|
|
Such an advance had however already begun in the Upanishads which had anticipated the new systems in all these
directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew
their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the
Upanisads, and built their systems independently by their own
rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upanisads were
thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas,
it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp
such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to
harmonize the suggestions of the Upanisads and of the sacrificial
creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent
and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are
indeed fulfilled in the Sâmkhya philosophy, germs of which may
be discovered in the Upanisads.
The Germs of Sâmkhya in the Upanisads.
It is indeed true that in the Upanisads there is a large number
of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the
infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing
forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the
earliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice,
and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result
[Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upanisads this Brahman appears
as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived
their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages
for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of
development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level
in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored,
and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the
only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the
monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was
another line of thought which was developing alongside of it,
which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made
up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara
and particularly in Maitrâyanî from which it appears
that the Sâmkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and
many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the
date of Maitrâyanî has not yet been definitely settled, and the details
[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R.E._).]
[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This
has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]
found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion
of the Sâmkhya thought as it developed in the Upanisads. It is
not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave
some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sâmkhya-Yoga
philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all
the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it
unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanisads with the
doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of
relativism of the Jains.
Sâmkhya and Yoga Literature.
The main exposition of the system of Sâmkhya and Yoga in
this section has been based on the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_, the _Sâmkhya
sűtras_, and the _Yoga sűtras_ of Patańjali with their commentaries
and sub-commentaries. The _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ (about
200 A.D.) was written by Îs'varakrsna. The account of Sâmkhya
given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and
this has been treated separately. Vâcaspati Mis'ra (ninth century
A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudî_. But
before him Gaudapâda and Râjâ wrote commentaries on the
_Sâmkhya kârikâ_ [Footnote ref 1]. Nârâyanatîrtha wrote his _Candrikâ_
on
Gaudapâda's commentary. The _Sâmkhya sűtras_ which have been commented
on by Vijńâna Bhiksu (called _Pravacanabhâsya_) of the
sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author
after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the
fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the
_Sâmkhya sűtras_. Vijńâna Bhiksu wrote also another elementary
work on Sâmkhya known as _Sâmkhyasâra_. Another short work
of late origin is _Tattvasamâsa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two
other works on Sâmkhya, viz Sîmânanda's _Sâmkhyatattvavivecana_
and Bhâvâganes'a's _Sâmkhyatattvayâthârthyadîpana_ (both later
than Vijńânabhiksu) of real philosophical value have also been
freely consulted. Patańjali's _Yoga sűtra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.)
was commented on by Vâysa (400 A.D.) and Vyâsa's bhâsya
commented on by Vâcaspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'âradî_,
by Vijńâna Bhiksu _Yogavârttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century
_Bhojavrtti_, and by Nâges'a (seventeenth century) _Châyâvyâkhyâ_.
[Footnote 1: I suppose that Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_ was the
same
as _Râjavârttika_ quoted by Vâcaspati. Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_
has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamańjarî_, p. 109. This book
is probably now lost.]
Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may
mention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories
of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_
by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published
by the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation
to other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published,
and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication
with the Calcutta University.
Gunaratna mentions two other authoritative Sâmkhya works,
viz. _Mâtharabhâsya_ and _Âtreyatantra_. Of these the second is
probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sâmkhya, for we know
that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it
was called Âtreyasamhitâ or Âtreyatantra. Nothing is known
of the Mâtharabhâsya [Footnote ref 1].
An Early School of Sâmkhya.
It is important for the history of Sâmkhya philosophy that
Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been
dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sâmkhya, should
be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy.
According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhâtus_), viz. the
five elements such as âkâs'a, vâyu etc. and cetanâ, called also
purusa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to
be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five
conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold
prakrti (prakrti, mahat, ahamkâra and the five elements)[Footnote ref
2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence
is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses
there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with
them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate
sensing (_űha_) and conceiving (_vicâra_) before definite understanding
(_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the
combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with
a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance
[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sâmkhya-Yoga may omit the following
three sections at the time of first reading.]
[Footnote 2: Purua is here excluded from the list. Cakrapâni, the
commentator, says that the prakrti and purusa both being unmanifested,
the two together have been counted as one. _Prakrtivyatiriktańcodâsînam
purusamavyaktatvasâdharmyât avyaktâyâm prakrtâveva praksipya
avyaktas'avbdenaiva grhnâti._ Harinâtha Vis'ârada's edition of
_Caraka, S'ârîra_, p. 4.]
of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with
a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance
of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmâtras at all [Footnote ref 1].
The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) or gross matter,
the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhűtas and prakrti, mahat
and ahamkâra taking place through rajas make up what we call
man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases.
All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance,
life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also
the purusa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death,
bondage, or salvation. If the âtman were not regarded as cause,
all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a
permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one
others would be responsible. This purusa, called also _paramâtman_,
is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in
itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it
through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By
ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of purusa
and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action,
cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects
are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but
all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which
is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the
avyakta part of prakrti with purusa as forming one category.
The vikâra or evolutionary products of prakrti are called ksetra,
whereas the avyakta part of prakrti is regarded as the ksetrajńa
(_avyaktamasya ksetrasya ksetrajńamrsayo viduh_). This avyakta
and cetanâ are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested
prakrti or cetanâ is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is
derived the ego (_ahamkâra_) and from the ahamkâra the five
elements and the senses are produced, and when this production
is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time
of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return
back to prakrti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the
time of a new creation from the purusa the unmanifest (_avyakta_),
all the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, ahamkâra,
[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter,
is referred to as forming part of _prakrti_ which is regarded as having
eight elements in it _prakrtis'castadhâtuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat,
ahamkâra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming
part of the prakrti we hear of indriyârthâ, the five sense objects
which have evolved out of the prakrti.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
etc.--appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of
dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and
tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer
this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in
association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself
takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish,
undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will
and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive,
yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are
associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains
are felt by the conglomeration (_râs'i_), and not by the âtman presiding
over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and
pain comes desire (_trsnâ_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and
from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Moksa means complete
cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association
of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the
manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when
there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns
that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves,
but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do
not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last
renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally
extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence
of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote
ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this
state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any
characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sâmkhyas as their
goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are
rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be
enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,
[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary
previous to Cakrapâni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve
back into the prakrti--the purusa--and at the time of rebirth they
become manifest again. See Cakrapâni on s'ârîra, I. 46.]
[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhűta, it is not in any
sense like the Brahman of Vedânta which is of the nature of pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like
absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alaksanam_),
resembling Nâgârjuna's Nirvâna. Thus Caraka
writes:--_tasmims'caramasannyâse saműlâhhsarvavedanâh
asamjńâjńânavijńânâ nivrttim yântyas'esatah. atahparam
brahmabhűto bhűtâtmâ nopalabhyate nihsrtah sarvabhâvebhyah cihnam
yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavidâm brahma taccâksaramalaksanam. Caraka,
S'ârîra_ 1. 98-100.]
the state of moksa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours
in the shape of association with good people, abandoning
of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed
attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva)
thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and
this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self.
As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or
character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation
(_mokse nivrttirnihs'esâ_).
The main features of the Sâmkhya doctrine as given by Caraka
are thus: 1. Purusa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera
of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed
which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmâtras are
not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of
the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of
emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute
existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is
no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the
conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, ahamkâra etc.
6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).
This account of Sâmkhya agrees with the system of Sâmkhya
propounded by Pańcas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of
Âsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the
Mahâbhârata XII. 219. Pańcas'ikha of course does not describe
the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what
little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sâmkhya
he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pańcas'ikha
speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all
Sâmkhya literature to prakrti) in the state of purusa
(_purusâvasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination
of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases
with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a
discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as
the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility.
The same discussion occurs in Pańcas'ikha also, and the proofs
[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:
(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect,
(2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to
remember.]
[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty
in accepting Pańcas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sâmkhya doctrine.
This may probably be due to the fact that the Sâmkhya doctrines sketched
in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]
for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again
Pańcas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions
of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,--and the
element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such
independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the
phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our
suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Moksa
is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these
phenomena. The gunas described by Pańcas'ikha are the different
kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it.
The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the ksetra, as
Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the
last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose
themselves in the ocean and it is called alinga (without any
characteristic)--a term reserved for prakrti in later Sâmkhya.
This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation
which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction
(_samyagbadha_).
Gunaratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of
_Saddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sâmkhya, the
Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these
the doctrine of the Maulikya Sâmkhya is said to be that which
believed that there was a separate pradhâna for each âtman
(_maulikyasâmkhyâ hyâtmânamâtmânam prati prthak pradhânam
vadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sâmkhya doctrine
I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this
represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sâmkhya.
In _Mahâbhârata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sâmkhya are
mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the
school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five
(the well-known orthodox Sâmkhya system) and those who
admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a
supreme being in addition to purusa and this was the twenty-sixth
principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the
form of Sâmkhya advocated in the _Mahâbhârata_. The schools of
Sâmkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here
denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of
Sâmkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the
[Footnote 1: Gunaratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 99.]
other chapters of the _Mahâbhârata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self
apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon
day; it is said that as Râhu (the shadow on the sun during an
eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be
seen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'arîrinah_) are spoken of as
manifesting from prakrti.
We do not know anything about Âsuri the direct disciple
of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of
Sâmkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same
form in the _Mahâbhârata_ and has been attributed there to Pańcas'ikha
is probably the earliest form of Sâmkhya available to us
in a systematic form. Not only does Gunaratna's reference to the
school of Maulikya Sâmkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka
(78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sâmkhya as described by Îs'varakrsna
and referred to in other parts of _Mahâbhârata_ is a definite
proof that Îs'varakrsna's Sâmkhya is a later modification, which
was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as
an authoritative old Sâmkhya view.
Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavâsin altered
the Sâmkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks
that Vindhyavâsin was a title of Îs'varakrsna [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe
holds that the date of Îs'varakrsna was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a
very plausible view that Îs'varakrsna was indebted for his kârikâs to
another work, which was probably written in a style different
from what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Kârikâ_ seems to
be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the
[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Âsuri is quoted by Gunaratna
(_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when
buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (purusa) has experience.
It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]
[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]
[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramârtha's life of
Vasubandhu," _J.
R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be
extremely doubtful, for Gunaratna mentions Îs'varakrsna and
Vindhyavâsin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_
pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavâsin (p. 104) in
anustubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Îs'varakrsnâ. It
appears that Îs'varakrsna wrote two books; one is the _Sâmkhya
kârikâ_ and another an independent work on Sâmkhya, a line from which,
quoted by Gunaratna, stands as follows:
"_Pratiniyatâdhyavasâyah s'rotrâdisamuttha adhyaksam_" (p.
