| Self-manifestation
contradictory. |
Aph.
49.* [And,] in
its [Soul's,] being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedántís
say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and
agent [in one, which is a contradiction].
a.
That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul
consists of, there is the 'opposition of patient and agent' [in one].
b.
But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between patient and agent;
because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged
in it, can, itself, furnish
p. 448 the
relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeshikas declare, that,
through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, object to
itself. To this he replies:
| Illuminating function of Soul. |
Aph.
50.* This [Soul],
in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals
the non-intelligent.
a.
But then, in that case, if duality be established in accordance with
proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring
non-duality? To this he replies:
| A salvo for the Vaidic view. |
Aph.
51.* There is no
contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of
Scripture which seems to
p. 449
assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those
who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness
of the things of time'].
a.
He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not
only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the
non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal:
| The world's reality
irrefragable. |
Aph.
52.* The world is
real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because
there is [in Scripture,] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].
a.
We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to
the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the
like; inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c.,
when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence
of] Sleep,2
&c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking]
Universe, in which Mind is the first,3
[according to Book
I., § 71].
p. 450
b.
He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent
state [at any given instant], but, also, always:
Aph.
53.* Since it
cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever
is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].
a.
That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible
that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into
existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a
subtile form.
b.
Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the
experiencer belong to diverse subjects, be asserts the distribution
[of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two
aphorisms:
Aph.
54.*
Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.
p. 451
| Experience is got rid of when. |
Aph.
55.* Experience
ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from
Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really,
Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to
Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made
over to the king].
a.
He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation
of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahmá:
| Paradise no security against
transmigration. |
Aph.
56.* Even in the
world of the moon, &c., there is return [to munane existence];
because of there really being a cause [of such return].
a.
'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c.
b.
But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these
various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane
existence]. To this he replies:
p. 452
Aph.
57.* Not by the
counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of
Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel
given by mundane instructors].
a.
But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there no return from
the world of Brahmá? To this he replies:
| A salvo for Scriptural text. |
Aph.
58.* There is
Scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation, [on going to the world of
Brahmá]; this [Emancipation] being effected [more readily in that
world than in this, but only] by intermediacy [of the appropriate
means].
a.
He alleges the Scriptural text of Soul's going [to the locality
where it is to experience], even though it be all-filling, [and can,
therefore, have no place into which to move]:
Aph.
59.* And, in
accordance with the text of its 'going,' though it [Soul,]
p. 453 is
all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or
body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.
a.
For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to
some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an
adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is
moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it
[here].
b.
He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body,] is
formed through the superintendence of the experiencer, [Soul]:
| The Body's existence dependent
on Soul. |
Aph.
60.* This
[constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is
[organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find
putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].
a.
But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body,]
for Experiencers [i.e., Souls,] take place
p. 454
without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he
replies:
| Desert not the author of the
Body. |
Aph.
61.* If you say
that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert
[that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with
the matter to be operated
upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case
with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.
a.
That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not
directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body] ,
should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body,
&c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the
seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of
a plant.
b.
According to the system of the Vaiśeshikas and others, it
is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of
the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he
tells us, that, in his own doctrine,
p. 455
since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through
these, be the cause [of the Body]:
Aph.
62.* For this is
impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert,
&c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for
these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness,
[not of Soul].
a.
And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends
[in the causing of the Body,] quite directly, by conjunction simply,
without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import.
b.
But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living
soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this
doubt, he says:
p. 456
| Soul how limited and unlimited. |
Aph.
63.* The nature
of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to soul
devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect argument.1
a.
To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this
is the character of the soul distinguished by peraonality, not of pure
Soul, [which is unlimited].
b.
Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of
Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of Self-consciousness, he first
states the products of Self-consciousness:
Aph.
64.* The
effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness,
not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiśeshikas];
because there is no proof [of the reality of such].4
a.
By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established
p. 457 by
Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the destructive
agencies of Brahmá and Rudra1
[respectively], owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness, [or
peronality].
b.
But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others,
still who is the maker of Self-consciousness? to this he replies:
Aph.
65.* It is the
same as in the arising of Desert.
a.
Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which
sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular time,—since,
if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we
should have an infinite regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises
from time alone. as the cause; but there is not another maker
thereof, also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning.
p. 458
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