|
|
|
p. 31
| A thing cannot act where it is
not. |
Aph.
28.* Also [in my
opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and
the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer;
because there is a local separation; as there is between him that
stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra.
a.
In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present
objecting to], the soul is circumscibed, residing entirely within the
body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the
relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external
object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two
persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Páṭaliputra:
such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vásaná)
is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the
cloth [to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the
flower-basket [to which they impart their odour.]
b.
By the word 'also' the absence or conjunction [between the soul and
objects (see § 10)], &c., which he himself
holds, is connected [with the matter of the present aphorism].
p. 32
c.
Srughna and Páṭaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several
places far apart.
d.
But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the
soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object;
inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the
object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he
declares [as follows]:
| On the heretical view, the free
soul would be equally liable to bondage. |
Aph.
29.* [It is
impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence
received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that
case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and
the free].
a.
To complete the sense, we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible
that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and
the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no
distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because
bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the
free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as likely to come
across objects as any other]: such is the meaning.
p. 33
b.
Here he ponders a doubt:
| The heretic's attempted defence. |
Aph.
30.* If [the
heretic, wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between
the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in
virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will
find his answer in the next aphorism].
a.
That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they
[the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming
into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one
and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may
result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the
merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated
alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity,
the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if [this
be urged, then we look forward].
b.
This he disputes, [as follows]:
p. 34
| Each back must bear its own
burden. |
Aph.
31.* They cannot
stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not
belong to one and the same time.
a.
Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do
not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not
only that objects (see § 26. b.)
momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls,
also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation
[between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of
deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits];
because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects
[§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul
of to-day], occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to
an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in
question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning.
b.
He ponders a doubt:
| Whether merit may, or may not,
be imputed. |
Aph.
32.* If [the
heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in
regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].
a.
But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that
p. 35 the
merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge
that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such
as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindu Law,' Vol. III., p. 104)
celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to
the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiatc the
gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the
experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen' [merit or
demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of
yesterday]: such is the meaning [of the heretic].
b.
He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact:
| This will not help the heretic's
argument. |
Aph.
33.* [Your
illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one
permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in
anticipation of conception, &c.
a.
'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of
p. 36 the
son, by [means of the performance of]1
the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take
place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one
[self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to
birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so
as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time
subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread,
for which the young Bráhman would not be a fit subject, if the
ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and
thus your illustration is not a real one, [on your own theory:
it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].
b.
And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a
fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should
arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the
ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school],
that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is
the injunction [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the
ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].
p. 37
c.
Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument
here next stated, viz.,] 'But then, since bondage, also, [like
everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing
determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,'
[which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]:
| Whether bondage may not be
momentary, and so require no cause. |
Aph.
34.* Since there
is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the
momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].
a.
'Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism].
b.
And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause
at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]:
| (1) |
Bondage, &c., is momentary; |
| (2) |
Because it exists, |
| (3) |
[Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the
lamp-flame, or the like. |
p. 38
c.
And [continues the heretic,] this [reason, viz., 'existence'] does not
extend unduly1
[as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that,
also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute; [in being
momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the
expression, 'since there is no such thing as a permanent
result' [§ 34].
d.
He objects [to this heretical view]:
| The fact of recognition proves
that things are not momentary. |
Aph.
35.* No, [things
are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this
is proved by recognition.
a.
That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its
being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §
34. b.]. taken from such facts of recognition as, 'what I
saw, that same do I touch,' [an argument which may be stated as
follows], viz.:
| (1) |
Bondage, &c., is permanent; |
| (2) |
Because it exists,
p. 39 |
| (3) |
[Everything that exists is permanent,] as a jar, or the
like. |
| That things are momentary is
contradicted by Scripture and reasoning. |
Aph.
36.* And [things
are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and
reasoning.
a.
That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the general principle,
that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary,
is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., '[All] this, O ingenuous
one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other
arguments as this, viz., 'How should what exists proceed from the
non-existent?'
| The heretic's illustration is
not a truth. |
Aph.
37.* And [we
reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a
fact.
p. 40
a.
That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all
things] is denied; because this momentary churacter does not [in fact]
belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which
thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, (§
34. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to
momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute
and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to
thee momentary]: such is the import.
| If things were momentary, there
could be no relation of cause and effect. |
b.
Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted,
then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect,
in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not
say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and
effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that,
otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who
desires an effect; [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes
adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as
follows]:
p. 41
| The causal relation is not
between things that arise simultaneously. |
Aph.
38.* It is not
between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the
relation of cause and effect exists.
a.
Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist
between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into
[their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first;
because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we
should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating
with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent
production]. Nelther is it the last; in regard to which he declares
[as follows]:
| A product cannot survive its
substantial cause. |
Aph.
39.* Because,
when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise, and
survive it].
a.
The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the
theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when
the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the
product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is
to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being
substantially identical with, however formally different from,] its
p. 42
substantial cause, [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it].
b.
With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he
mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the
momentary duration of things]:
| The coexistence of substance and
product is impossible, if things be momentary. |
Aph.
40.* Moreover,
not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be
such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one
[the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible,
because the two keep always asunder.3
a.
To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory
objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and
effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the
consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'4
The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and
p. 43
substance,1
are (1) concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists,
the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,2
that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer
exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be;
because, since things [in your opinion,] are momentary in their
duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as
they are antecedent and consequent,3
belong to opposite times, [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the
product, according to you, does not come into existence until its
substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal
relation just defined].
b.
But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of
substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal
relation between the two, but] 'let the nature of a cause belong to
the substantial cause,
p. 44 as it
belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.'
To this he replies:
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Antecedence to the product does
not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument. |
Aph.
41.* If there
were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination
[of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an
instrumental cause].
a.
And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of
this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence
[to the product]; because antecedence constitutes no distinction
between it and the instrumental causes; for, [as we need
scarcely remind you], that there is a distinction between
instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such
is the meaning.
| The question whether anything
exists besides Thought. |
b.
Other heretics say: 'Since nothing [really] exists, except Thought,
neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream [have no
real existence].
p. 45
Therefore it has no cause; nor it is absolutely false.'
He rejects the opinion of these [heretics]:
| We have the evidence of
Intuition for the External, as well as for the Internal. |
Aph.
42.* Not Thought
alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.
a.
That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone;
because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought
is, by intuition.
b.
But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive
perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.],
we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist,
even in the absence of objects!' To this he replies:
| The denial of the external
amounts to Nihilism. |
Aph.
43.* Then, since,
if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void,
[i.e., nothing exists at all].
p. 46
a.
That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void
offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought
does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective:
and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective,
then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the
existence of] thought.
b.
'Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the
searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a
void is all:' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next
aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very
crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition:
| The heretic goes the length of
asserting sheer Nihilism. |
Aph.
44.* The reality
is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.
a.
The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing
exists at all] is the reality, [or the only
p. 47
truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that which is
perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the
beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in
the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary
existence,—is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be
bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason
assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to
perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the very
nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own nature;
[so that nothing could continue, if it ceased to perish]: such
is the meaning.
b.
He rejects [this heretical view]
| Nihilism denied; as the
indiscerptible is indestructible. |
Aph.
45.* This is a
mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.
a.
'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere
counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-assertion that a
thing must needs be perishable, because it
p. 48 exists;
[and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up
of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things,
cannot perish.
b.
[But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products
perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean
that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too,
by such a cognition as this, that 'the jar has passed away,' it is
settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of
having passed away.
c.
He states another objection [to the heretical view]:
| Nihilism is open to the same
objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories. |
Aph.
46.* Moreover,
this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same
fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].
p. 49
a.
This view, moreover [§ 44], is not a good one;
because it has the same fortune as, i.e., is open to similar reasons
for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [§
26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides
Thought [§ 41. b.]. The reason for the
rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration.
viz. [as stated in § 35], the fact of recognition,
&c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it
is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the
rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought. viz. [as
stated in § 42], the intuition of the external,
&c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the
import.
b.
Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics],
viz., 'Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's
aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the
cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing],
and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means
required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing
positively does not exist],' this too, can hardly be: so he declares
[as follows]:
p. 50
| The soul's aim is not
annihilition |
Aph.
47.* In neither
way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the
soul's aim.
a.
'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as
consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for
the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because
the [whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the
joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because
[they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent
soul, [(see § 33) in respect of which the
liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predicable].
b.
Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causes of [the
soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over
and above those [proposed by unbelievers, and] already rejected, are
to be set aside:
| It is by no movement that the
soul gets into bondage. |
Aph.
48.* Not from any
kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's
bondage result].
p. 51
a.
'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the
topic [of discussion].
b.
The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result
from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its
entrance into a body.
c.
He states a reason for this:
| What is all-pervading does not
change place. |
Aph.
49.* Because this
is impossible for what is inactive, [or in other words without motion]
a.
That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is
impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because]
all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].
b.
But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and
of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world
and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege,
but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the
text, 'Of the size
p. 52 of the
thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like:1
[but] this conjecture he repels:
| Were the soul limited, it might
be perishable. |
Aph.
50.* [We cannot
admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being
limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars,
&c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its
imperishableness].
a.