108).
If Vâcaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumâna in his
_Tattvakaumudî_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sâmkhya
kârikâ_ then Îs'varakrsna must be a different person from Vindhyavâsin
whose views on anumâna as referred to in _S'lokavârttika,_ p. 393, are
altogether different. But Vâcaspati's own statement in the
_Tâtparyyatîkâ_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not
faithful.]
_Mahâbhâsya_ of Patańjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1].
The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which
frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned
with the strictly technical part of Sâmkhya, and it is just possible
that the book from which Patańjali quoted the passage, and which
was probably paraphrased in the Âryâ metre by Îs'varakrsna
was not a Sâmkhya book at all. But though the subject of the
verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sâmkhya, yet
since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of
Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard
against certain objections against the Sâmkhya doctrine of
prakrti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the
verse of a Sâmkhya book which was paraphrased by Îs'varakrsna.
The earliest descriptions of a Sâmkhya which agrees with
Îs'varakrsna's Sâmkhya (but with an addition of Îs'vara) are to be
found in Patańjali's _Yoga sűtras_ and in the _Mahâbhârata;_ but we
are pretty certain that the Sâmkhya of Caraka we have sketched
here was known to Patańjali, for in _Yoga sűtra_ I. 19 a reference is
made to a view of Sâmkhya similar to this.
From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sâmkhya
of Caraka and Pańcas'ikha is very important; for it shows a
transitional stage of thought between the Upanisad ideas and
the orthodox Sâmkhya doctrine as represented by Îs'varakrsna.
On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and
that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that
the purusa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyâya,
and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer
than the orthodox Sâmkhya.
We hear of a _Sastitantras'âstra_ as being one of the oldest Sâmkhya
works. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ as
containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote
ref 2]. A quotation from _Râjavârttika_ (a work about which there is no
definite information) in Vâcaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sâmkhya
kârika_(72) says that it was called the _Sastitantra because
it dealt with the existence of prakrti, its oneness, its difference
from purusas, its purposefulness for purusas, the multiplicity of
purusas, connection and separation from purusas, the evolution of
[Footnote 1: Patańjali's Mahâbhâsya, IV. I. 3.
_Atisannikarsâdativiprakarsât műrttyantaravyavadhânât
tamasâvrtatvât indriyadaurvalyâdatipramâdât,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]
[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ,_ pp. 108, 110.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
the categories, the inactivity of the purusas and the five _viparyyayas_,
nine tustis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the
eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].
But the content of the _Sastitantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya
Samhitâ_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sâmkhya
of the _Sastitantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ was of
a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pańcarâtra
Vaisnavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ says that Kapila's
theory of Sâmkhya was a Vaisnava one. Vijńâna Bhiksu, the
greatest expounder of Sâmkhya, says in many places of his work
_Vijńânâmrta Bhâsya_ that Sâmkhya was originally theistic, and that
the atheistic Sâmkhya is only a _praudhivâda_ (an exaggerated
attempt to show that no supposition of Îs'vara is necessary to
explain the world process) though the _Mahâbhârata_ points out
that the difference between Sâmkhya and Yoga is this, that the
former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy
between the two accounts of _Sastitantra_ suggests that the original
_Sastitantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ was
subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is
corroborated by the fact that Gunaratna does not mention among
the important Sâmkhya works _Sastitantra_ but _Sastitantroddhâra_
[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs,
and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karikâ_ of Is'varakrsna, but I
have omitted them in my account of Sâmkhya as these have little
philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five,
viz. avidyâ (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa
(antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo,
moha, mahâmoha, tamisrâ_, and _andhatâmisra_. These are of nine kinds
of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prakrti
will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary
to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's
life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time
(_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhâgya_), and
the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of
causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of
protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things
earned by enjoyment (_parâpara_), increase of desires leading to greater
disappointments (_anuttamâmbhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others
(_uttamâmbhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations
with those who consider prakrti and its evolutes as the self. The
siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of
scriptures (_târa_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutâra_),
(3) proper reasoning (_târatâra_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas
with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field
(_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice
(_sadâmudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and
modamâna lead directly to the separation of the prakrti from the purus'a.
The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses
and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the
absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tustis
and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the
achievement of the Sâmkhya goal.]
(revised edition of _Sastitantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the
earlier Sastitantra was lost even before Vâcaspati's time.
If we believe the Sastitantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya
Samhitâ_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was
composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it
has to be assumed that Kapila's Sâmkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It
seems probable that his disciple Âsuri tried to popularise it. But it
seems that a great change occurred when Pańcas'ikha the disciple of
Âsuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine
differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It
is said in _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ (70) that the literature was divided by
him into many parts (_tena bahudhâkrtam tantram_). The exact
meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that
the original _Sastitantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises.
It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vaisnavas
accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential
parts as the Sâmkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption
that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are
a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the
Pâtańjala Sâmkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may
be ventured is that Pańcas'ikha probably modified Kapila's
work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this
supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of
Sâmkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but
which is kept in a modified form by the Pâtańjala school of Sâmkhya,
second an atheistic one as represented by Pańcas'ikha, and
a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sâmkhya system.
An important change in the Sâmkhya doctrine seems to have
been introduced by Vijńâna Bhiksu (sixteenth century A.D.) by his
treatment of gunas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this
interpretation of Sâmkhya as the most rational and philosophical
one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system
of the accepted Kapila and the Pâtańjala school of Sâmkhya. But
it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gunas was
applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then
they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase
and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the
[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 109.]
[Footnote 2: _evam sadvims'akam prâhah s'arîramth mânavâh sâmkhyam
samkhyâtmakatvâcca kapilâdibhirucyate. Matsyapurâna_, IV. 28.]
totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation
of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijńâna Bhiksu
and the Vaisnava writer Venkata [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga
philosophy compiled by Patańjali and commented on by Vyâsa,
Vâcaspati and Vijńana Bhiksu, agree with the Sâmkhya doctrine
as explained by Vâcaspati and Vijńana Bhiksu in most points I
have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Pâtańjala schools
of Sâmkhya and have treated them together--a principle which
was followed by Haribhadra in his _Saddars'anasamuaccaya_.
The other important Sâmkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapâda
are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanâtana and Vodhu. Nothing is
known about their historicity or doctrines.
Sâmkhya kârikâ, Sâmkhya sűtra, Vâcaspati Mis'ra and
Vijńâna Bhiksu.
A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation
of the Sâmkhya-Yoga system. The _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ is
the oldest Sâmkhya text on which we have commentaries by
later writers. The _Sâmkhya sűtra_ was not referred to by any
writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth
century A.D.). Even Gunaratna of the fourteenth century A D. who
made allusions to a number of Sâmkhya works, did not make any
reference to the _Sâmkhya sűtra_, and no other writer who is known
to have flourished before Gunaratna seems to have made any
reference to the _Sâmkhya sűtra_. The natural conclusion therefore
is that these sűtras were probably written some time after
the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to
prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is
said at the end of the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ of Îs'varakrsna that the
kârikâs give an exposition of the Sâmkhya doctrine excluding
the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the
parables attached to the original Sâmkhya works--the
_Sastitantras'âstra_. The _Sâmkhya sűtras_ contain refutations
of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable
that these were collected from some earlier Sâmkhya work which is
now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition
of the _Sastitantras'âstra_ (_Sastitantroddhâra_ as mentioned by
[Footnote 1: Venkata's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume
of the present work.]
Gűnaratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to
suppose that the Sâmkhya doctrine found in the sűtras differs in
any important way from the Sâmkhya doctrine as found in the
_Sâmkhya kârikâ_. The only point of importance is this, that the
_Sâmkhya sűtras_ hold that when the Upanisads spoke of one absolute
pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved
in the class of intelligent purusas as distinct from the class of
the gunas. As all purusas were of the nature of pure intelligence,
they were spoken of in the Upanisads as one, for they all form
the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some
sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in
the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_. This is, however, a case of omission and not
of difference. Vijńâna Bhiksu, the commentator of the _Sâmkhya
sűtra_, was more inclined to theistic Sâmkhya or Yoga than
to atheistic Sâmkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in
his _Sâmkhyapravacanabhâsya, Yogavârttika_, and _Vijńânâmrtabhasya_
(an independent commentary on the Brahmasűtras of
Bâdarâyana on theistic Sâmkhya lines). Vijńâna Bhiksu's own
view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he
agreed more with the views of the Sâmkhya doctrine of the
Puranas, where both the diverse purusas and the prakrti are said
to be merged in the end in Îs'vara, by whose will the creative
process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya.
He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the
_Sâmkhya sűtras_, but he remarked that these were used only with
a view to showing that the Sâmkhya system gave such a rational
explanation that even without the intervention of an Îs'vara it could
explain all facts. Vijńâna Bhiksu in his interpretation of Sâmkhya
differed on many points from those of Vâcaspati, and it is difficult
to say who is right. Vijńâna Bhiksu has this advantage that
he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points
on which Vâcaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the
nature of the conception of the gunas, which I believe is the most
important thing in Sâmkhya. Vijńâna Bhiksu described the
gunas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vâcaspati and
Gaudapâda (the other commentator of the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_)
remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their
interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of
Vijńâna Bhiksu, but yet while they were silent as to any definite
explanations regarding the nature of the gunas, Bhiksu definitely came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation
of their nature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Since no definite explanation of the gunas is found in any
other work before Bhiksu, it is quite probable that this matter
may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka
nor the _Mahâbhârata_ explains the nature of the gunas. But
Bhiksu's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known
of the manifestations and the workings of the gunas in all early
documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhiksu
in giving my account of the nature of the gunas. The _Kârikâ_
speaks of the gunas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as
being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and
causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vâcaspati
merely paraphrases this statement of the _Kârikâ_ but does not enter
into any further explanations. Bhiksu's interpretation fits in well
with all that is known of the gunas, though it is quite possible
that this view might not have been known before, and when the
original Sâmkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness
as to the conception of the gunas.
