and _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 220-22, Vâtsyâyana, Udyotakara, Vâcaspati and
Jayanta on _Upamâna_.]
[Footnote 2: See Kumârila's treatment of abhâva in the _S'lokavârttika_,
pp. 473-492.]
and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the
next chapter, hold that negation (_abhâva_) appears as an intuition
(_mânam_) with reference to the object negated where there are no
means of ordinary cognition (_pramâna_) leading to prove the existence
(_satparicchedakam_) of that thing. They held that the notion
"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no
contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when
we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence
of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and
the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see
neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged
that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say
the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even
then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact,
which is absent in the other case, we could never say
that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and
remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises
the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual
perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were
no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence
at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he
is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where
he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware
of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even
without perceiving the place and without any operation of the
memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of
there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence,
for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind,
and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could
be regarded as a reason (_linga_), for the non-perception of the jug
is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no
concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and
its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of
non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty
about the notion of non-existence (_abhâva_) which was sought
to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be
admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process
of knowledge. Nyâya however says that the perception of
non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception
of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g. there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the
ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug
arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and
there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground
should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of
the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due
to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug
is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle
that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact
with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or
non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even
without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance,
and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact.
It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required
in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation
or non-existence of other places which are far away from him.
To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary
that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a
thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only
be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as
well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension
of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to
be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence
but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived
before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence
(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) can thus, according
to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive
existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere
vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not,"
as position (_bhâva_) is what generates the cognition "it is."
The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold
that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with
specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now);
but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think
that negation could thus be associated with them in any
relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its
_pratiyogi_ (thing negated--e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for
when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there
is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the
relation of opposition (_virodha_), for we could have admitted it, if the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug,
for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without
effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation
is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the
nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it
will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it
will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or
that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception,
e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception--there
is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâranânupalabdhi
(non-perception of cause--there is no smoke here, since there is
no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species--there
is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi
(non-perception of effects--there are not the causes of smoke here,
since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception
of contradictory natures--there is no cold touch here because
of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory
effects--there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7)
virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance--past is not of necessity
destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi
(opposition of effects--there is not here the causes
which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi
(opposite concomitants--there is no touch of snow here,
because of fire); (10) kâranaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes--there
is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);
(11) kâranaviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes--this
place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it
is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).
There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation,
but that does not prove that there is any reason for the
cognition of negation (_heturnâbhâvasamvidah_). All that we can
say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use
(_yogyatâ_) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ
is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage
as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.
Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of
negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions
which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive
perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu_, p. 11, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 53-7.]
leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug
(_anupalambhah abhâvam vyavahârayati_) [Footnote ref 1].
The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive
existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we
have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said
that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception
of the ground without the jug. But is this being without
the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then
it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even
when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over
the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a
distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground
with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground,
without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter
much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation
is apprehended by perception as much as any positive
existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different;
just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects
there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of
negation with space and time with which it appears associated is
the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality
(_vis'esya vis'esana_). The relation between the negation and its
pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is
the other is not. The _Vais'esika sûtra_ (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva
in a similar way as Kumârila the Mimamsist does, though the
commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'esika
the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _prâgabhâva_ (the
negation preceding the production of an object--e.g. of the jug
before it is made by the potter); (2) _dhvamsâbhâva_ (the negation
following the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it is
destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyonyâbhâva_ (mutual
negation--e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindutîkâ_, pp. 34 ff., and also
_Nyâyamañjarî_,
pp. 48-63.]
[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the
sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign
of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the
non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_linga_) of its
non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for
he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses
(_bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagrahanayogyah_) and that there is an actual
sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the
preception of non-existence (_abhâvendriyasannikarso'pi
abhâvagrahanasâmagrî_), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]
in the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyantâbhâva_ (a negation which
always exists--e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in
other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].
The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices
for the seeker of Salvation.
It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere
of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence
of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do
not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are
_tarka_, _nirnaya_, _vâda_, _jalpa_, _vitandâ_, _hetvâbhâsa_, _chala_,
_jâti_ and _nigrahasthâna_.
Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern
its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of
some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not
inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right
conclusion. When there is doubt (_sams'aya_) about the specific
nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nirnaya means the
conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two
opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the
doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them
tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is
called a _vâda_. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants
give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents.
A jalpa is called a _vitandâ_ when it is only a destructive
criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without
seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas
are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. _Nyâya_
sûtras enumerate five fallacies (_hetvâbhâsas_) of the middle (hetu):
_savyabhicâra_ (erratic), _viruddha_ (contradictory), _prakaranasama_
(tautology), _sâddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _kâlâtîta _(inopportune).
Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove
opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible
like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because
it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha
is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a
jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakaranasama is that
[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with
reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects,
and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]
where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form
(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of
eternality); sâdhyasama is that where the reason itself requires
to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion,
but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);
kâlâtîta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not
tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that
sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the
drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and
the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour
is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was
already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the
case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the
stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.