That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or
the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it
would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and
[hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our
settled principle, [that the soul is imperishable].*
b.
He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.]
referring to the motion [of the soul, by showing that the
motion is not really of the soul, but of an accessory]:
p. 53
| Soul moves not, any more than
Space. |
Aph.
51.* The text
regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable,
only] because of the junction of an attendant;1
as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though
we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].
a.
Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the
declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,'2
the text3
regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a
movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there
is the text, 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar
is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the
space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky,
[incapable of being moved]';4
and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to
belong to the soul (49. b.),] belongs to Nature
[see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. l.], from such
maxims3
as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful
or baneful;
p. 54 and it
is wilful Nature that] in the three worlds, reaps these': such
is the import.2
b.
It has already been denied [§ 16] that the
bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works] in the shape either of
enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage,
moreover] does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit]
resulting therefrom:
| The bondage of the soul is no
result of any merit or demerit. |
Aph.
52.* Nor,
moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or
demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.
a.
That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from
the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned
p. 55 by
works.1
Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or
demerit (see § 16. a.)] is no property
of the soul.
|
|
|
|
|
|
b. But then [some one may say], 'Let
it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen,' i.e., the merit
[or demerit] even of another, should attach to a different person;'
whereupon he declares [as follows]:
| Else, bondage might cling even
to the emancipated. |
Aph.
53.*4
If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of
the soul might extend unduly, even to the emancipated].
a.
That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause
were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be], then
there might be an undue extension; bondage would befall even the
emancipated, [for the same reasons as those stated under §
16. a.].
p. 56
b.
What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why
the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these
causes], beginning with its essence [see § 6. b.],
and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16];
inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture, [that any one of these should
be the cause]:
| A single text of Scripture
upsets, equally, all the heretical notions of the soul's
relation to bondage. |
Aph.
54.* And this
[opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of causes
alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that
declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that
point.
a.
And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those
[supposed causes already treated of,] among which its essential
character [§ 6. b.] is the first, this
would be contradictory to such texts as, 'Witness, intelligent, alone,
and without the [three] qualities [is the soul]:'2
such is the meaning.
b.
The expression 'and so much for that point' means,
p. 57 that
the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here
closes.
c.
The case, then, stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are
overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, 'There would be no fitness in
the enjoining' [see § 7], &c., it is
ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is
just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.
d.
But then, in that case, [some one may say], this conjunction of Nature
and of the soul [§ 54. c.], whether it
be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§
5. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated.
Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as follows]:
| How the true cause of bondage
affects not the emancipated. |
Aph.
55.* Moreover,
the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take
place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity,
p. 58 [in
this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated].
a.
'The conjunction thereof,' i.e., the conjunction of Nature and of the
soul; this conjunction, moreover, does not take place again 'through
non-discrimination,' i.e., through the want of a discrimination
[between Nature and soul] in the emancipated, [who do
discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing
to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]: such is the
meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are not on a
level, [under the circumstances stated at § 54. c.]:
such is the import.
| The true cause of bondage, in
other words, non-discrimination. |
Aph.
56.* Bondage
arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].2
a.
Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage]
p. 59 which
is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it:]
| Non-discrimination is removable
by discrimination alone. |
Aph.
56.* The removal
of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness.
a.
The necessary means, established throughout the world, in such cases
as 'shell-silver' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver],
viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by this alone is
'its removal,' i.e., the removal of the non-discrimination [between
Nature and soul], to be effected, and not by works, or the
like: such is the meaning: just as darkness, the dark, is removed by
light alone, [and by no other means].
b.
'But then [some one may say], if merely the non-discrimination of
Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on
the want of discrimination], the cause of bondage, and if merely the
discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would
be liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's
possessing] a body, &c.; and this is contrary to Scripture,
p. 60 to the
institutes of law, and to sound reasoning.' To this he replies:
| The discrimination of Nature, as
other than soul, involves all discrimination. |
Aph.
57.* Since the
non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the
non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this
will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].
a.
By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul,
what non-discrimination of other things there is, such
as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something
other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation
of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the
non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something
other than soul,] does occur, it is based on the
non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none
antecedent [viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect
[and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature,] is,
itself, an effect, [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of
its cause].
p. 61
b.
The state of the case is this: as, when the soul has been
discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it
should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties],
the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own
properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the
cause, when soul, in its character of unalterableness, &c.,
has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there
should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products
thereof [i.e., of Nature], such as the 'understanding,' and the like,
which have the character of being modifications [of primal
Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].*
c.
But then [some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a
conceit [entertained by people in general,] of a Nature [or
primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding,'
&c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first
principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into],
such as, 'I am ignorant,' and so on, can be accounted for on the
ground simply of an 'understanding,' &c., [without postulating a
primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding,'
&c.]:'
p. 62 well,
if any one says this, I reply, 'no;' because, unless there were such a
thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the
following, viz., 'Having died, having died, again, when there is a
creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell;' because
no products, such as the 'understanding,' when they have
perished, can be created anew, [any more than a gold-bracelet, melted
down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from
the materials].
| The soul's confounding itself
with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself
with anything else. |
d.
Moreover, it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the
identity of themselves with their] 'understanding,' &c., is [the primary
cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by anything; because
'understanding' and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects.
Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some
predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of
one's identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a
conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and
nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this
in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform
[deferentially] to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary
life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c.,
produced
p. 63 by a
field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and,
from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the
ownership of] the bracelets, or other things, formed of that gold;
and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically
antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one's property],
there is the removal of those, [i.e., the removal of the conceits that
the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding
products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property:
and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the
'understanding,' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of
which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].
e.
[And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge
of a regressus ad infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may
assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be
asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to it; or
if it be supposed thut we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle,
when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the
cause of
p. 64 its continuing
so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is,
reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that] there
is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency,' in the
case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in
the case of the self-continuance1
thereof, [i.e., of that error of confounding one's self with Nature];
because [these two are alike] without antecedent, like seed and
sprout, [of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old
puzzle, 'which was first, the acorn, or the oak?' being a frivolous
question].
f.
But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul's bondage [at one
time], and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one
time], and its non-discriminatian [at another], then this is in
contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that
it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;' and it is in
contradiction to such texts as this, viz., 'The absolute truth is
this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production
[of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is
it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated;
[seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].'3
This [charge of inconsistency] he repels:
|
|
|
|
|
|
p. 65
| The bondage of the soul is
merely verbal. |
Aph.
58.* It is merely
verbal, and not a reality1
[this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides
in the mind, [and not in the soul].
a.
That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind
[and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely
verbal, i.e., it is vox et praeterea nihil; because is is
merely a reflexion, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal
[when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false
imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no
contradiction to what had been said before, [as the objector (under §
57. f.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case.
p. 66
| Whether Testimony, or Inference,
without Perception, might not avail to dissipate the soul's
bondage. |
b.
But then, if bondage, &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal,
let them be set aside by hearing [that they are merely verbal],
or by argument [establishing that they are so]. Why, in the Scripture
and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a
discriminative knowledge [of Soul, as distinguished from Non-soul],
going the length of immediate cognition? To this he replies:
| The truth must be directly
discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony,
or of Inference. |
Aph.
59.* Moreover, it
[the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature,] is not to be removed by
argument; as that of a person perplexed about the points of the
compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.
a.
By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to
aggregate [or take in, along with 'argument'] 'testimony,' [or verbal
authority, which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove
the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception
of the real state of the case].
p. 67
b.
That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though [granted to
be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, by
inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving;
just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though
merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection], in the case of1
a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as
to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference,
without immediate cognition, i.e., without [his] directly perceiving
[how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate
perception 'testimony,' or 'inference,' may conduce, but the necessity
of which these media, or instruments of knowledge; cannot
supersede].
c.
Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows,
viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the assertion [in Aph.
56], viz., that 'The removal of it is to be effected by the
necessary means,' that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination
[between soul and Nature], is the remover of non-discrimination
[in regard to the matter in question], tell us, is that knowledge of a
like nature with the hearing
p. 68 [of
Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this
being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§ 59]:
'Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument,' &c. That is to
say: non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument,
or by testimony, unless there be discrimination as an immediate
perception; just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard
to [his] direction; because the only thing to remove an immediate
error is an immediate individual perception [of the truth. For
example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if
they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk
which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony
of a friend, that it is white; but still nothing will remove
his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk, except a
direct perception of whiteness.
d.
Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the
immediate discrimination [of Soul from
p. 69
Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination' [here
referred to].
e.
This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and
Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one
from the other, therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (pramáṉa)
which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible
realities] is [first] to be set forth:
| The evidence for things
imperceptible. |
Aph.
60.* The
knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference; as that of
fire [when not directly perceptible,] is by means of smoke, &c.
a.
That is to say: 'of things imperceptible,' i.e., of things not
cognizable by the senses, e.g., Nature and the Soul, 'the knowledge,'
i.e., the fruit lodged in the soul, is brought about by means of that
instrument of right knowledge [which may be called] 'Inference' (anumána),
[but which (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 5) is, more correctly, 'the
recognition of a Sign']; as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in
such and such a locality, where we cannot directly
p. 70
perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign,'
occasioned by smoke, &c.
b.
Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is]
not established by 'Inference,' is estalished by Revelation. But,
since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge],
in this [the Sánkhya] System, 'Inference' only is laid down [in the
aphorism,] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not
disregarded [in the Sánkhya system; as will be seen from Aph.
88 of this Book].
c.
He [next] exbibits the order of creation of those things among which
Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among
these, severally], preparatorily to the argument that will be
[afterwards] stated:
p. 71
| The twenty-five Realities
enumerated. |
Aph.
61.* Nature (prakṛiti)
is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas),
and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat);
from Mind, Self-consciousness (ahankára); from
Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra), and
both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and,
from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthúla-bhúta).
[Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of
twenty-five.
a.
'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness,'
&c., is their being neither less nor more [one than another]; that
is to say, the state of not being [developed into] an effect
[in which one or other of them predominates]. And thus 'Nature' is the
triad of 'Qualities' (guṉa), distinct from the products
[to which this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning.3
b.
These things, viz., 'Goodness,' &c., [though spoken of as the
three Qualities], are not 'Qualities' (guṉa) in the Vaiśeshika
sense of the word; because [the 'Qualities' of
p. 72 the Vaiśeshika
system have, themselves, no qualities (see Kaṇáda's 16th
Aph.); while] these have the qualities of Conjunction,
Disjunction, Lightness, Force,1
Weight, &c.2
In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word
'Quality' (guṉa) is employed [as the name of the three
things in question],3
because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary
rank in the scale of being], and because they form the cords
[which the word guṉa also signifies], viz., 'Mind,'
&c., which consist of the three [so-called] 'Qualities,' and which
bind, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.5
c.
Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (mahat),
viz., the principle of Understanding, (buddhi), is the product.
'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this
there are two products, (1) the
p. 73 'Subtile
Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs.' The 'Subtile Elements' are
[those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of
'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal,
are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the
five 'Gross Elements.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either
product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggregate of
things. That is to say, besides these there is nothing.
d.
He [next], in [several] aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring
[of the existence of these principles, the one from the other]:
| The existence of the 'Subtile
Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross.' |
Aph.
62.* [The
knowledge of the existence] of the five 'Subtile Elements' is [by
inference,] from the 'Gross Elements.'
p. 74
a.
'The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied, [to complete the
aphorism, from Aph. 60].
b.
Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist, by
Perception; [and] thereby [i.e., from that Perception; for Perception
must precede Inference, as stated in Gotama's 5th Aphorism,] are the 'Subtile
Elements' inferred, [the στοιχει̑α
στοιχείων of Empedocles].
And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as
follows:
(1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not
reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic],
consist of things [Subtile Elements, or Atoms,] which have distinct
qualities; [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour;
and so of the others]:
(2) Because they are gross;
|
|
|
|
|
|
(3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less
gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.; [the
gross web being formed of the less gross threads; and so of the
others].
| And thence that of
Self-consciousness. |
Aph.
63.* [The
knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference,]
from the external and internal
p. 75
[organs], and from these ['Subtile Elements,' mentioned in Aph.
62].
a.
By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs,
and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of
[the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.
b.
The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the
following [somewhat circular] manner:
(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made
up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:
(2) Because they are products of
Self-consciousness:
(3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not
made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i.e., is not a product
of Self-consciousness]; as the Soul, [which, not being made up
thereof, is not a product of it].
c.
But then, if it be thus [i.e., if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare,
that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness,
while Self-consciousness depends on Understanding,' or 'Intellect,' or
'Mind,' the first product of Nature' (see Aph.
61)], then [some may object, that], since it would be the case
that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar,
the jar made by him would disappear, on the beatification of the
potter, whose internal organ [or 'Understanding'] then surceases.
p. 76 And
this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case; because another
man [after the beatification of the potter,] recognizes that
'This is that same jar [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our
deceased acquaintance].'
d.
[In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's
beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his
internal organ [or 'Intellect'] which could be causes [as the jar
no longer can be,] of the emancipated soul's experiencing
[either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect
in general, nor [an end] of intellect altogether: [so that we might
spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns
the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the
potter surceases, on his beatification: but we may go further,
and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect'
of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the
surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be
stated as follows]:
e.
Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch.
vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why
jars and the like [continue to exist], and
p. 77 not
the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c., [who may lose their
Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiraṉyagarbha
(see Vedánta-śara, § 62), never loses his
Self-consciousness, while aught living continues].
| And thence that of Intellect. |
Aph.
64.* [The
knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that
[Self-consciousness, § 63].
a.
That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz.,
Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of
'Intellect' (buddhi), the great 'inner organ' (antaẖkaraṉa),
[hence] called 'the great one' (mahat), [the existence of which
is recognized] under the character of the cause of this
[product, viz., Self-consciousness].
b.
And so the application [again rather circular, of the process of
inference to the case,] is as follows:
(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made
out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind];
(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of
judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum;
and]
p. 78
(3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not
made out of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i.e., is not
a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul, [which is not made out of
this or of anything antecedent], &c.
c.
Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Every one, having
first determined anything under a concept [i.e., under such a form of
thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that this
which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action
of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, 'This is I,' or
'This ought to be done by me,' and so forth: so much is quite settled;
[and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now,
having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the
thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the
various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and
effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception,
and the subsequent occasional judgment, which is a function of
Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the
relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which
the [two sets of] functions belong; [and this is sufficient,] because
it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function
of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of
the cause; [nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any
p. 79
product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in the
cause of that product].
| And thence that of Nature. |
Aph.
65.* [The
knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference,] from that
['Intellect,' § 64].
a.
By inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., the principle [of
Intellect, termed], 'the Great one,' which is a product, there
comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as [its] cause.
b.
The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as
follows:
(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are
Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has
these affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:
(2) Because, whilst it is a product [and
must, therefore, have arisen from something consisting of that which
itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness;
[and]
p. 80
(3) [Every product that has the affections
of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in
something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c.
c.
For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore,
[is known to be mainly made up of, or] partakes of the quality of
'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore,
partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and
perhaps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of the
quality of Darkness.'
d.
And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is
[the principle], that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect
should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the
cause.
|
|
|
|
|
|
e. Now he
states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of] inference
for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause
and effect that has been mentioned,
p. 81 [in
the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its
various products]:
| The argument for the existence
of Soul. |
Aph.
66.* [The
existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination
[of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the
sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly
unintelligent products].
a.
'Combination,' i.e., conjunction, which is the cause [of all products;
these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts].
Since whatever has this quality, as Nature,2
Mind, and so on [unlike soul, which is not made up of parts],
is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that
soul exists: such is the remainder, [required to complete the
aphorism].
b.
But the application [of the argument, in this particular case, is as
follows]:
(1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the
'Great one,' with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent],
has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the
[eventual] Liberation of some other than itself:
p. 82
(2) Because it is a combination [or compages];
(3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a
seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its
several component parts render no mutual service].
c.
Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he
establishes the eternity of Nature (prakṛiti):
| Argument for the eternity of
Nature. |
Aph.
67.* Since the
root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.3
a.
Since 'the root' (múla), i.e., the cause of the twenty-three
principles, [which, with soul and the root itself, make up the
twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya,] 'has no root,'
i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhána), is
'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other
cause of Nature; because there would be
p. 83 a regressus
in infinitum, [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by
parity of reasoning, would require another cause; and so on without
end].
b.
He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, [as
follows]:
p. 84
| The employment of the term
Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debate the regressus in
infinitum. |
Aph.
68.* Even if
there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point; and
so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question, when we
speak of the root of things, under the the name of 'Nature'].
a.
Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if
there were a succession of causes,—another cause of Nature, and
another [cause] of that one, again,—there must be, at last, a halt,
or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one,
uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal
Agency (pra-kṛiti); for this [word prakṛiti,
usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is
nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root:
such is the meaning.
b.
But then [some Vedántí may object according to this view of
matters], the position that there are just twenty-five realities is
not made out; for, in addition to2
the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you,] is the
cause of Mind,3
another unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sára,
§ 21], presents
p. 85
itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as follows]:
| Nature and Soul alike uncreated. |
Aph.
69.* Alike, in
respect of Nature, [and of both Soul and Nature, is the argument for
the uncreated existence].2
a.
In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the cause which is the
root [of all products], the same side is taken by us both, the
asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí]. This
may be thus stated: As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production
of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such
texts as this, viz.: 'This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was
produced from the great Spirit.'*
Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be
asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal
production of both; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the
two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in
the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c.,
is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken
of,] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned;
for there is mention
p. 86 of
[such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of
the Kaurma [Puráṉa], beginning, 'Of action [or
the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and so on. And, as there
is no mention, in Scripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as
figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance,
which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism
of the Yoga, to be [not a separate entity, but] 'an affection
of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the
twenty-five] Realities, [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to
be styled ignorance].
b.
Or [according to another, and more probable, interpretation
p. 87 of the
aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in
support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning.
c.
But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of arriving, by
inference, at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature,
Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, in the shape of
discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the
case of all [men]? In regard to this point, he states [as
follows]:
| All do not profit by the saving
truth; because it is only the best kind of people that are
fully amenable to reason. |
Aph.
70.* There is no
rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth];
because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of
three descriptions.
a.
For those privileged [to enguge in the inquiry] are of three
descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting,
are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sánkhya]
arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside], by means of the
sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the
mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made
to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side,
by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these
people employ them to prove], or by
p. 88
arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha].