There are some other points in which Bhiksu's interpretation
differs from that of Vâcaspati. The most important of these may
be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of
the buddhi states with the purusa. Vâcaspati holds that there is
no contact (_samyoga_) of any buddhi state with the purusa but that
a reflection of the purusa is caught in the state of buddhi by
virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed
into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection
that it does not explain how the purusa can be said to be the
experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection
in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience
(_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any
actual connection of the purusa with the buddhi. The answer of
Vâcaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space
and time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific
kind of fitness (_yogyatâ_) by virtue of which the purusa, though it
remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi,
and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed
to a person. Vijńâna Bhiksu differs from Vâcaspati and says that
if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no reason why purusa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time
of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all,
for the fitness being in the purusa, he could not be divested of it,
and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in
the buddhi for ever. Vijńana Bhiksu thus holds that there is a
real contact of the purusa with the buddhi state in any cognitive
state. Such a contact of the purusa and the buddhi does not
necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on
account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change
means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers
changes, and when these changes are reflected in the purusa, there
is the notion of a person or experiencer in the purusa, and when
the purusa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears
as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between
Vâcaspati and Bhiksu as regards the nature of the perceptual
process. Bhiksu thinks that the senses can directly perceive the
determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas,
whereas Vâcaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the
sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate
sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is
the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at
the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association
by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified
by the activity of manas called samkalpa which coordinates the
indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and
conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics.
Bhiksu who supposes that the determinate character of things is
directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate
position to manas as being only the faculty of desire,
doubt, and imagination.
It may not be out of place to mention here that there are
one or two passages in Vâcaspati's commentary on the _Sâmkhya
kârikâ_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_ahamkâra_)
as producing the subjective series of the senses and the
objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will,
but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not
necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view
with regard to the evolution of the tanmâtras from the mahat;
for contrary to the view of _Vyâsabhâsya_ and Vijńâna Bhiksu etc.
Vâcaspati holds that from the mahat there was ahamkâra and from ahamkâra the tanmâtras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijńâna Bhiksu however
holds that both the separation of ahamkâra and the evolution of the
tanmâtras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more
reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some
other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between
Vâcaspati and Bhiksu which are not of much philosophical
importance.
Yoga and Patańjali.
The word yoga occurs in the Rg-Veda in various senses such
as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection,
and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the
other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was
used in this sense in Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as
the S'atapatha Brâhmana and the Brhadâranyaka Upanisad [Footnote ref 2].
The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature
[Footnote ref 3].
With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the
Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very
much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow
of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues
and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].
As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force
of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of
a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally
applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control
of the senses [Footnote ref 5].
In Pânini's time the word yoga had attained its technical
meaning, and he distinguished this root "_yuj samâdhau_" (_yuj_
in the sense of concentration) from "_yujir yoge_" (root _yujir_ in
the sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as
a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological
derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].
[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]
[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114.
9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahmana 14. 7. I. II.]
[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German
Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]
[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; Brh. I. 2. 6; Brh. III. 8. 10;
Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brâh, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129;
S'atap. Brâh. XI. 5. 8. 1.]
[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriyâni hayânâhuh visayâtesugocarân_.
The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects.
Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriyânyasya hayâh_ the conative senses are its
horses.]
[Footnote 6: _Yugyah_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from
_yuja samâdhau_. A consideration of Panini's rule "Tadasya
brahmacaryam,"
V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which
passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time
(Pânini as Goldstűcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with
these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by
the name of Yoga.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the _Bhagavadgîtâ_, we find that the word yoga has been
used not only in conformity with the root "_yuj-samâdhau_" but
also with "_yujir yoge_" This has been the source of some confusion
to the readers of the _Bhagavadgîtâ._ "Yogin" in the sense
of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded
with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of
this word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ tried to mark out a
middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction
on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action
of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently
from _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the
best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet
abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.
Kautilya in his _Arthas'âstra_ when enumerating the philosophic
sciences of study names Sâmkhya, Yoga, and Lokâyata. The
oldest Buddhist sűtras (e.g. the _Satipatthâna sutta_) are fully
familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus
infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical
method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.
As regards the connection of Yoga with Sâmkhya, as we find
it in the _Yoga sűtras_ of Patańjali, it is indeed difficult to come to
any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted
notice in many of the earlier Upanisads, though there had not
probably developed any systematic form of prânâyâma (a system
of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we
come to Maitrâyanî that we find that the Yoga method had attained
a systematic development. The other two Upanisads in
which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetâs'vatara and
the Katha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three
Upanisads of Krsna Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga
methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to
the Sâmkhya tenets, though the Sâmkhya and Yoga ideas do not
appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of
the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the
Maitrâyanî in the conversation between S'âkyâyana and Brhad
ratha where we find that the Sâmkhya metaphysics was offered in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes,
and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the
Sâmkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the
work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently
systematized by Patańjali. Thus S'âkyâyana says: "Here some
say it is the guna which through the differences of nature goes
into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when
the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the
mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief,
certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but
mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in
his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating
he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and
he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a
man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave,
but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man
stand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign of
liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening
of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness.
All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a
verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together
with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called
the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"
An examination of such Yoga Upanisads as S'ândilya, Yogatattva,
Dhyânabindu, Hamsa, Amrtanâda, Varâha, Mandala
Brâhmana, Nâdabindu, and Yogakundalű, shows that the Yoga
practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but
none of these show any predilection for the Sâmkhya. Thus the
Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana, however, in his bhâsya on _Nyâya sűtra_, I. i
29,
distinguishes Sâmkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sâmkhya holds
that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any
change in the pure intelligence (_niratis'ayâh cetanâh_). All changes
are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects.
Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the purusa.
Dosas (passions) and the pravrtti (action) are the cause of karma.
The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non
being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last
view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyâsabhâsya,_ It is
closer to Nyâya in its doctrines. If Vâtsyâyana's statement is correct,
it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in
creation was borrowed by Sâmkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the
same sűtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sâmkhya
and Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being "_abhautika._"
Curiously
enough Vâtsyâyana quotes a passage from _Vyâsabhâsya,_ III. 13, in his
bhâsya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]
S'aivas and S'aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga;
they grew in another direction as the Hathayoga which
was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through
constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also
associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The
Yogatattva Upanisad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the
Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Hathayoga and Râjayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some
cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedântism
with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in
the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also
very great, but we have to leave out these from our present
consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as
they are not connected with our present endeavour.
Of the Pâtańjala school of Sâmkhya, which forms the subject of
the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patańjali was probably
the most notable person for he not only collected the different
forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which
were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all
on the Sâmkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which
they have been handed down to us. Vâcaspati and Vijńâna
Bhiksu, the two great commentators on the _Vyâsabhâsya_, agree
with us in holding that Patańjali was not the founder of Yoga,
but an editor. Analytic study of the sűtras brings the conviction
that the sűtras do not show any original attempt, but a
masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented
by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also
in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition
and classification shows that the materials were already in
existence and that Patańjali systematized them. There was
no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of
other systems, except as far as they might come in by way of
explaining the system. Patańjal is not even anxious to establish
the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts
as he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists
occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are
described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated
from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are
[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigîsavya wrote
"_Dhâranâs'âstra_" which
dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patańjali.
He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the
nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory
where concentration is to be made. See Vâcaspati's _Tâtparyatîkâ_ or
Vâtsyâyana's bhâsya on _Nyâya sűtra_, III. ii. 43.]
criticized; the putting of an "_iti_" (the word to denote the
conclusion
of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to
denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course
another "_iti_" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the
conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis
seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a
hand other than that of Patańjali who was anxious to supply
some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for
the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of
view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the
supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a
marked change (due either to its supplementary character or
to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last
chapter as compared with the style of the other three.
The sűtras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what
has already been said in the second chapter and some of the
topics introduced are such that they could well have been
dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar
discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter
is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sűtras,
whereas the average number of sűtras in other chapters is between
51 to 55.
We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date
of this famous Yoga author Patańjali. Weber had tried to connect
him with Kâpya Patamchala of S'atapatha Brâhmana [Footnote ref l]; in
Kâtyâyana's _Varttika_ we get the name Patańjali which is explained
by later commentators as _patantah ańjalayah yasmai_ (for
whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed
difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of
names. There is however another theory which identifies the
writer of the great commentary on Pânini called the _Mahâbhâsya_
with the Patańjali of the _Yoga sűtra_. This theory has been
accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of
some Indian commentators who identified the two Patańjalis.
Of these one is the writer of the _Patańjalicarita_ (Râmabhadra
Dîksîta) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth
century. The other is that cited in S'ivarâma's commentary on
_Vâsavadattâ_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century.
The other two are king Bhoja of Dhâr and Cakrapânidatta,
[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
the commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh
century A.D. Thus Cakrapâni says that he adores the Ahipati
(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech
and body by his _Pâtańjala mahâbhâsya_ and the revision of
_Caraka._ Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of
that illustrious sovereign Ranaranigamalla who by composing his
grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patańjala and by
producing a treatise on medicine called _Râjamrgânka_ has like the
lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech,
mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyâsa (which is considered
to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also
based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that
the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion
between the three Patańjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor,
and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as
_Pâtańjalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in his
commentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of
metals.
Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore
in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian
and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these
commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great
commentators of the grammar school such as Bhartrhari, Kaiyyata,
Vâmana, Jayâditya, Nâges'a, etc. are silent on this point.
This is indeed a point against the identification of the two
Patańjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later
age. And if other proofs are available which go against such
an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the
Yoga writer to be the same person.
Let us now see if Patańjali's grammatical work contains anything
which may lead us to think that he was not the same
person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the
philosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patańjalis
differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that
dravya is described in _Vyâsabhâsya_ in one place as being the
unity of species and qualities (_sâmânyavis'esâtmaka_), whereas
the _Mahâbhâsya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also
specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on
either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally
antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by Vyâdi and Vâjapyâyana (Vyâdi holding that words denoted
qualities or dravya and Vâjapyâyana holding that words denoted
species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pânini had these two different ideas in
"_jâtyâkhyâyâmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyâm_" and
"_sarűpânamekas'esamekavibhaktau_," and Patańjali the writer of
the _Mahâbhâsya_ only combined these two views. This does not show
that he opposes the view of _Vyâsabhâsya_, though we must remember
that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard
to the writer of the sűtras. Moreover, when we read that dravya
is spoken of in the _Mahâbhâsya_ as that object which is the
specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is
of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--"_yat
sâsnâlângulakakudakhuravisânyartharűpam_," we are reminded of
its similarity with "_ayutasiddhâvayavabhedânugatah saműhah
dravyam_"
(a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the
_Vyâsabhâsya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahâbhâsya_ I have
not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us
in holding that the two Patańjalis cannot be identified. There
are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even
in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians
that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable
for us to judge anything about the personal views
of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the
writer of the _Mahâbhâsya_ knew most of the important points of
the Sâmkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer
to the guna theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sâmkhya dictum of ex
nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the
idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of
change _vikâra_ as production of new qualities _gunântarâdhâna_
(5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133).
