THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.

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These aphorisms have been extracted from The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila. Presently they are incomplete and will be updated soon complete with necessary links and book marks.

Without commentary

Book 1

1. Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.
2. The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil,] after [its temporary] cessation.
3. [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger
4. This [method of palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].
5. Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else.
6. And there is no difference between the two.
7. There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially.
8. Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].
9. There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.
10. If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].
11. Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible].
12. Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage].
13. Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason]
14. Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body.
15. Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.
16. Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal, [if the case were as you imagine].
17. If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.
18. If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] 'no;' [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.
19. [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.
20. Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.
21. If it ['Ignorance'] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántíc] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].
22. And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].
23. If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say 'no,' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].
24. [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal we say] 'no;' because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]
25. [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeshikas and others.'
26. Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like.
27. [The bondage] thereof moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.
28. Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pátaliputra.
29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free].
30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between the two cases  does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].
31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.
32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].
33. [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.
34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].
35. No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.
36. And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.
37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact.
38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists.
39. Because, when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it].
40. Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.
41. If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause].
42. Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.
43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all].
44. The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.
45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.
46. Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].
47. In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.
48. Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's bondage result].
49. Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or in other words without motion]
50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].
51. The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant; as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].
52. Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.
53. If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul might extend unduly, even to the emancipated].
54. And this [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.
55. Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity, p. 58 [in this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated].
56. Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].
57. The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness.
58. Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].
59. It is merely verbal, and not a reality [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides in the mind, [and not in the soul].
60. Moreover, it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature,] is not to be removed by argument; as that of a person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.
61. The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference; as that of fire [when not directly perceptible,] is by means of smoke, &c.
62. Nature (prakṛiti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat); from Mind, Self-consciousness (ahankára); from Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra), and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthúla-bhúta). [Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five.
63. [The knowledge of the existence] of the five 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference,] from the 'Gross Elements.'
64. [The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference,] from the external and internal p. 75 [organs], and from these ['Subtile Elements,' mentioned in ].
65. [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, ].
66. [The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference,] from that ['Intellect,' ].
67. [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products].
68. Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.

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