But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in
the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process
of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]:
such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs
reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning.
b.
He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and
'Self-consciousness'; [the reader being presumed to remember that
Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be
familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements'
(see § 61)]:
| By 'the Great one' is meant
Mind. |
Aph.
71.* The first
product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called 'the Great
one,' is Mind.
a.
'Mind' (manas). 'Mind' [is so called], because its function is
'thinking' (manana). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (niśchaya).
That of which this is the function
p. 89 is
'intellect' (buddhi); and that is the first product,
that called 'the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning.
| The relation of
Self-consciousness to Mind. |
Aph.
72.*
'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]
a.
'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I
exist,' 'I do this, that, and the other thing'], is that which
is subsequent: that is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after
'the Great one' [§ 71].
b.
Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which
brings out the Ego, in every case of cognition, the matter of
which cognition would, else, have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature,
the formless Objective], it therefore follows that the others [among
the phenomena of mundane existence,] are effects of this
[Self-consciousness]; and so he declares [as follows]:
p. 90
| All products, save Mind, result
from Self-consciousness. |
Aph.
73.* To the
others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of
Self-consciousness].
a.
'To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Self-consciousness:
that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the
others,2
the eleven 'Organs' (indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,'
and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the
Subtile elements.
b.
But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relinquish your dogma,
that Nature is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares [as
follows]:
p. 91
|
|
|
|
|
|
p. 91
| Nature, immediately the cause of
Mind, is, mediately, the cause of all other products. |
Aph.
74.* Moreover,
mediately, through that [i.e., the 'Great one' (§ 71)]
the first [cause, viz., Nature,] is the cause [of all products]; as is
the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes,
of jars, &c.].
a.
'Moreover, mediately,' i.e., moreover, not in the character of the
immediate cause, 'the first,' i.e., Nature, is the Cause of
'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately,] through 'the Great
one' and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiśeshikas,
the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,]
through combinatians of two atoms, and so on: such is the meaning.
b.
But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them
is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this,
he declares [as follows]:
p. 92
| Why Nature is the sole cause. |
Aph.
75.* While both
[Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one
[viz., Soul,] is devoid [of this character of being a cause], it is
applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature].
a.
That is to say: 'while both,' viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent
to every product, still, 'since the one,' viz., Soul, from the fact of
its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a
jar], must be 'devoid,' or lack the nature of a cause, 'it is
applicable,' i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other
of the two.
b.
But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since
there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this,
he says:
p. 93
| Why the theory of a plastic
Nature is preferable to that of Atoms. |
Aph.
76.* What is
limited cannot be the substance of all [things].
a.
That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]; as yarn
cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the
theory suggested,] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all]
things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause.
Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning.
b.
He alleges Scripture in support of this:
| Scripture declares in favour of
the theory. |
Aph.
77.* And [the
proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text
of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from
Nature].
a.
An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in §
76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon
authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of
the world, in such terms as, 'From Nature the world arises,' &c.
p. 94
b.
But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is
seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence
be the cause [of each product]; since this is an invariable
antecedent, [and, hence, a cause; 'the invariable antecedent being
denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be
trusted]. To this he replies:
Aph.
78.* A thing is
not made out of nothing.
a.
That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a
nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an
entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of
a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be
unreal: such is the meaning.
b.
Let the world, too, be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any
ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows]:
p. 95
| Reasons why the world is not to
be supposed unreal. |
Aph.
79.* It [the
world] is not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory [to its
reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes,
[leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].
a.
When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster,
which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being
silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition,
that this is not silver. But, in the case in question [that of
the world regarded as a reality], no one ever has the cognition, 'This
world is not in the shape of an entity,' by which [cognition,
if any one ever really had such,] it being an entity might be opposed.
b.
And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved
cause; e.g., some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow,
through such a fault as the jaundice, [which depraves his eye-sight].
But, in the case in question, [that of the world regarded as a
reality], there is not such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of
the senses]; because all, at all times, cognize the world as a
reality. Therefore the world is not an unreality.
p. 96
c.
But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the
[substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not
[necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares
[as follows]:
| The product of something is
something; and that of nothing, nothing. |
Aph.
80.* If it [the
substantial cause,] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that
the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity]
therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it
possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it
is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the
relation of identity]?
a.
If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], then,
since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present
themselves in the product, 'this would be the case,' i.e., it would be
the case that the product was real, 'because of union therewith,'
i.e., because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is
its subatratum]. [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a nonentity
[were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by
reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world's being
[on that supposition,] necessarily a non-entity, [like its supposed
cause], how could this be the case, [that it would be real]?
p. 97
|
|
|
|
|
|
b. But
then [a follower of the Mímáṅsá may say], since [it
would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity,
let works alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of
the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies:
| Action cannot serve as a
substratum. |
Aph.
81.* No; for works
are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product].
a.
Granting that 'the uneeen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may
be an instrumental cause, [in bringing about the mundane
condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the
character of the substantial cause [of any product]: and our
theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be
accepted; because Liberation arises [see § 56,3
and § 83,] from discerning the distinction
between Nature and the Soul.
p. 98
b.
But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by
undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there
for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies:
| Salvation is not to be obtained
by ritual observances |
Aph.
82.* The
accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation] is not moreover, through
Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which
is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is
accomplished through acts, [and is therefore, a product,
and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the
ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births.
a.
'Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they
are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not
thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.e., the
accomplishment of Liberation; 'because one is liable to repetition of
births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was
accomplished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated
p. 99 [soul]
is still liable to repetition of births,1
inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal,
[just] because it is [the result of] acts. For this
reason, the chief end of man does not consist in this, [which is
gained through ritual observances].
b.
He shows what does constitute the chief end of man:
| In regard to the attainment of
the chief end of man, the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya. |
Aph.
83.* There is
Scripture for it, that he who has attained to discrimination, in
regard to these [i.e. Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births.
a.
'In regard to these,' i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who
has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in
consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no
repetition of births; the text, viz., 'He does not return
again,'4
&c.
p. 100
b.
He states an objection to the opposite view:
| Pain can lead only to pain, not
to liberation from it. |
Aph.
84.* From pain
[occasioned, e.g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the
sacrificer, and not liberation from pain]; as there is not
relief from chilliness, by affusion of water.
a.
If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as
sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains,
Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the
qualities of its cause,] would include a variety of pains; and it
would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end: for, to
one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion or water does not
bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional]
chilliness.
b.
But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of
pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]; but
the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things
desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, 'By
means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,' &c.
To this he replies:
p. 101
| The character of the end
contemplated makes no difference in regard to the
transitoriness of what is effected by works. |
Aph.
85.* [Liberation
cannot arise from acts]; because whether the end be something
desirable, or undesirable, [and we admit that the motive of the
sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no
difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and,
therefore, not eternal, but transitory].
a.
Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works
done without desire, [on the part of the virtuous sacrificer], still,
though there is a difference [as you contend,] between [an act
done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference
to enjoyment, this makes no difference with repect to the fact of the
Liberation's being produced by acts, [which, I repeat, permanent
Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain; for it [the
Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be
perishable, because it is a production. The text which declares
that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has
reference to knowledge, [which, I grant, may be gained by such
means]; and Liberation comes through knowledge; so that these [works]
are instruments of Liberation
p. 102 mediately:
[but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate
cause].
b.
[But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place
[as you Sánkhyas contend,] through the knowledge of the distinction
between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the
Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means],
mundane life may return, were both on an equality, [we, whose
Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory, and you Sánkhyas,
whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of
reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies:
p. 103
| The right means effect
Liberation once for all. |
Aph.
86.* Of him who
is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it
[i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge,] is absolute:3
there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on
works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise,
only to return again to earth].
a.
Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is
free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [see §
56,1]
is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal
thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of
Non-discrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be
a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of
Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such]
similarity, [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector,
under § 85. b.].
b.
It has been asserted [in § 61,] that there is a
class of twenty-five [things which are realities], and, since these
cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by
p. 104 proof,
therefore he displays this; [i.e., he shows what he means by
proof]:
| What is meant by evidence. |
Aph.
87.* The
determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul
and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' (pramá).
What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given
'right notion'], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or
evidence, (pramáṉa)].
a.
'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramátṛi);
in short, not previously known. The 'determination,' i.e., the
ascertainment [or right comprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is
'right notion'; and, whether this be an affection 'of both,'
i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of
only one or other of the two, [as others hold,] either way,
'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is
[what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramáṉa): such is
the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several
species falling to beconsidered hereafter]: such is the meaning.
p. 105
b.
It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in
their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,]
the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things
remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and
'discrimination,' [which excludes doubt].
c.
In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge],
if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the Soul [see §
87. a.], then the [proof, or] evidence is an affection of
the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the 'right notion' is
spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection
[of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it
[the proof, or evidence, or whatever we may choose to call that from
which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ
[with its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to
sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul's cognition
and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases of] 'right
notion,' then both of these aforesaid [the affection of the
Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its
appropriate object, &c., in the other
p. 106
case,] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramáṉa). You
are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken
of as 'evidence,' it is only as being mediately [the sources of
right knowledge].
d.
How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies:
| There are three kinds of
evidence. |
Aph.