We may add to it that the _Mahâbhâsya_ agrees with the Yoga
view as regards the Sphotavâda, which is not held in common
by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this
external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin
their works in a similar manner (_atha yogânus'âsanam_ and
_athas'âbdânus'âsanam_)--"now begins the compilation of the
instructions on Yoga" (_Yoga sűtrâ_)--and "now begins the
compilation
of the instructions of words" (_Mahâbhâsya_).
It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments
[Footnote 1: Patańjali's _Mahâbhâsya,_ 1. 2. 64.]
which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the
_Yoga sűtra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive,
as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patańjalis
cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the
Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed
Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which,
as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they
were written by Patańjali it cannot be inferred that because
Vâcaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijńâna-vâdi
type, we are to infer that the sűtras refer to Vasubandhu or
even to Nâgârjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sűtras
had been developing long before the time of Nâgârjuna.
Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators
may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two
Patańjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative
critical study of the _Yoga sűtras_ and the text of the _Mahâbhâsya,_
which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga
sűtras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patańjali.
Postponing our views about the time of Patańjali the Yoga
editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing
the other work _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for
our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous
one and he translates it along with another book called _Sânka_
(Sâmkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the
form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that
this book was not the present _Yoga sűtra_ of Patańjali, though it
had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation
and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation.
The book was called by Alberuni _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, which is to
be translated as the book of Pâtańjala, because in another place,
speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when
translated stands as "the author of the book of Pâtanjal." It
had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes
many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It
treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in
the _Yoga sűtra_, but the manner in which these are described (so
[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist
reference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramânakam tadâ kim syât_
(IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyâsabhâsya, as Bhoja, who had
consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count
it as sűtra.]
far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by
Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change
from what we find in the _Yoga sűtra_. Following the idea of God
in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless
emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and
shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they
could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name
of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of
which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives
him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical
with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it
uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption
with him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].
The idea of soul is the same as we find in the _Yoga sűtra._
The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the
eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation
on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation
corresponding to the four stages we have as in the _Yoga
sűtra._ He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation,
of which the first is the _abhyâsa_ (habit) of Patańjali, and the
object of this abhyâsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second
stands for vairâgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek
his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. _Yoga sűtra,_ I. 23 and
I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasâyana
or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the
same as in the _Yoga sűtra,_ II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated
state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being
one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an _urddhvaműla
avâks'âkha as'vattha_ (a tree with roots upwards and branches
below), after the Upanisad fashion, the upper root is pure
Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different
doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of
interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the
roots.
[Footnote 1: Cf. _Yoga sűtra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga sűtras_
speak of Is'vâra (God) as an eternally emancipated purusa, omniscient,
and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the
obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice
are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of
concentration. The commentator Vyâsa notes that he is the best object,
for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills
that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No
argument is given in the _Yoga sűtras_ of the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
The difference of this system from that of the _Yoga sűtra_ is:
(1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance
that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption
in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and
the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the
Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any
connection with God as we find in the _Yoga sűtra_ has been lost
sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in
God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance
of Yoga as control of mental states (_cittarttinirodha_) is lost
sight of, and (7) rasâyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the
means of salvation.
From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification
of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patańjali's _Yoga sűtra_ in
the direction of Vedânta and Tantra, and as such it
probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga
doctrine of the sűtras entered into a new channel in such a way
that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments
of Vedânta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author
mentions rasâyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable
that he flourished after Nâgarjuna and was probably the same
person who wrote _Pâtańjala tantra_, who has been quoted by
S'ivadâsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of
by Nâges'a as "_Carake_ Patańjalih." We can also assume with some
degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that
Cakrapani and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with
the writer of the _Mahâbhâsya. It is also very probable that Cakrapâni
by his line "_pâtańjalamahâbhâsyacarakapratisamskrtaih_"
refers to this work which was called "Pâtańjala." The commentator
of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvîpas and
the sâgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the
_Vyâsabhâsya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably
written at a time when the _Vyâsabhâsya_ was not written
or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni
[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sâmkhya, gives
a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama,
but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of _Pâs'upatadars'ana_ in
_Sarvadas'anasamgraha_.]
also described the book as being very famous at the time, and
Bhoja and Cakrapâni also probably confused him with Patańjali
the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book
of Patańjali was probably written by some other Patańjali within
the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not
be improbable that when _Vyâsabhâsya_ quotes in III. 44 as "_iti_
Patańjalih," he refers to this Patańjali.
The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrâyana
Upanisad consisted of six angas or accessories, namely prânâyâma,
pratyâhâra, dhyâna, dharanâ, tarka and samâdhi [Footnote ref 1].
Comparing this list with that of the list in the _Yoga sűtras_ we find
that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been
replaced by âsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two
heresies given in the _Brahmajâla sutta_ we know that there were
people who either from meditation of three degrees or through
logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external
world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the
association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samâdhi
or Dhyâna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called
s'âs'vatavâda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an anga in
samâdhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the angas given in
Maitrâyanî Upanisad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine,
when the Sâmkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being
grafted on each other, and when the Samkhya method of discussion
did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The
substitution of âsana for tarka in the list of Patańjali shows that
the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Samkhya.
The introduction of ahimsâ (non-injury), satya (truthfulness),
asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha
(want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santosa (contentment)
as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is
deemed impossible (for the first time in the sűtras), probably
marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the
Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrî,
karunâ, muditâ, upeksâ is also equally significant, as we do not
find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other
literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation.
Beginning from the _Âcârângasűtra, Uttarâdhyayanasűtra_,
[Footnote 1: _prânâyâmah pratyâhârah dhyânam dharanâ tarkah
samâdhih
sadanga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8).]
the _Sűtrakrtângasűtra,_ etc., and passing through Umâsvati's
_Tattvârthâdhigamasűtra_ to Hemacandra's _Yogas'âstra_ we find that
the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the
basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the
opinion expressed in Alberuni's _Pâtanjal_ that these cannot give
salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from
the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its
thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection
with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the
same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely
suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the
path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics
of the samsâra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination,
decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of
similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism.
Avidyâ is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyâ should
not be confused with the Vedânta avidyâ of S'ankara, as it is an
avidyâ of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion
nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the
range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyâ is the ignorance
of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sűtra
"_anityâs'uciduhkhânâtmasu nityas'uciduhkhâtmakhyâtiravidyâ_"
(II. 5).
The ground of our existing is our will to live (_abhinives'a_).
"This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be
ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds
of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts
off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of
Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in
the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has
never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu
literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things
in this section is to show that the _Yoga sűtras_ proper (first three
chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of
Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between
the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such
[Footnote 1: _Yoga sűtra,_ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yathâcikitsâs'âstram
caturvyűham rogo rogahetuh ârogyam bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi
s'âstram caturvyűhameva; tadyathâ samsârah, samsârahetuh moksah
moksopâyah; duhkhabahulah samsâro heyah, pradhânapurusayoh
samyogo heyahetuh, samyogasyâtyantikî nivrttirhânam hanopâyah
samyagdar`sanam, Vyâsabhâsya_, II. 15]
[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 1].]
a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another.
As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed
to think that the date of the first three chapters of the _Yoga
sűtras_ must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there
is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the
grammarian Patańjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may
take them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].
The Sâmkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Purusa.
The Sâmkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles,
souls and _prakrti_, the root principle of matter. Souls are
many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities.
They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a
smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are
not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But
the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it
and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the
mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are
many, and had it not been so (the Sâmkhya argues) with the
birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one
all would have died [Footnote ref 2].
The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension,
and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly
grasp in order to understand the Sâmkhya philosophy. Unlike
the Jaina soul possessing _anantajńâna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha_,
and _anantavîryya_, the Sâmkhya soul is described as being
devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute
pure consciousness (_cit_). The Sâmkhya view differs from
the Vedânta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to
be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (_ânanda_) [Footnote ref
3]. Bliss with Sâmkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it
belongs to prakrti and does not constitute the nature of soul;
secondly, according to Vedânta the individual souls (_Jîva_) are
[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian systems of thought,_ ch. II. The most important point in favour
of this identification seems to be that both the Patańjalis as against
the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _sphota_ which was
denied even by Sâmkhya. On the doctrine of Sphota see my _Study
of Patanjali_, Appendix I.]
[Footnote 2: _Kârikâ_, 18.]
[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's _Tattvapradîpikâ,_ IV.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the
Brahman, but according to Sâmkhya they are all real and many.
The most interesting feature of Sâmkhya as of Vedânta is
the analysis of knowledge. Sâmkhya holds that our knowledge
of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things
are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind,
the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in
some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature
like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go,
they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things,
and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material,
but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest.
These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious,
if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection
with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted
as the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the
Upanisads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite
consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas,
and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not
detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle
which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which
illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes.
The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self"
but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other
things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The
Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and
every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the
veil. Sâmkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image
of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent
principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle
matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms
or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance,
and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed
in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves,
the pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated.
So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic
of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would
be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and
[Footnote 1: _Tattakaumudî_ 5; _Yogavârttika_, IV. 22;
_Vijńânâmrtabhâsya_, p. 74; _Yogavârttika_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_,
I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vyâsabhâsya,_ I. 6, 7.]
so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the
same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens
these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious.
This principle of consciousness (_cit_) cannot
indeed be
separately perceived _per se_, but the presence of this principle in
all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference.
This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality,
no impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes
place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it,
and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes
of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item
of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is
but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the
principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge
carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness,
it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness.
Knowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of a
particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation
of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening,
pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is
concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind
knowledge-stuff.
The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent
parts, and had held that the coming together of these
brought about the conscious states. This coming together was
to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity
or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary
collocation. With Sămkhya however the self, the pure _cit_, is
neither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent.
Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements
of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise
have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into
connection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted
as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and
may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the
expression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of
[Footnote 1: It is important to note that Sâmkhya has two terms to denote
the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of
awareness as such (_cit_) and the content (_buddhi_) which is the form
of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition
takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.]
knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a
system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called
purusa. There is a separate purusa in Sâmkhya for each individual,
and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedânta
âtman however is different from the Sâmkhya purusa in this that
it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being,
and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory mâyâ it
appears as many.