The later Nyâya works divide savyabhicâra into three classes,
(1) sâdhârana or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is
an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire
is also an object of knowledge), (2) asâdhârana or too restricted
(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this
cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the
sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasamhârin or unsubsuming
(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of
knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be
found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion
may also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipaksa_ is that in
which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite
conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is
non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal)
is of three kinds (i) _âs'rayâsiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant
because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in
the sky), (2) _svarûpâsiddha_ (sound is a quality because it is
visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyâpyatvâsiddha_ is that
where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence
is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because
there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red
hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated
with smoke. The fallacy _bâdhita_ is that which pretends to prove
a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot
because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the
fallacies counted by Vais'esika. Contrary to Nyâya practice Pras'astapâda counts the fallacies of the example. Dinnâga also
counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is
incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;
but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakîrtti counted also the
fallacies of the paksa (minor); but Nyâya rightly considers that
the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard
inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the
intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the
purpose of defeating him. Jâti consists in the drawing of contradictory
conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with
the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthâna
means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving
self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is
conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious
opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating
tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical
work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to
emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamañjarî_ that these
had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant
disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.
If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the
pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,
and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding
onward for the attainment of moksa should acquire these devices
for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge
of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyâya sûtra as
being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].
The doctrine of Soul.
Dhûrtta Cârvâkas denied the existence of soul and regarded
consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were
other Cârvâkas called Sus'iksita Cârvâkas who admitted the
existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.
The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.
The naiyâyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics
mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.
They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing,
etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 586-659, and _Târkikaraksâ_ of
Varadarâja and _Niskantaka_ of Mallinâtha, pp. 185 ff.]
some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self
is not proved according to Nyâya merely by the notion of our
self-consciousness, as in the case of Mîmâmsâ, for Nyâya holds
that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may
be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or
I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot
be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we
cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the
inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to
which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced
as a result of collocations. Never has the production of
âtman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any
destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not
located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at
the same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel with
the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though
âtman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are
seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation
of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested
or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness
as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].
Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different
facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than
the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and
pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures
and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be
due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed
in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world
must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as
the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.
Îs'vara and Salvation.
Nyâya seeks to establish the existence of Îs'vara on the basis of
inference. We know that the Jains, the Sâmkhya and the Buddhists did
not believe in the existence of Îs'vara and offered many antitheistic
arguments. Nyâya wanted to refute these and prove the existence
of Is'vara by an inference of the sâmânyato-drsta type.
[Footnote 1:_Jñânasamavâyanibandhanamevâtmanas'cetayitrtvam_, &c.
See
_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 432 ff.]
The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the
world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never
produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to
this view the Nyâya holds that the world as a whole is also an
effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips
occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in
nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a
result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the
atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of
the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a
difference between the order and arrangement of human productions
(e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe;
and therefore from the order and arrangement(_sannives'a-vis'istatâ_)
of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was
produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and
arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator
or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyâya answers that the
concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement"
in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with
specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case
may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar
other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same
kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard
the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider
the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general.
So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and
arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and
thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be
different from the order and arrangement of things produced by
man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would
not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many
effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground
without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold,
for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created
by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has
a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in
its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order
and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an
effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator.
Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes, so Îs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus
omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not
require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without
any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is
always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the
karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or
protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the
results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless
can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in
the external world, so Îs'vara also can by his will create the
universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any
association of body with Îs'vara is indispensable for our conception
of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body,
so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of
our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements
are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].
The naiyâyikas in common with most other systems of Indian
philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that
the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of
sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (_sarvam
duhkham vivekinah_); the wise therefore is never attached to the
so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.
The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithyâjñâna_)
which consists in thinking as my own self that which
is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge;
when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and
as Nyâya says, of the proofs (_pramâna_), the objects of knowledge
(_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference is
attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can
be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (_pratipaksabhâvanâ_),
namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any
pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but
pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it
will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction
of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and
ignorance about them (collectively called dosa, cf. the kles'a of
Patañjali) are also destroyed.
With the destruction of attachment actions (_pravrtti_) for the
[Footnote:1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 190-204,_ Îs'varânumâna_ of
Raghunâtha
S'iromani and Udayana's _Kusumâñjalî_.]
fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with
it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment,
actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the
production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of
sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all
its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains
in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyâya-Vais'esika
is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a
state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in
its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness
in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute
happiness (_ânanda_), though really speaking the state of mukti
can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in
its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain,
knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].
[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 499-533.]
Suggested Further Reading
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| Source:
A History Of Indian Philosophy Surendranath Dasgupta Volume I
First Edition: Cambridge, 1922. Produced by Srinivasan Sriram
and sripedia.org, William Boerst and PG Distributed
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