88.* Proof is of
three kinds:1
there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established,
then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these
three proofs].
a.
'Proof is of three kinds;' that is to say, 'perception'
p. 107 (pratyaksha),
'the recognition of signs' (anumána), and 'testimony' (śabda),
are the [three kinds of] proofs.
b.
But then [some one may incline to say], let 'comparison' [which is
reckoned, in the Nyáya, a specifically distinct source of knowledge],
and the others [such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in
like manner, in the Mímáṅsá], also be instruments of right
knowledge, [as well as these three], in [the matter of] the
discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, 'because, if
those [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the
three kinds of proof established, 'everything [that is really true]
can be established [by means of them], there is no establishment of
more;' no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out; because of
the cumbrousness [that sins against the philosophical maxim, that we
are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case]:
such is the meaning.
c.
For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only a triad of proofs,
where he says [see the Institutes, Ch. xii., v. 105]: 'By that man who
seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, [these] three [sources of
right knowledge] must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference,
and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute,
p. 108
&c.].' And 'Comparison,' and 'Tradition' (aitihya), and the
like, are included under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception'
(anupalabdhi) and the like are included under Perception; [for
the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is
nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without
a jar on it].
d.
He [next] states the definitions of the varieties [of proof, having
already (§ 87) given the general definition]:
Aph.
89.* Perception (pratyakska)
is that discernment which, being in3
conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.
a.
'Being in conjunction,' [literally,] 'existing in conjunction;'
p. 109
'portrays the form thereof,' i.e., assumes the form of the thing with
which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel
into which it is poured]; what 'discernment,' or affection of the
Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see
Yoga Aphorisms, I., § 5 and § 8. b.)] is the evidence
[called] Perception: such is the meaning.
b.
But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of Perception (§
89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is
intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of
things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening
things as interrupt ordinary perception]; because there is, here, 'no
form of the thing, in conjunction' [with the mind of him who
perceives it, while absent]: having pondered this doubt, he corrects
it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of
perception] is not what he intends to define:
p. 110
| The definition not to be blamed,
though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic. |
Aph.
90.* It is not a
fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of
adepts in the Yoga]; because that of the adepts in the Yoga
is not an external perception.
a.
That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here
defined; and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external
[organs of sense]. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition];
i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these;
[because there is no intention to include them].
b.
[But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to
expect,] he states the real justification [of the definition in
question]:
| But the definition does apply to
the perceptions of the mystic. |
Aph.
91.* Or, there is
no fault [in the definition], because of the conjunction, with causal
things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.4
p. 111
a.
Or, be it so that the perception of the Yogí, also, shall be
the thing to be defined; still there is no fault [in our definition, §
89]; it does not fail to extend [to this, also]; since the mind of
the Yogí, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced
by concentration, does come into conjunction with things [as
existent] in their causes, [whether or not with the things as
developed into products perceptible by the external senses].
b.
Here the word rendered 'causal' (lína) denotes the things, not
in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in §
89. b.]; for we, who assert that effects exist
[from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects,
and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their
causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially
exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic,
or the clairvoyant,] is possible.
| Objection, that the definition
does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord.' |
c.
But then, [some one may say,] still this [definition] does not extend
to the Lord's perceptions; because, since these are from
everlasting, they cannot
p. 112 result
from [emergent] conjunction. To this he replies:
| That any 'Lord' exists is not
proved. |
Aph.
92.* [This
objection to the definition of Perception has no force]; because it is
not proved that there is a Lord (íśwara).
a.
That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception], because
there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied [from §
90].
b.
And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance
with3
the arrogant dictum of [certain] partisans [who hold an opinion not
recognized by the majority]. Therefore, it is to be understood, the
expression employed is, 'because it is not proved that there is
a Lord,' but not the expression, 'because there is no Lord,'
p. 113
|
|
|
|
|
|
c. But,
on the implication1
that there is a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our
definition of Perception, (§ 89),] is merely the
being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction [of a
sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the 'Lord' may be
of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to
come from the same source].
d.
Having pondered the doubt, 'How should the Lord not be proved
[to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, [which declare his
existence]?' he states a dilemma which excludes [this]:
| A dilemma, to exclude proof that
there is any 'Lord.' |
Aph.
93.* [And,
further,] it is not proved that he [the 'Lord,'] exists; because
[whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound,
he can be neither the one nor the other.
a.
The 'Lord' whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles,
&c.? Or is he in bondage through these?
p. 114
Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not
proved that there is a 'Lord:' such is the meaning.
b.
He explains this very point:
| The force of the dilemma. |
Aph.
94.* [Because,]
either way, he would be inefficient.
a.
Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which [as
compulsory motives,] would instigate him to create; and, if he were
bound, he would be under delusion; he must be [on either alternative,]
unequal to the creation, &c. [of this world].
b.
But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the
Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies:
p. 115
| The import of the texts which
speak of the 'Lord.' |
Aph.
95.* [The
Scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord' are either
glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized3
[deities of the Hindu pantheon].4
a.
That is to say: accordingly as the case may be, some text
[among those in
which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended, in the
shape of a glorification [of Soul], as the 'Lord,' [as Soul is held to
be], merely in virtue of junction [with Nature], to incite [to still
deeper contemplation], to exhibit, as what is to be known, the
liberated Soul, i.e., absolute Soul in general; and some other text,
declaratory, for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by
resolution [to create, is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind
of the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the
eternity, &c., of the familiarly known3
Brahmá,
p. 116
Vishṉu, Śiva, or other non-eternal 'Lord;' since
these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality], &c.,
[and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a
secondary sense; [seeing that the Soul, in every combination,
is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].
b.
But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under §
95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.], the fact that it [viz.,
Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the
case; for, in the world, we speak of government in reference only to
modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so
shall take place], &c. To this he replies:
p. 117
| Soul, like the lode stone, acts
not by resolve, but through proximity. |
Aph.
96.* The
governorship [thereof, i.e., of Soul over Nature] is from [its]
proximity thereto, [not from its resolving to act thereon]; as is the
case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron].
a.
If it were alleged that [its, Soul's] creativeness, or [its]
governorship, was through a resolve [to create, or to govern],
then this objection [brought forward under § 95. b.]
would apply. But [it is not so; for,] by us [Sánkhyas,] it is
held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the
like, is merely from [its] proximity [to Nature]; 'as is the
case with the [lodestone] gem.'
b.
As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity,
without resolving [either to act or to be acted on], &c., so, by
the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the
principle [called] the 'Great one,' [or Mind, (see §
61. c.)]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as]
its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it:
such is the meaning
p. 118
c.
And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Puráṉas1]:
'As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone,] stands void of
volition, just so this world is created by a deity who is mere
Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the Soul, both agency
[seemingly,] and non-agency, [really]. It is not an agent,
inasmuch as it is void of volition; [and it is] an agent,
merely through approximation [to Nature].'
d.
In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls overrule, merely
through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]:
p. 119
| In like manner, embodied souls
do not energize. |
Aph.
97.* In the case
of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls
[is solely through proximity].
a.
'The agency is solely through proximity:' so much is supplied [from §
96].
b.
The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particular
productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as
contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump, (see Vedánta-sára,
§ 67)],—animal souls, i.e., souls in which the intellects [of
individuals] reflect themselves [see § 99. a.],
overrule, merely through proximity, but not through any effort; seeing
that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.
c.
But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient
'Lord,' through the doubt of a blind tradition, [in the absence of an
intelligently effective guardianship], the Vedas would cease to
be an authority; [a possibility which, of course, cannot be
entertained for an instant]. To this he replies:
p. 120
| How the Vedas need not the
'Lord' to authenticate them. |
Aph.
98.* The
declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá, for
example], since he knows the truth, [is authorative
evidence].
a.
To complete [the aphorism, we must say], 'since Hiraṉyagarbha
[i.e., Brahmá,] and others [viz., Vishṉu and Śiva],
are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is true, the declaration
of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the
speakers, is evidence [altogether indisputable].'
b.
But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§
96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the
term,—as the magnet may be said, is a secondary sense, to draw the
iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and
literally, the iron draws the magnet],—who is the primary [or
actual,] overruler? In reference to this, he says:
p. 121
| It is in the shape of the
internal organ, that Nature affects Soul. |
Aph.
99.* The internal
organ,1
through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the
overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet].
a.
The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through
its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its
being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself
in [and contemplate itself in,] Soul; 'just as the iron,' that is to
say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in
consequence of [its] mere proximity, [and so acquires magnetism by
magnetic induction].
b.
He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct
perception,] states the definition of inference (anumána):
p. 122
Aph.
100.* The
knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the
connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference.
a.
That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth,] is [a
kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, [which is
none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant
accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by 'connexion'
(pratibandha) here being meant 'constant attendedness' (vyápti);
and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has
possession of any general principle].
b.
But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul; [whilst an
Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of
knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal organ, or
understanding (see § 87. c.)]
c.
He [next] defines testimony (śabda):
p. 123
Aph.
101.* Testimony
[such as is entitled to the name of evidence, is a declaration by one
worthy [to be believed].
a.
Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;' and so the evidence which is
called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable
declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the
understanding, or internal organ (see § 100. b.)]
the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, [which is called,]
'knowledge by hearing' (śabda-bodha).
b.