Thought and Matter.
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are
made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter
are, why then should the purusa illuminate it and not external
material objects. The answer that Sâmkhya gives is that the
knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects
in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance
of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (_sattva_), which
resembles the light of purusa, and is thus fit for reflecting and
absorbing the light of the purusa. The two principal characteristics
of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it
has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed
by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has
again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able
to catch the reflection of the _cit_--the super-translucent transcendent
principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic
of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to
both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is
at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity
of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the
intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the
gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that
thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of
thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour,
and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its
object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter
did not possess some of the essential substances of which the
copy was made up. But this plastic entity (_sattva_) which is
so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination
in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some
such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have
movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images
do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent
and plastic element of thought (_sattva_) in association with
movement (_rajas_) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation
of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction
(_tamas_) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses
things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff)
holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness,
and actual knowledge comes before our view as though
by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the
light of the purusa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its
stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture
or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates
that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests
itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both
thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a
plasticity of intelligence-stuff (_sattva_), energy-stuff (_rajas_), and
mass-stuff (_tamas_), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last
two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.
Feelings, the Ultimate Substances [Footnote ref 1].
Another question that arises in this connection is the position
of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Sâmkhya
holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have
analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most
interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that
we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we
should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped
sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its
appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and
we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image.
Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of
knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down
the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of
matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling
which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale
of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there
comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling
[Footnote 1: _Kârikâ_, 12, with Gaudpâda and Nârâyanatîrtha.]
reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark
the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the
point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in
ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain
stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at
a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with
matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves,
the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross
matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in
taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross
matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed
to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember
the Sâmkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and
matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances
which are in essence but three types of feeling entities.
The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we
have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations
of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings
that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that
we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither
sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression
(_visâda_) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of
manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as
shining (_prakâs'a_), energy (_pravrtti_), obstruction (_niyama_), there
are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as
the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross
matter and thought by their varying modifications.
The Gunas [Footnote ref 1].
These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically
called _guna_ in Sâmkhya philosophy. Guna in Sanskrit has three
meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These
entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it
may be mentioned in this connection that in Sâmkhya philosophy
there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each
and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What
we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance
of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality
[Footnote 1: _Yogavârttika_, II. 18; Bhâvâganes'a's
_Tattvayâthârthyadîpana_, pp. 1-3; _Vijńânâmrtabhâsya_,
p. 100; _Tattvakaumudî_, 13; also Gaudapâda and Nârâyanatîrtha, 13.]
signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts; any
object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sâmkhya
holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality,
however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding
subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a
quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects
but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities
were thus called gunas probably to suggest that they are the
entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves
as gunas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be
called gunas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes
by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and
matter. These may also be called gunas as things of secondary
importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they
continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual
groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably
constant like the souls (_purusa_). Moreover the object of the
world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the purusas,
the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of
primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined
to justify the name guna as applied to these subtle entities, it
should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or
subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gunas are
infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics
as described above they have been arranged in three classes or types
called _sattva_ (intelligence-stuff), _rajas_ (energy-stuff) and _tamas_
(mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in
certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the
_sattva-gunas_ and those which behave as units of activity are called
the _rajo-gunas_ and those which behave as factors of obstruction,
mass or materiality are called _tamo-gunas_. These subtle guna
substances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number
of sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or a
larger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas and
sattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result
of this, different substances with different qualities come into being.
Though attached to one another when united in different proportions,
they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined
resultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is
however one and only one stage in which the gunas are not compounded
in varying proportions. In this state each of the guna
substances is opposed by each of the other guna substances, and
thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in
which none of the characters of the gunas manifest themselves.
This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics
that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It
is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which
is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium
of the gunas is called prakrti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state which
cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose,
but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the
earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications
take place.
|
|
|
|
|
Prakrti and its Evolution.
Sâmkhya believes that before this world came into being there
was such a state of dissolution--a state in which the guna compounds
had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their
mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakrti. Then
later on disturbance arose in the prakrti, and as a result of that a
process of unequal aggregation of the gunas in varying proportions
took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold.
Prakrti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the
gunas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate,
differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gunas are
always uniting, separating, and uniting again [Footnote ref 2]. Varying
qualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one
another and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve
from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or
qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce
the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies
never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy
there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter,
resistance, stability, is due to tamas, and all conscious manifestation
to sattva. The particular guna which happens to be predominant
in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and
others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their
[Footnote 1: _Yogavârttika,_ II. 19, and _Pravacanabhâsya,_ I. 61.]
[Footnote 2: _Kaumudî_ 13-16; _Tattvavais'âradî_ II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also
_Yogavârttika,_ IV. 13,14.]
effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy
latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a
moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is
partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of
the gunas in different proportions presuppose the state of prakrti
as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to
conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are
exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass,
and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibrium
is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural
affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other
reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there
arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at different
moments. When one guna is preponderant in any particular
collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series
beginning from the first disturbance of the prakrti to the final
transformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite law
which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B.N.Seal [Footnote ref 1],
"the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated
(_vaisamya_) within the undifferentiated (_sâmyâvasthâ_) of the
determinate (_vies'a_) within the indeterminate (_avis'esa_) of the
coherent (_yutasiddha_) within the incoherent (_ayutasiddha_). The
order of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the
parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate,
less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated,
more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such
an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in
the shape of the evolving collocations of guna reals take place
within the body of the prakrti. Prakrti consisting of the infinite
reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not
mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or
that the totality of the gunas in the prakrti has been unhinged
from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast
number of gunas constituting the worlds of thought and matter
has been upset. These gunas once thrown out of balance begin to
group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then
in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of
aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way
that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones,
so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.
[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_,
1915, p.7.]
For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this
second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the
reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first
stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the
second stage is made good by a refilling from the prakrti. So also,
as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals
of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage
is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the
first stage from the prakrti. Thus by a succession of refillings the
process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where
there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical
and physical changes of qualities in things which had already
evolved. Evolution (_tattvântaraparinâma_) in Sâmkhya means the
development of categories of existence and not mere changes of
qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental).
Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent
category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiated
and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus
it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation
of new stages as integrated in previous stages (_samsrstaviveka_).
Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium.
But how or rather why prakrti should be disturbed is the most
knotty point in Sâmkhya. It is postulated that the prakrti or the
sum-total of the gunas is so connected with the purusas, and there
is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prakrti,
that all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sake
of the diverse purusas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and
sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them
to absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world
into the quiescent state (_pralaya_) of prakrti takes place when the
karmas of all purusas collectively require that there should be
such a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment
the guna compounds are gradually broken, and there is a backward
movement (_pratisańcara_) till everything is reduced, to the gunas in
their elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition
brings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a
mere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense
activity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of
new things and qualities (_visadrs'a-parinâma_); this course of new production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same
state (_sadrs'a-parinâma_) of equilibrium, so that there is no change
or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension
of the teleology or purpose of the gunas, or an absolute break of
the course of guna evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it
has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated
karmas of purusas, and since there is still the activity of the
gunas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production,
is also a stage of the samsâra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation)
is of course quite different, for in that stage the movement
of the gunas ceases forever with reference to the liberated soul.
But still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium?
The Sâmkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental
(non-mechanical) influence of the purusa [Footnote ref 1]. This
influence of the purusa again, if it means anything, means that there
is inherent in the gunas a teleology that all their movements or
modifications should take place in such a way that these may serve the
purposes of the purusas. Thus when the karmas of the purusas had demanded
that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period
there was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purpose
of the prakrti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable
world for the experiences of the purusas by which its quiescent
state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the
inherent teleology of the prakrti, which demands that a state of
pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should
begin. Since there is a purpose in the gunas which brought
them to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposes
that it also may be broken up again when the purpose
so demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prakrti brought
about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative
work again, and it is this natural change in the prakrti that may
be regarded from another point of view as the transcendental
influence of the purusas.
Mahat and Ahamkâra.
The first evolute of the prakrti is generated by a preponderance
of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state
from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a
state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds
[Footnote 1: The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the
disturbance of the equilibrium of prakrti for new creation takes place by
the will of Îs'vara (God).]
|
|
|
|
|
|
within it the minds (_buddhi_) of all purusas which were lost in the
prakrti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution
of prakrti to serve the purusas is thus manifested by the separating
out of the old buddhis or minds (of the purusas) which hold within
themselves the old specific ignorance (_avidyâ_) inherent in them
with reference to each purusa with which any particular buddhi
is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This
state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi)
or all the purusas is therefore called _buddhitattva._ It is a state
which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals.
The individual buddhis of individual purusas are on one
hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated
with their specific purusas. When some buddhis once begin to
be separated from the prakrti, other buddhi evolutions take
place. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation
of buddhis is effected for the service of the purusas,
all the other direct transformations that take place from the
prakrti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being
once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations
of prakrti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance,
which thus have exactly the same composition as the
first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prakrti becomes
buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded
as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it
all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of
which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of
view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising
all creation, and is thus called _mahat_ (the great one). It is called
_linga_ (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the
ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished
from the prakrti which is called _alinga,_ i.e. of which no
linga or characterise may be affirmed.
This mahat-tatva being once produced, further modifications
begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of
undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance
and tama preponderance. This state when the mahat
is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of
tamas, rajas and sattva's called _ahamkâra,_ and the above three
tendencies are respectiviy called _tâmasika ahamkâra_ or _bhűtâdi_,
_râjasika_ or _taijasa ahamâra,_ and _vaikârika ahamkâra._ The râjasika
ahamkâra cannot make a new preponderance by itself; it only helps (_sahakâri_) the transformations of the sattva preponderance
and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former
preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more
and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember
that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva
preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on
the line of sattva development could only take place when the
buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first
development of the buddhi on this line is called _sâttvika_ or _vaikârika
ahamkâra_. This ahamkâra represents the development
in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine,"
and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi the
function of which is a mere understanding and general datun as
thisness.
The ego or ahamkâra (_abhimâna-dravya_) is the specific expression
of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine.
The function of the ego is therefore called _abhimâna_ (self-assertion).
From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision,
touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five cognitive senses of speech,
handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative
sense; the _prânas_ (bio-motor force) which help both conation and
cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual
ahamkâras and senses are related to the individual buddhis
by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come
into being. Each buddhi with its own group of akamkâra (ego)
and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar
other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as
knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different
for each individual, but so far as a general mind (_kârana buddhi_)
apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of
all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi
is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated
ignorance (_avidyâ_). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of ahamkâra
and the senses are so related that though they are different
from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the
buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We
must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling,
for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to ahamkâra, the deficiency
of buddhi is made good by prakrti; again as ahamkâra
partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the deficiency is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the
change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good
and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state
and finally from prakrti.
The Tanmâtras and the Paramânus [Footnote ref 1].
The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped
by the liberated rajas of ahamkâra, in order to make itself preponderant,
and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming
the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi,
is called _bhűtâdi._ From this bhűtâdi with the help of rajas are
generated the _tanmâtras,_ the immediately preceding causes of the
gross elements. The bhűtâdi thus represents only the intermediate
stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas
reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmâtras.
There has been some controversy between Sâmkhya and Yoga
as to whether the tanmâtras are generated from the mahat or from
ahamkâra. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that
evolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasing
differentiation in integration within the evolving whole.
Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation
which takes place within the mahat but through its stage as
bhűtâdi. Bhűtâdi is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid
of all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass.
The second stadium tanmâtra represents subtle matter, vibratory,
impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "potentials"
arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units
in different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribution
of the original energy (_rajas_). The tanmâtras possess something
more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess
physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of
impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of
viscous and cohesive attraction [Footnote ref. 2].
In intimate relation with those physical characters they also
possess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch,
colour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid
[Footnote 1: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the
translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely
indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given
in Ray's _Hindu Chemistry._ The credit of explaining Sâmkhya physics,
in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.]
[Footnote 2: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]
of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles
of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other
words, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar
transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can
act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest
particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (_atîndriya_
but not _anudbhűta_) [Footnote ref 1].
Of the tanmatras the _s'abda_ or _âkâs'a tanmâtra_ (the sound-potential)
is first generated directly from the bhűtâdi. Next
comes the _spars'a_ or the _vâyu tanmâtra_ (touch-potential) which is
generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhűtâdi with the
âkâs'a tanmâtra. The _rűpa tanmâtra_ (colour-potential) is generated
similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhűtâdi; the
_rasa tanmâtra_ (taste-potential) or the _ap tunmâtra_ is also similarly
formed. This ap tanmâtra again by its union with a unit of tamas
from bhűtâdi produces the _gândha tanmâtra_ (smell-potential) or
the _ksiti tanmâtra_ [Footnote ref 2]. The difference of tanmâtras or
infra-atomic units and atoms (_paramânu_) is this, that the tanmâtras
have only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be
grouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence
as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses.
It is important in this connection to point out that the classification
of all gross objects as ksiti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is
not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view
of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be
brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a
particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are
said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be
grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of
these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or
tanmâtras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five
gross forms.
The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmâtras as
follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter
from bhűtâdi generates the âkâsa-atom. The touch-potentials combine
with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the
[Footnote 1: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]
[Footnote 2: There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmâtras and
atoms were explained in literatures other than Sâmkhya; for some account
of it see Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]
vâyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials
and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The
taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials
and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the
smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate
the earth-atom. The âkâs'a-atom possesses penetrability, the vâyu-atom
impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat
and light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom
cohesive attraction. The âkâsa we have seen forms the transition
link from the bhűtâdi to the tanmâtra and from the tanmâtra to
the atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice at
this stage. Sâmkhya distinguishes between a kârana-âkâs'a and
kâryâkâs'a. The kârana-âkâs'a (non-atomic and all-pervasive)
is the formless tamas--the mass in prakrti or bhűtâdi; it is
indeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness
(_âvaranâbhâva_) or vacuum [Footnote ref 1]. When energy is first
associated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential;
the atomic âkâs'a is the result of the integration of the
original mass-units from bhűtâdi with this sound-potential (_s'abda
tanmâtra_). Such an âkâs'a-atom is called the kâryâkâs'a; it is
formed everywhere and held up in the original kârana âkâs'a as
the medium for the development of vâyu atoms. Being atomic
it occupies limited space.
The ahamkâra and the five tanmâtras are technically called
_avis'esa_ or indeterminate, for further determinations or
differentiations of them for the formation of newer categories of
existence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called
_vis'esa,_ i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined
as to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course
of evolution which started in the prakrti reaches its furthest limit
in the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms
on the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having
atomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due
to spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introduction
of new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are
not such that a newer category of existence could be formed by
them which was substantially different from the combined atoms.
[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal in describing this âkâs'a says "Âkâs'a
corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and
in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." Ray's _History
of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 88.]
The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things
certainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it
will be better to enquire about the principle of causation according
to which the Sâmkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehended
or interpreted.
Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy [Footnote ref 1].
The question is raised, how can the prakrti supply the deficiencies
made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes
from them? When from mahat some tanmâtras have evolved, or
when from the tanmâtras some atoms have evolved, how can the
deficiency in mahat and the tanmâtras be made good by the
prakrti?
Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations
that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk,
changes into curd, and so on? Sâmkhya says that "as the total
energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving,
cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same
ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes
in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes,
and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the
gunas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the
(material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the production
or rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the
unmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (_udbhűta-vrtti_)
in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary
to call forth the so-called material cause into activity [Footnote ref 2]."
The appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure
of the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the
sculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality
and the concomitant conditions (_sahakâri-s'akti_) or efficient cause
(_nimitta-kârana_, such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanical
help or instrumental help to this passage or the transition [Footnote ref
3]. The refilling from prakrti thus means nothing more than this, that
by the inherent teleology of the prakrti, the reals there are so
collocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat
have been collocated to form the bhűtâdi or the tanmâtras.
[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâsya_ and _Yogavârttika_, IV. 3;
_Tattvavais'âradî_,
IV. 3.]
[Footnote 2: Ray, _History of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 72.]
[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 73.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of
transformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of
material causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the
sum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the
sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens
is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs
the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of
energy together with a fresh collocation(_gunasannives'avis'esa_).
As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one
field to another of the same or lower level has only to remove
the obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself
to the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes
(such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in any
collocation against its transformation into any other collocation,
the energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding
manner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the
energy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a
state of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this
barrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a
corresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for
the formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed
from the prakrti, guided by the constant will of Îs'vara, the reals
in equilibrium in the state of prakrti leave their state of arrest
and evolve themselves into mahat, etc.
Change as the formation of new collocations.
It is easy to see from what we have already said that any
collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form,
unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the
present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous
instrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocation
of the five atoms of ksiti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The
difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its
collocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms
is different from that in another. The formation of a collocation
has an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that
collocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that
these barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other
infinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier
is removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers
could be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing.
And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by
which they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out of
any other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the
line of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be overstepped"
(_parinâmakramaniyama_) or in other words there are
some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the
evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those
lines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows
in countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of
countries (_des'âpabandha_); certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy
season only, this is limitation of season or time (_kâlâpabandha_);
deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (_âkârâpabandha_);
curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes
(_nimittâpabandha_). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that
path which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural
obstructions [Footnote ref 1].
Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least
to the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and
changing places in any and every object. At each moment the
whole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms
at any moment is different from what it was at the previous
moment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived
as _dharmaparinâma_ or changes of _dharma_ or quality; but perceived
or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This
change of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by
virtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new,
and these are respectively called the _laksanaparinâma_ and
_avasthâparinâma_. At every moment every object of the world is
undergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future,
as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state
we call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latent
again it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential,
manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future,
present and past [Footnote ref 2].
[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâsya, Tattvavais'âradî_ and _Yogavârttika,_ III.
14.]
[Footnote 2: It is well to note in this connection that Sâmkhya-yoga does
not admit the existence of time as an independent entity like the
Nyâya-Vais'esika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind
grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind
(_buddhi-nirmâna_). The time required by an atom to move its own measure
of space is called a moment (_ksana_) or one unit of time. Vijńâna
Bhiksu regards one unit movement of the gunas or reals as a moment. When
by true wisdom the gunas are perceived as they are both the illusory
notions of time and space vanish. _Vyâsabhâsya, Tattvavais'âradî_, and
_Yogavârttika_, III. 52 and III. 13.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
Causation as Satkâryavâda (the theory that the effect potentially
exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause).
The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of
the Sâmkhya view of causation as _satkâryavâda_. Sâmkhya holds
that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent;
causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due
to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already
held in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means
an internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and
this exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of
the barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of
such a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation--the
effect. This doctrine is called _satkâryavâda,_ i.e.
that the kârya or effect is _sat_ or existent even before the causal
operation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in
the sesarnum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk, The
causal operation (_kârakaiyâpâra_) only renders that manifest
(_âvirbhűta_) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition
(_tirohita_) [Footnote ref 1].
The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Sâmkhya
did, but with them there was no background to the change;
every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was
past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There
were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and
qualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance.
Sâmkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas,
but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions
of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals
change constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable.
The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came
into being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory
of causation and also on account of their doctrine of s'űnya, they
were called _vainâs'ikas_ (nihilists) by the Vedântins. This doctrine
is therefore contrasted to Sâmkhya doctrine as _asatkâryavâda._
[Footnote 1: _Tattvakaumudî,_ 9.]
The jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and
that from one point of view satkâryavâda is true and from another
asatkâryavâda. The Sâmkhya view that the cause is continually
transforming itself into its effects is technically called _parinâmavâda_
as against the Vedânta view called the _vivarttavâda_: that
cause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but
illusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form--mere
Maya [Footnote ref. 1].
Sâmkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.
Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite
number of reals produce all the world and its transformations;
whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of
cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which
prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the
first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakrti? Sâmkhya
denies the existence of Îs'vara (God) or any other exterior influence,
and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which
guides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands
that the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that
they may render some service to the souls either in the direction
of enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a
tendency that prakrti is disturbed, and the gunas develop on two
lines--on the mental plane, _citta_ or mind comprising the sense
faculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it is
in fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one
hand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the
buddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objective
things. It is this tendency to be of service to the purusas
(_purusârthatâ_) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains
all disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and
finally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain
liberation from the association of prakrti and its gratuitous service,
which causes us all this trouble of samsâra.
Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent
[Footnote 1: Both the Vedânta and the Sâmkhya theories of causation are
sometimes loosely called _satkâryyavâda._ But correctly speaking as some
discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedânta theory of causation
should be called satkâranavâda for according to it the _kârana_ (cause)
alone exists (_sat_) and all _kâryyas,_ (effects) are illusory appearances
of the kârana; but according to Sâmkhya the kâryya exists in
a potential state in the kârana and is hence always existing and real.]
prakrti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe,
how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best
service to the purusas, how can it remove its own barriers and
lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prakrti
equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the
evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to
their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones?