He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth
[the various divisions of] evidence:
| Why the kinds of Evidence have
been here set forth. |
Aph.
102.* Since the
establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by
means of evidence, the decaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of
evidence, has been here made].
a.
It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are
established as being distinct, [the one from the
p. 124
other]: therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared: such
is the meaning.
b.
Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by
which, especially, viz., by a proof which is one kind of inference,
Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively:
| The existence of Soul and Nature
argued from analogy. |
Aph.
103.* The
establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.
a.
[Analogy (sámányato dṛishṭa) is that kind of
evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an
argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives
from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something
which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the
means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for
instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where, under such
circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, i.e., not
cognizable by the senses, is established; as when,
p. 125 for
example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an
act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such
instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a
quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge,
viz., [the instrument named] Sense, is established [or inferred to
exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this
[species of inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul are proved
[to exist]: such is the meaning.
b.
Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from analogy for [the
existence of] Nature is as follows: the Great Principle [viz.,
Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is formed
out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the
aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61)
the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is [undeniably,] a
production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion;
just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like; [has the
characteristic properties
p. 126 of
the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of
gold, or the like].
c.
But, [as regards tht argument from analogy, in proof of the existence]
of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 66,
to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another;
because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for
instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the
benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard
to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that
they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something
of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is
inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c.,
[which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such
is the meaning.
d.
But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is
habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the
Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or
of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this
he replies:
p. 127
| When it is that experience
ceases. |
Aph.
104.* Experience
[whether of pain or pleasure, ends with the discernment of] Thought,
[or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].
a.
By 'Thought' [we mean] soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure,]
ceases, on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,'
though devoid of a beginning, [see Tarka-sangraha, § 92],
surceases [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be], so,
eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning,]
continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference
[between Nature and Soul]; so that experience [whether of pain or
pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of
the case.
b.
[But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it
must follow [which seems unreasonable,] that another is the
experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To
this he replies:
| The fruit of the action is not
always the agent's. |
Aph.
105.* The
experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the
agent; as in the case of food, &c.
p. 128
a.
As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who
was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof,
i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], so is the case here, also.
b.
Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to
silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles
it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine, [in regard to
the doubt started under § 104. b.]:
| To suppose that Soul acts and
experiences is an error. |
Aph.
106.* Or, [to
give a better account of the matter than that given in §
105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the
notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has
the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion].
a.
The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that
the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. b.)]
is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an
agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination;' that is to say,
because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and
Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it
is the agent that experiences the fruit; [whereas the actual
agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither
pain nor pleasure].
p. 129
b.
The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in §
106,] he states [as follows]:
| Soul is really neither agent nor
experiencer. |
Aph.
107.* And, when
the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor
experience].
a.
'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of
evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire
distinctness, one from the other], 'there is neither,' i.e., neither
the condition [as regards soul,] of an agent nor that of a patient.
b.
Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the
distribution of the subject-matter of evidence:
p. 130
| What is perceptible, under
certain circumstances, may be imperceptible, under others. |
Aph.
108.* [A thing
may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time,] not an
object, through there being, in consequence of great distance,
&c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on
the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].
a.
An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or
conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an
object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the
want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its
object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the
junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.
| What may prevent perception. |
b.
[To explain the '&c.,' and to exemplify the causes that may
prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the
thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of
great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not
perceived; [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the
collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a
thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall
[is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from
distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not
perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose];
through its subtilty,
p. 131 an
atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered
by the sound of a drum; and so on.
c.
How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,] comes the
imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares:
Aph.
109.* Her
imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtility.
a.
'Her,' i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By
subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as
a Naiyáyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the
consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the
Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive.
p. 132
b.
How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] Nature determined?
To this he replies:
| Nature inferred from the
existence of productions. |
Aph.
110.* [Nature
exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of
productions.
a.
As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the
beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the
knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have
the three Qualities; [(see § 62. a.) and
the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is
given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].
b.
Some [the Vedántís,] say that the world has Brahma as its
cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but
our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature
as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found
itself] thereon:
p. 133
| A doubt thrown on the existence
of Nature, by the contradiction of dissentients. |
Aph.
111.* If [you
throw out the doubt that] it [viz., the existence of Nature,] is not
established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other
views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].
a.
'Because of the the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya],
it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sánkhyas,]
is not established.
b.
But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if
a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then
an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for,] would be proved
to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare
that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accompanier of an
effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.],
that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production;
well,] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of
the aphorism].
|
|
|
|
|
|
c. He
states [his] doctrine [on this point]:
p. 134
| Mutual denials settle nothing. |
Aph.
112.* Still,
since1
each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere
unsupported] denial is not [decisive].
a.
If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then
[look you,] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could
it be established? If the one side is established by there
being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant
accompanier, on the recognition of that which is constantly
accompanied [by it], it is the same with my [side], also:
therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied
[in this peremptory fashion].
b.
Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from
effect be granted; how is it that this [cause] is Nature, and
nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies:
p. 135
| Nature the only hypothesis
consistent with what appears. |
Aph.
113.* Because
[if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a
contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].
a.
Quality is threefold [see § 61. a.],
viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness: there would be a contradiction
to these: such is the meaning.
b.
The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things
around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a
contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and
delusion, which is recognizable in the world; [because nothing, we
hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause, and
pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].
c.
He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is
that of what existed [antecedently], or of what did not exist:
p. 136
| What never existed will never
exist. |
Aph.
114.* The
production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.
a.
Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the
production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is,
that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time]
produced.
b.
He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent]
entity:
| A product cannot be of nothing. |
Aph.
115.* Because of
the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may
consist].
a.
And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the
cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always,
every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on
the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows]:
p. 137
| Else, anything might occur at
any time, anywhere. |
Aph.
116.* Because
everything is not possible everywhere and always [which might be the
case] if materials could be dispensed with].
a.
That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not
possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; 'everywhere,'
i.e., in every place; 'always,' i.e., at all times.
b.
For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of
what existed not [antecedently]:
| Effects preexist, potentially,
in their causes. |
Aph.
117.* Because it
is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what
is possible, [as a product of it].
a.
Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else
than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the
competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else
than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass:
therefore, since 'that which is competent,' viz., the cause, makes the
product which is 'possible' [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity
that the production takes
p. 138
place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was possibility]:
such is the meaning.
b.
He states another argument:
| The product is nothing else than
the cause. |
Aph.
118.* And
because it [the product,] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the
shape of the product].
a.
It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production,
moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect;
and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity,
production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the
meaning.
b.
He ponders a doubt:.
| A doubt whether that which is
can be said to become. |
Aph.
119.* If [it be
alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which
already is [then the answer will be found in the next
aphorism].
p. 139
a.
That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists
antecedently to its production], since the effect [every
effect,] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility
of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming, the adjunction of arising,
in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the
shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] 'arising'
[or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not
exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning.
b.
He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]:
| Production is only
manifestation; and so of the opposite. |
Aph.
120.* No; [do
not argue that what is cannot become; for] the employment and
the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation
[and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not].
a.
'No;' the view stated [in § 119] is not the
right one: such is the meaning.
b.
As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought
manifestly out by means of washing, &c.,
p. 140 so,
by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestness;
[whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden, [and no longer
appears as a pot].
c.
And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for
example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from
the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the
stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in
the husk, by threshing; &c.
d.
Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production
of an effect' are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the
manifestation of the effect: that is to say, the employment of
[the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of
what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term]
'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of
that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the
employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's
becoming an entity which was not an entity.
p. 141
e.
But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the
fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment
of the term] destruction?1
To this he replies:
| What is meant by destruction. |
Aph.
121.*
Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as
destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced].
a.
The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause
[i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted the jar], to this
are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction,' and the kind
of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its
destruction].4
p. 142
b.
[But some one may say], if there were [only] a resolution [of a
product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or
παλιγγενεσία]
of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it
is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can
discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed
into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is
changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively]
changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from
the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.
c.
Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that you
speak of under § 120] something real, or
something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore,
never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant
manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not
real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the
absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be
something real; and] there must be [in order to give rise to
it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation
can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,
p. 143 on
the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than
its cause]; and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. To this
he replies:
| How manifestation may occur
without being an entity. |
Aph.
122.* Because
they seek each other reciprocally,3
as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate
manifestation, from eternity to eternity].
a.
Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is
no fault; for there is no starting-point; as is the case with
seed and plant, [which people may suppose to have served, from
eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally].
p. 144
b.
He states another argument:
| The objections to the theory of
manifestation retorted. |
Aph.
123.* Or, [at
all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your
theory of] 'production.'
a.
Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it
is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be
production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as
you allege against our theory, under § 121.
c.] If it be not produced, then, pray, is this
because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it
is unreal, then production never is at all; so that it would never be
perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not
something produced,] because it is eternal, then there would be
at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you
will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since
'production' itself consists of production, what need of
supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then, in like
manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists
of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of
manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours,
also; [and
p. 145 thus
every objection stated or hinted under § 121. c.,
is capable of being retorted].
b.
He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the
products of Nature, mutually:
| The characters common to all
products. |
Aph.
124.* [A product
of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable,
multitudinous, dependent, mergent.
a.