There must be some intelligent Being who should help the course
of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony
may be attained. This Being is Îs'vara. Îs'vara is a purusa who
had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His
body is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by
ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent
wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of
the reals by which the evolution of the gunas may best serve the
double interest of the purusa's experience (_bhoga_) and liberation
(_apavarga_) should be removed. It is according to this permanent
will of Îs'vara that the proper barriers are removed and the
gunas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the
service of the best interests of the purusas. Îs'vara has not created
the prakrti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prakrti in its
quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order
by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order
of the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of Îs'vara
in Yoga and its denial by Sâmkhya marks the main theoretic
difference between the two according to which the Yoga and
Sâmkhya are distinguished as Ses'vara Sâmkhya (Sâmkhya with
Îs'vara) and Nirîs'vara Sâmkhya (Atheistic Sâmkhya) [Footnote ref 1].
Buddhi and Purusa.
The question again arises that though purusa is pure intelligence,
the gunas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how
can the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover,
the purusa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of
impurity and what service or need can such a purusa have of
the gunas? This difficulty is anticipated by Sâmkhya, which has
already made room for its answer by assuming that one class of
the gunas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and
the intelligence of the purusa to a very high degree, so much so
[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'âradî,_ IV. 3; _Yogavârttika,_ I. 24; and
_Pravavanabhâsya,_ V. 1-12.]
that it can reflect the intelligence of the purusa, and thus render
its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent.
Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional
operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the
buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue
of the reflection of the purusa in the buddhi, these appear as if
they are intelligent. The self (purusa) according to Sâmkhya-Yoga
is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its
existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and
grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly
noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through
beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing
states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes
are further so associated with the reflection of the purusa in the
buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the purusa.
This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the purusa
in the buddhi has such a special fitness (_yogyatâ_) that it is interpreted
as the experience of the purusa. This explanation of
Vâcaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijńâna Bhiksu.
Vijńâna Bhiksu says that the association of the buddhi with the
image of the purusa cannot give us the notion of a real person
who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore
that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the purusa,
it is then superimposed upon the purusa, and we have the notion
of an abiding person who experiences [Footnote ref 1]. Whatever may be the
explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the purusa
is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of _cit_ on
buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the purusa cannot
realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own.
Buddhi resembles purusa in transparency, and the purusa fails to
differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as
a result of this non-distinction the purusa becomes bound down
to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the
buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinction
of purusa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi
is what is meant by _avidyâ_ (non-knowledge) in Sâmkhya, and is
the root of all experience and all misery [Footnote ref 2].
[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'âradî_ and _Yogavârttika_, I. 4.]
[Footnote 2: This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with
Sâmkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things
(e.g. the snake and the rope) that is the cause of illusion; it is
therefore called the _akhyâti_ (non-apprehension) theory of illusion
which must be distinguished from the _anyathâkhyâti_ (misapprehension)
theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending
one (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake). _Yogavârttika,_ I. 8.]
Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the
purusa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itself
and the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of
buddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference
but positively false knowledge, that we take the purusa to be
that which it is not (_anyathâkhyâti_). It takes the changing,
impure, sorrowful, and objective prakrti or buddhi to be the
changeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks
buddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and
capable of giving us happiness. This is the avidyâ of Yoga.
A buddhi associated with a purusa is dominated by such an
avidyâ, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated
with the same purusa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidyâ.
If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged
in the prakrti, and the avidyâ also sleeps with it. When at the
beginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated
with the purusas emerge, the old avidyâs also become manifest
by virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the
purusas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus
proceeds the course of samsâra. When the avidyâ of a person
is rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to
attach itself to the purusa and is forever dissociated from it, and
this is the state of mukti.
The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.
It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have
evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusa.
What is the process of this experience? Sâmkhya (as explained
by Vâcaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes
into touch with external objects. At the first moment of this
touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particulars
of the thing cannot be noticed. This is called _nirvikalpa
pratyaksa_ (indeterminate perception). At the next moment by
the function of the _samkalpa_ (synthesis) and _vikalpa_ (abstraction
or imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in
all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates,
and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and
|
|
|
|
|
|
thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized
by the purusa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the
experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamkâra,
and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other
times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijńâna Bhiksu
differs from this view of Vâcaspati, and denies the synthetic
activity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi
directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses.
At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate,
but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate [Footnote ref 1].
It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced
to a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire,
doubt and imagination.
Buddhi, including ahamkâra and the senses, often called _citta_
in Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame
of a lamp, it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure
sattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one content
to another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi
and purusa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being
interpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the
purusa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of
consciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour.
The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its
functions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Sâmkhya
does not admit any separate prana vâyu (vital breath) to keep the
body living. What are called _vâyus_ (bio-motor force) in Vedânta
are but the different modes of operation of this category of
buddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movements
performs the life-functions and sense-functions of the body.
[Footnote 1: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes
place through the senses, the sense data of colours, etc., are modified
by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are
however perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme
of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external
objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they
are reflected, like trees in a lake
"_tasmims'ca darpane sphâre samasta vastudrstayah
imâstâh pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrumâh_" _Yogavarttika_, I. 4.
The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by
the senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the
external objects and assumes their forms: "_indriyânyeva pranâlikâ
cittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola kadvârâ bâhyavastusűparaktasya
cittasyendryasahityenaivârthakarah parinâmo bhavati_" _Yogavârttika_, I.
VI. 7. Contrast _Tattvakaumudî_, 27 and 30.]
Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or
rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions
(_samskâras_) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies
of all past lives (_vâsanâ_) [Footnote ref 1]. These samskâras are revived
under suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births
in their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the
same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected
within itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different
animal lives. It is knotted with these vâsanâs like a net. If a man
passes into a dog life by rebirth, the vâsanâs of a dog life, which
the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of
births, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of
a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes
attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival
of the vâsanâ suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be
any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and
tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was
born as man.
The samskâras represent the root impressions by which any
habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in
which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were
[Footnote 1: The word samskâra is used by Pânini who probably preceded
Buddha in three different senses (1) improving a thing as distinguished
from generating a new quality (_Sata utkarsâdhânam samskârah_, Kâs'ila
on Pânini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and
(3) adornment (Pânini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pitakas the word
sankhâra is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing,
perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas
(collected by Childers). In fact sankhâra stands for almost anything
of which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many
diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of
aggregation (_samavâya_ of Pânini) is prominent. The word _samskaroti_
is used in Kausîtaki, II. 6, Chândogya IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and
Brhadâranyaka, VI. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet
come across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The
meaning of samskâra in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means
the impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objects
experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative
exist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions be
reproduced as memory (smrti). The word vâsanâ (_Yoga sűtra_, IV. 24)
seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanissads do not mention it and
so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pâli pitakas.
_Abhidhânappadîpikâ_ of Moggallâna mentions it, and it occurs in
the Muktika Upanisad. It comes from the root "_vas_" to stay. It is
often loosely used in the sense of samskâra, and in _Vyâsabhâsya_ they
are identified in IV. 9. But vâsanâ generally refers to the tendencies of
past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which
can find scope in this life. But samskâras are the sub-conscious states
which are being constantly generated by experience. Vâsanâs are innate
samskâras not acquired in this life. See _Vyâsabhâsya, Tattvâvais'âradî_
and _Yogavârttika_, II. 13.]
engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might
not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced
before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the
citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without
any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of
any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its
roots as already left in the citta in the form of samskâras should
be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrary
tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own
samskâra naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable
samskâras.
Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (cestâ)
by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their
objects. There is also the reserved potent power (s'akti) of citta,
by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue
to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved
in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga
method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state
of mind to the exclusion of others.
Merit or demerit (_punya, pâpa_) also is imbedded in the citta
as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and
giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.
Sorrow and its Dissolution [Footnote ref 1].
Sâmkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all
experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain
substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations,
all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree
of painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure,
we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited
it, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the
fear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much
greater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the
keenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his
capacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full
of sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that
all is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by
ordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences
through the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or
the final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures
lead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing
sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately;
he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the
pleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according
to the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve
the sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also
some pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded
as desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures
that he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow.
Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes,
what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is
uprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to
philosophy to find out the means of doing it.
[Footnote 1: Tattavais'âradî and Yogavârttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaumudî,
I.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical
enquiry of the Sâmkhya philosophy [Footnote ref 1]. All experiences are
sorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences
may be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after
death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and purusa
are associated with each other, the sufferings will continue.
Citta must be dissociated from purusa. Citta or buddhi, Sâmkhya
says, is associated with purusa because of the non-distinction
of itself from buddhi [Footnote ref 2]. It is necessary therefore that in
buddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the
nature of purusa; when this true conception of purusa arises in
the buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from
and quite unrelated to purusa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As
a result of that, buddhi turns its back on purusa and can no
longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connected
with sorrow, and thus the purusa remains in its true
form. This according to Sâmkhya philosophy is alone adequate
to being about the liberation of the purusa. Prakrti which was
leading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils
its final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating
[Footnote 1: Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the
cessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow
{_duhkhabahlah samsârah heyah_).]
[Footnote 2: The word _citta_ is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is
the repository of all sub-conscious states. Sâmkhyn generally uses, the
word buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they
emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.]
purusa from prakrti. This final purpose being attained the
prakrti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whom
this right knowledge was generated; for other purusas however
the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiences
from one birth to another in an endless cycle.
Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient.
In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true
knowledge differentiating purusa and buddhi should arise, but it
is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all
its samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived
again. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest
state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the purusa. This is
the _kevala_ (oneness) state of existence after which (all samskâras,
all avidyâ being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any
longer to hold on to the purusa, and like a stone hurled from a
mountain top, gravitates back into the prakrti [Footnote ref 1]. To
destroy the old samskâras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a
graduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should
be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher
and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler
states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin
advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and
try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the
state when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity.
At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the purusa, and
final liberation takes place.
Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (1) _s'ukla_ or
white (_punya_, those that produce happiness), (2) _krsna_ or black
(_pâpa_, those that produce sorrow), (3) _s'ukla-krsna_ (_punya-pâpa_,
most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious
as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many
insects), (4) _as'uklâkrsna_ (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and
meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains).
All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the
world and avoid taking the lives of insects [Footnote ref 2]. All karmas
[Footnote 1: Both Sâmkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state a
_Kaivalya_ (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been
absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at
this state purusa remains for ever alone without any association
with buddhi, see _Sâmkhya kârikâ_, 68 and _Yoga sűtras_, IV. 34.]
[Footnote 2: _Vyâsabhâsya_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_, IV. 7.]
proceed from the five-fold afflictions (_kles'as_), namely _avidyâ,
asmitâ, râga, dvesa_ and _abhinives'a_.
We have already noticed what was meant by avidyâ. It consists
generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it
as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge
while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other
four forms of asmitâ, etc. Asmitâ means the thinking of worldly
objects and our experiences as really belonging to us--the
sense of "mine" or "I" to things that really are the
qualities or
transformations of the gunas. Râga means the consequent attachment
to pleasures and things. Dvesa means aversion or antipathy
to unpleasant things. Abhinives'a is the desire for life or love of
life--the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our
experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family
to be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are
attached to these; because we feel great antipathy against any
mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our
life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all
proceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidyâ, which consists
in the false identification of buddhi with purusa. These five,
avidyâ, asmitâ, râga, dvesa and abhinives'a, permeate our buddhi,
and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together
with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as
a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth
to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them [Footnote ref 1]. The karma in
the aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of
it is called _karmâs'aya_. (the bed of karma for the purusa to lie in).
We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (_kles'a_) of
the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or
modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the
teleology of the prakrti and the removal of obstacles in the course
of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of
Îs'vara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous
one pleasure.
The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate,
and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such
a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for
him according to the evolution of prakrti as shall make it possible
for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the
[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâsya_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_, II. 3-9.]
present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth
(as this or that animal or man), the period of life (_âyus_) and the
painful or pleasurable experiences (_bhoga_) destined for that life.
Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce
their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has
done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which
he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which
he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain
in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first
and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good
actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions,
all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot
again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those
karmas which have already ripened. This is the _jîvanmukti_ stage,
when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering
mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already
ripened (_tisthati samskâravas'ât cakrabhramivaddhrtas'arîrah_).
Citta.
The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature
in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patańjali in
his _Yoga sűtra_ in the sense of the partial or full restraint or
steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may
be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against
a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct.
The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called
_ksipta_ (wild) and of the latter type _praműdha_ (ignorant). There
is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which
concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining
steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to
another thing and so on. This is called the _viksipta_ (unsteady)
stage of mind (_cittabhűmi_). As distinguished from these there is
an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on
an object for a long time. This is the _ekâgra_ (one-pointed) stage.
There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes
are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti,
and is called the _nirodha_ (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of
Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.
The cittas have five processes (_vrtti_), (1) _pramâna_ [Footnote ref 1]
(valid
[Footnote 1: Sâmkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any
cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on
correspondence with external facts or objects (_svatah prâmânyam
svatah aprâmânyam_). The contribution of Sâmkhya to the doctrine
of inference is not definitely known. What little Vâcaspati says on the
subject has been borrowed from Vâtsyâyana such as the _pűrvavat, s'esavat_
and _sâmânyatodrsta_ types of inference, and these may better be
consulted in our chapter on Nyâya or in the Tâtparyatîkâ_ of Vâcaspati.
Sâmkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the
ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds
of inference "_mâtrânimittasamyogivirodhisahacâribhih.
Svasvâmibadhyaghâtâdyaih sâmkhyânâm saptadhânumâ_"
(_Tâtparyatîkâ_, p.
109). Sâmkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I.I. V) is
"_sambandhâdekasmât pratyaksacchesasiddhiranumânam_."]
cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference
and scriptural testimony), (2) _viparyaya_ (false knowledge, illusion,
etc.), (3) _vikalpa_ (abstraction, construction and different kinds of
imagination), (4) _nidrâ_ (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which
tamas tends to predominate), (5) _smrti_ (memory).
These states of mind (_vrtti_) comprise our inner experience.
When they lead us towards sâmsara into the course of passions
and their satisfactions, they are said to be _klista_ (afflicted or
leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they
are called _aklista_ (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards
samsara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of
mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states,
and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation)
must be regarded as good.
This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta,
that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes
towards bad (sâmsara). It is like a river, as the _Vyâsabhâsya
says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the
good. The teleology of prakrti requires that it should produce
in man the sâmsara as well as the liberation tendency.
Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts
and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts,
and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad
thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore
never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is
as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather
remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows
that our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic
attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an
innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation
[Footnote ref 1]. Removal of pains
[Footnote 1: Sâmkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction
of three kinds of sorrows, _âdhyâtmika_ (generated internally by the
illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind),
_âdhibhautika_ (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by
other men, beasts, etc.) and _âdhidaivika_ (generated by the injuries
inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours
(_purusârtha_).]
is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but
still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible
tendency of the mind. Man has power (_s'akti_) stored up in his
citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may
gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the
other. He must succeed in this, since prakrti wants liberation for
her final realization [Footnote ref 1].
Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).
The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on
the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation,
so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more
weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind
can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should
be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin
should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (_ahimsâ_),
absolute and strict truthfulness (_satya_), non-stealing (_asteya_),
absolute sexual restraint (_brahmacarya_) and the acceptance of
nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (_aparigraha_).
These are collectively called _yama_. Again side by side with these
abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions
and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the
habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the
body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (_tapas_), the study
of philosophy (_svâdhyâya_) and meditation on Îs'vara
(_Îs'varapranidhâna_). These are collectively called _niyamas_.
To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as
_pratipaksa-bhâvanâ, maitrî, karunâ, muditâ_ and _upeksâ_.
Pratipaksa-bhâvanâ means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish
motive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought
(self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope.
Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations
with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere
abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should
habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with
our fellow-beings. The practice of maitrî means to think of
all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to
think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one
should practise karunâ or kindly feeling for sufferers, muditâ
[Footnote 1: See my "_Yoga Psychology_," _Quest_, October, 1921.]
or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upeksâ
or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others.
The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note
of the vices of vicious men.
When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures
(_vairâgya_) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances
of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross
and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may
attain liberation by a constant practice (_abhyâsa_) attended with
faith, confidence (_s'raddhâ_), strength of purpose and execution
(_vîrya_) arid wisdom (_prajńâ_) attained at each advance.
The Yoga Meditation.
When the mind has become pure the chances of its being
ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such
a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (_âsana_) and fixes his mind
on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should
fix it on Îs'vara, for in that case Îs'vara being pleased removes
many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for
him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice,
and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration
(_samâdhi_) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying
concentration namely _vitarka, vicâra, ânanda_ and _asmitâ_. Of
these vitarka and vicâra have each two varieties, _savitarka, nirvitarka,
savicâra, nirvicâra_ [Footnote ref 1]. When the mind concentrates on
objects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka
stage; when on the five tanmâtras with a remembrance of their
qualities it is called savicâra, and when it is one with the tanmâtras
without any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicâra.
Higher than these are the ânanda and the asmitâ states. In the
ânanda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions
of the senses causing pleasure. In the asmitâ stage buddhi
concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications.
In all these stages there are objects on which the mind
consciously concentrates, these are therefore called the _samprajńâta_
(with knowledge of objects) types of samâdhi. Next to this comes
the last stage of samâdhi called the _asamprajńâta_ or nirodha
samâdhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining
[Footnote 1: Vâcaspati, however, thinks that ânanda and asmitâ have also
two other varieties, which is denied by Bhiksu.]
long in this stage the old potencies (samskâras) or impressions
due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards
the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner
thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the
nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the
buddhi becomes as pure as the purusa, and after that the citta not
being able to bind the purusa any longer returns back to prakrti.
In order to practise this concentration one has to see that
there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a
quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles
is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This
has to be stopped by the practice of _prânâyâma_. Prânâyâma
consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then
giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for
hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need
of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained
steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.
The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting
in a steady posture, holding the breath by prânâyâma, excluding
all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (_dhâranâ_).
At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same
thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called
_dhyâna._ After sufficient practice in dhyâna the mind attains the
power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one
with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is
no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind
becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called
_samâdhi_ [Footnote ref 1]. We have already described the six stages of
samâdhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samâdhi, he passes
on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards
he attains miraculous powers (_vibhűti_) and his faith and hope
in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them
many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even
though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax.
His wisdom (_prajńâ_) also increases at each step. Prajńâ knowledge
is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to
[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the word _samâdhi_ cannot properly be
translated either by "concentration" or by "meditation." It
means that
peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes
one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing
states.]
certain gross things and certain gross qualities [Footnote ref 1] prajńâ
has no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the
tanmâtras, the gunas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their
subtle conditions and qualities [Footnote ref 2]. As the potencies
(_samskâra_) of the prajńâ wisdom grow in strength the potencies of
ordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain
always in his prajńâ wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajńâ that
it leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to samsâra.
The final prajńâs which lead to liberation are of seven kinds,
namely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering and
misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and
roots of samsâra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more
of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of
direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge
in the shape of a discrimination of purusa from prakrti has been
understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather
metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are
as follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and
emancipation (_bhoga_ and _apavarga_) has been realized. (6) The
strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gunas drives
them into prakrti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops.
(7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gunas
become merged in the prakrti and remain there for ever. The
purusa having passed beyond the bondage of the gunas shines
forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in
this Sâmkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prakrti. It
is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Sâmkhya tries to
achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected
discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.
[Footnote 1: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the
_Kârikâ_ as follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky),
extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ
(e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object
(e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by
walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight),
being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown
into a lake).]
[Footnote 2: Though all things are but the modifications of gunas yet the
real nature of the gunas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. What
appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic
(mâyâ):
"_Gunânâm paramam rűpam na drstipathamrcchati
Yattu drstipatham prâptam tanmâyeva sutucchakam._"
_Vyâsabhâsya_, IV. 13.
The real nature of the gunas is thus revealed only by _prajńâ._]
Suggested Further Reading
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Source:
A History Of Indian Philosophy Surendranath Dasgupta Volume I
First Edition: Cambridge, 1922. Produced by Srinivasan Sriram
and sripedia.org, William Boerst and PG Distributed
Proofreaders. While we have made every effort to reproduce the
text correctly, we do not guarantee or accept any responsibility
for any errors or omissions or inaccuracies in the reproduction
of this text. Please refer the original text for any academic or
serious studies. |
|
|
|