'Caused,' i.e. having a cause. 'Uneternal,' i.e., destructible. 'Not
all-pervading,' i.e., not present everywhere. 'Mutable,' i.e.,
distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another
form], &c. It [the soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and,
probably, takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable,
as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous,' i.e., in consequence of the
distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body].
'Dependent,' [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent,' that is to say, it
[i.e., every product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which
it originated.
p. 146
b.
[But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas
enumerate (see § 61), and no more], pray, are
such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing;
you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an
hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he
replies:
| The qualities of the Nyáya are
implied in the term Nature. |
Aph.
125.* There is
the establishment of these [twenty-four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya,
which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly
enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as
contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya],
&c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another
point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in
which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].
p. 147
a.
Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four
principles, 'in reality,' truly, quite evidently,—since the
character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c.,
[which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—'
there is the establishment of these,' i.e., there is their
establishment [as realities,] through their being implied just in
those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya].
b.
The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the
aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because they are hinted
by [the term] Nature;' that is to say, the qualities, &c. [such as
Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are
hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are,
mediately, products of Nature; for there is no difference between
product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is
not by reason of their not being at all.
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.
He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products
agree:
p. 148
| The characters common to Nature
and her products. |
Aph.
126.* Of both
[Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three
Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are
irrational, &c., [is the common property].
a.
Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the
meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By
the expression '&c.' is meant [their] being intended for another,
[see § 66]. 'Of both,' i.e., of the cause [viz.,
Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the
meaning:
b.
He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three
Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent]
parts of Nature:
| In what the three Qualities
differ. |
Aph.
127.* The
Qualities [§ 62] differ in character mutually by
pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms,
severally, the Qualities present themselves].
a.
'Pleasantness,' i.e., Pleasure. By the expression
p. 149
'&c.' is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i.e., not
heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,' i.e., Pain. By the
expression '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (rajas),
which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,' i.e., stupefaction. By the
expression '&c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy
and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz.,
Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder,
[required to complete the aphorism].
b.
At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects
they agree:
| In what respects the Qualities
agree, as well as differ. |
Aph.
128.* Through
Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ.
a.
The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the
p. 150
shape of the term laghu, 'light,' is not one intended to call
attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but] is one
where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 'lightness' (laghutwa)]
is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,' i.e.,
through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the
Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by
the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually
predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one
another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in
another], for the sake of Soul.
b.
By [the expressions, in § 124,] 'caused,'
&c., it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products.
He states the proof of this:
| Proof that Mind &c. are
products. |
Aph.
129.* Since they
are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities],
Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the
like.
a.
That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the
p. 151 rest
are products; because they are something other than the two which
[alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.
b.
He states another reason:
Aph.
130.* Because of
[their] measure, [which is a limited one].
a.
That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; because they are
limited in measure; [whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz.,
Nature and Soul, are unlimited].
b.
He states another argument:
Aph.
131.* Because
they conform [to Nature].
a.
[Mind and the rest are products]; because they well [follow and]
correspond with Nature; i.e., because the Qualities of Nature [§
61] are seen in all things: [and it
p. 152 is a
maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and
implies the cause].
b.
He states the same thing, [in the next aphorism]:
Aph.
132.* And,
finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the
product can do aught].
a.
It is by the power of its cause, that a product energizes, [as a chain
restrains an elephant, only by the force of the iron which it is made
of]; so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of
Nature,] powerless, produce their products in subservience to
Nature. Otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at
all times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged that
they do].
b.
And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify the
completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others
should be regarded as products].
c.
He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from
negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn
p. 153 from
the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they
are not products]:
| Converse proof of the same. |
Aph.
133.* On the
quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature,
or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have
resolved itself].
a.
Product and non-product; such is the pair or alternatives. 'On the
quitting thereof;' i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of
product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul;
[these two alone being non-products].
b.
[But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite
independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard
to this, he declares [as follows]:
p. 154
| Mind and the rest would not be
at all, if neither product nor non-product. |
Aph.
134.* If they
were other than these two they would be void; [seeing that there is
nothing self-existent, besides soul and Nature].
a.
If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i.e., than product
or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the
shape of what is 'void,' i.e., in the shape of nonentity.
b.
Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of
a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being
such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a
sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To
this he replies:
| What kind of causes can be
inferred from their effects. |
Aph.
135.* The cause
is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products];
because it accompanies it.
a.
That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which
you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed,
where the nature [or
p. 155
essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect; as [is the case with]
the inference, from the rising of the moon, that the sea is swollen
[into full tide; rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who
was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning
of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart
from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, moon-rise, is not
seen in the effect, tide; and, consequently, though we infer the
effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the
effect]. But, in the present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest,
the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the
effect. 'Because it accompanies it,' i.e., because, in Mind and the
rest, we see the properties of Nature, [i.e., Nature herself actually
present; as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar, actually
present in the jar].
b.
[But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let that principle
itself, the 'Great one' [or Mind], be the cause of the world: what
need of Nature? To this he replies:
p. 156
| How Mind must have an
antecedent. |
Aph.
136.* The
indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and
resolvable] effect. [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which
constitute Nature].
a.
'It is resolved;' such is the import of [the term] linga, [here
rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great
principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be
inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of
ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and
perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e.,
since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,]
we infer that into which it is resolvable, [in other words, its
'cause,' here analogously termed lingin, since 'effect' has
been termed linga].
b.
But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be
the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of
yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:
p. 157
| Why Nature, and nothing else,
must be the root of all. |
Aph.
137.* There is
no denying that it [Nature,] is; because of its effects, [which
will be in vain attributed to any other source].
a.
Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a
product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to
be] the case with its cause, there would be a regressus in
infinitum. If effects be from any root [to which there is
nothing antecedent], then this is that [to which we give the
name of Nature]. 'Because of its effects,' that is to say,
because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it is,'
i.e., that Nature is.
b.
Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is; yet [the opponent may
contend,] Soul positively cannot be; for [if the existence of
causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus
demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has no products. In
regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:
p. 158
| It is not from any effect that
Soul is inferred. |
Aph.
138.* [The
relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of
establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with
[the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being
such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is
matter of dispute].
a.
There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing,' i.e., as
to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark
nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for
the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity
[of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading,
or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every
[philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there
being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma);
for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of
[thing,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mímáṅsá creed,
or good works, according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to
involve] 'merit.'
|
|
|
|
|
|
b. 'Not
the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e.,
the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it.
This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing
it.'
p. 159
c.
[But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its
organs, &c.: what need of imagining anything else? To this he
replies:
Aph.
139.* Soul is
something else than the body, &c.
a.
[The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.
b.
He propounds an argument in support of this:
| The discerptible is subservient
to the indiscerptible. |
Aph.
140.* Because
that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the
sake of some other, [not discerptible].
a.
That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is
indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is
discerptible, there would be a regressus ad infinitum.
b.
And combinedness [involving (see § 67)
discerptibleness,]
p. 160
consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of
mutual commixture; or [to express it otherwise,] combinedness is the
state of the soft and the hard, [which distinguishes matter from
spirit]. And this exists occultly in Nature, as well as the rest;
because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in
the products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c.
c.
He elucidates this same point:
| Soul presents no indication of
being material. |
Aph.
141.* [And Soul
is something else than the body, &c.]; because there is [in Soul,]
the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.
a.
Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three Qualities,'
&c., i.e., because they are not seen [in it]. By the expression
'&c.' is meant, because the other characters of Nature,
also, are not seen [in soul].
b.
He states another argument:
p. 161
| Another proof that Soul is not
material. |
Aph.
142.* And [Soul
is not material;] because of [its] superintedence [over Nature].
a.
For a superintendent is an intelligent being; and Nature is
unintelligent: such is the meaning.
b.
He states another argument:
Aph.
143.* [And Soul
is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer.
a.
It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul. Although
Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an
experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism,] is made, because
of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it, [and thus
makes it seem as if it experienced (see §
58. a.)].
b.
Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for
the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature;
p. 162
[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]?
To this be replies:
| For Soul, not Nature, is
Liberation wanted. |
Aph.
144.* [It is for
Soul, and not for Nature;] because2
the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a
condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].
a.
The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in
the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the
three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it
would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not
eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal]. The isolation (kaivalya)
of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and
not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and
that is Soul.
b.
Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies:
p. 163
Aph.
145.* Since
light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must
pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which,
self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].
a.
It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not
self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas
hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded
not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities],
then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the
simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light.
b.
And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two
following texts from the Bṛihadáraṉyaka Upanishad2]:
'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all
this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'
c.
[But the Naiyáyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in
its substance], but have Intelligence as its
p. 164
attribute. Thereby it manifests all things; but it is not,
essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies:
Aph.
146.* It [Soul,]
has not Intelligence as its attribute; because it is without quality.
a.
If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold
everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to
alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation; [its
attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be
affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the
only unalterable].
b.
He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this, [i.e.,
in the view which he is contending against]:
| Scripture is higher evidence
than supposed intuition. |
Aph.
147.* There is
no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because
the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence
or qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration
of the contrary].
p. 165
a.
The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned,'1
&c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities
[to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be
entertained for a moment].
b.
But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that the fact,
established by Scripture, of its [i.e., soul's,] being devoid of
qualities, &c., cannot be denied; because the Scripture itself
confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof, i.e., the
[supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c., [in the soul].
| Argument against the soul's
being unintelligent. |
Aph.
148.* [If soul
were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort,] in
profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.
a.
If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not
be a witness, a knower. But that this is not
p. 166 the
case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasanty.'
By the expression '&c.' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included.
b.
The Vedántís say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For
Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:' 'Being one
[only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (śakti),
i.e., Illusion (máyá), but not through its own essence, [to
which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says
[as follows]:
| There is a multiplicity of
souls. |
Aph.
149.* From the
several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be
inferred].
a.
'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are
included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i.e., from their
being appointed; [birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A
multiplicity of souls;' that is to say, souls
p. 167 are
many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, all
must be born, &c.
b.
He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others, [viz., of the Vedántís]:
| The view of the Vedánta on this
point. |
Aph.
150.* [The Vedántís
say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover,
multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case
with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces
that they occupy].
a.
As Space is one,—[and yet], in consequence of the difference of
adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, it is
[familiarly] said, 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for then there no
longer exists a space marked out by the jar];3—so,
also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a
difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof, [i.e.,
of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body], it is
merely a way of talking [to say], 'The soul has perished.' [This,
indeed, is so far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul; but
p. 168 then
it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls.
[And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without
beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the
appointment of birth and death?
b.
He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt [as to the point
in question]:
| Refutation of the Vedánta on
this point. |
Aph.
151.* The
investment is different, [according to the Vedántís], but not that
to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion
will be seen].
a.
'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John,
Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to
which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity,] belongs, is not
different, [but is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now
consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not
to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because
this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would present
itself where it ought not;3
[the destruction of Devadatta,
p. 169
e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case
of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be
dead]: and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta
makes an] imputation of in consistent conditions is quite evident;
since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong
[simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous]
non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which
the Vedántí may seek to avail himself, as an illustration,] are not
contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion; [whereas, on the
other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one
portion of a monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion; as a
monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, without being in
conjunction with the stem].
b.
What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies:
| The Sánkhya is free from the
charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open. |
Aph.
152.* Thus,
[i.e., by taking the Sánkhya view,] there is no imputation of
contradictory conditions to [a Soul
p. 170
supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended
monad].
a.
'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the
manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of
incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul
'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one, [i.e., as a monad].
b.
[But, the Vedántí may contend,] we see the condition of
another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's
character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than
Nature]. To this he replies:
Aph.
153.* Even
though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of
another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not
established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one
[absolutely simple, unqualified entity].
a.
[The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is
not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is
not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not
real. Neither birth nor
p. 171
death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is uncompanioned,
[i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions].
|
|
|
|
|
|
b.
[But the Vedántí may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to
the Scripture. For, according to that, 'Brahma is one without a
second:'2
'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded
man,] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.'3
To this he replies:
| Scripture, speaking of Soul as
one, is speaking of it generically. |
Aph.
154.* There is
no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of
Soul]; because the reference [in such texts,] is to the genus,
[or to Soul in general].
a.
But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter,] to
the Scriptures [which speak] of the Oneness of Soul; because those
[Scriptural texts] refer to the genus.
p. 172 By genus
we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to
this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have
reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its
indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls
than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive
[for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning.
b.
But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just
as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts
that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To
this he replies:
p. 173
| The compatibility of Bondage and
Freedom. |
Aph.
155.* Of him
[i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is
that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception
[of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really,
was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].3
a.
By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that
Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it],
i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz.,
the condition of isolation, [the condition (see §
144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no
real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark,
from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for
life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six
inches of the ground].
p. 174
b.
[Well, rejoins the Vedántí,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is
dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a
maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this
showing, we recognize as correct the theory that soul is one, but not
that of soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies:
Aph.
156.* No:
because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not
perceive?
a.
What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his
eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of
the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you
do not see them]: such is the meaning.'
b.
He declares, for the following reason, also, that souls are many:
p. 175
| Scripture proof that Souls are
many. |
Aph.
157.* Vámadeva,
as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the
Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same
Scriptures, in the Vedántic sense].
a.
In the Puráṉas, &c., we hear, Vámadeva has been
liberated,' 'Śuka has been liberated,' and so on. If Soul were one,
since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of
one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive
liberations] would be self-contradictory.
b.
[But the Vedántí may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many,
since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one
or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been
liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that
Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct,
[which, the Vedántí flatters himself, does not involve the
inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya], To this he replies:
p. 176
| As it has been, so will it be. |
Aph.
158.* Though it
[the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has
not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be
inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].
a.
Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day,
we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of
the view that there will be Liberation [of all Souls, so as to
leave a void].
b.
He states another solution [of the difficulty]:
| The stream of mundane things
will flow on for ever. |
Aph.
159.* As now
[things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there
will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].
a.
Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation
successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary
consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As now, so
everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there
p. 177 will
be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the
world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal.
b.
On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§
157. b.], we should find a universal void; so that the
doubt2
is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be
an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so,
since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit
being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its adjunct,]
came to an end, the world would become void, [on the Vedánta theory,
as well as on the Sánkhya].
c.
Now, [if the Vedántí says,] there will not be a void, because
adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory
that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared]:4
'For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard
to the fact that Nature
p. 178 and
Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not
be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the
universe.'
d.
Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free?
If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there
is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence,] departed, then it [Soul,]
would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal.
If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then
meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of
liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies:
p. 179
| Soul is ever free, though it may
seem bound in all sorts of ways. |
Aph.
160.* It [Soul,]
is altogether free [but seemingly] multiform [or different, in
appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being
bound].3
a.
It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see §
19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom,]
is effected by meditation, &c., [which are, therefore, not
unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.].
b.
It has been declared that Soul is a witness.2
Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained
to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there
p. 180 is
no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple
entity, but something combined with the character of a
spectator or witness]. To this he replies:
Aph.
161.* It [Soul,]
is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it,
on liberation].
a.
A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith,
it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with
sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)],
when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?
b.
[Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature is Soul?
To this he replies:
p. 181
| The real condition of Soul. |
Aph.
162.* [The
nature of Soul is] constant freedom.5
a.
'Constant freedom:' that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid
of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19];
because Pain and the rest are modifcations of Understanding, [which
(see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from
which Soul is really distinct].
Aph.
163.* And,
finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure,
alike].
a.
By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered
'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is
completed.]
b.
[Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in
Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]?
To this he replies:
p. 182
| How Soul, which is not an agent,
is yet spoken of as such. |
Aph.
164.* [Soul's fancy
of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature],1
from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.
a.
[Its] 'being an agent,' i.e., Soul's fancy of being an agent, is 'from
the proximity of Intellect,' 'through the influence' of Nature, [(see §
19,) of which Intellect (see § 61) is a
modification].
b.
The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is
meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see
[practised] in the Scriptures, [e.g., where it is said, in the Veda:
'Soul is to be known; it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it
does not come again, it does not come again'4].
p. 183
c.
So much, in this Commentary1
on the illustrious Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya, for
the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sánkhya
system].
END OF BOOK I.
Suggested Further Reading
Footnotes
p. 12
* Instead
of 'indestructible' read 'impracticable.'
**
Remove the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.'
Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore
edition of Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya.
p. 16
3
Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted
continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that
definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator,
who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a,
in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered 'undue
result.' For the synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga,
respectively, see Aph. 53. with the comment on
it, and the comment on Aph. 151. of this Book.
Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these
terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,'
&c. As technicalities, they generally signify 'illegitimately
extended application' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed.
p. 17
2 Upádhi,
for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed.
p. 20
1 This is
the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed.
p. 21
1 The
Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first
edition. Vijnána here supplies the comment. Ed.
p. 23
* 'That is
to say,' &c., See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational
Refutation, &c., p. 63.
p. 25
* Read,
instead of 'your own implied dogma,' 'the dogma which you accept.'
p. 29
2 Vásaná,
a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages
of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof.
Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining
unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the
resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed.
p. 36
1 The
brackets are of my inserting. Ed.
p. 38
1 Vyabhichára
is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the
translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who
renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' 'derogation,'
'failure,' 'impossibility,' 'unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical
technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle
term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed.
p. 42
3 For vyabhichára,
the word used in the original, see 1, at p.
38, supra. Ed.
4 Here
again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichára. Ed.
p. 43
1 I have
inserted the words 'in product and substance.' Ed.
2 The
original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of
negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English equivalents
of this term, occurring in the singlar number; see Book VI., Aph.
15 and 63.
Ed.
3
'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated
'successive' in Aph. 38. a, at p. 41, supra.
Ed.
p. 52
1 Śwetáśwatara
Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed.
* 'That is
to say,' &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation,
&c., p. 119.
p. 53
1 Upádhi;
often, below, 'investment' and 'adjunct.' Ed.
2 Bhagavad-gítá,
ii., 24. Ed.
3 'Text'
and 'maxim' are here meant to represent śruti and smṛiti,
taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for
the same terms; in wider acceptations, 'books of Scripture and of
law,' &c. The first is 'revealed law,' the Vedas; the second,
'memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mánava, and also
any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have
originated from a superhuman source; but only the former is regarded
as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed.
4 The
anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the
original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien,
vol. ii., p. 61.
p. 54
2 For
another rendering, see my translation of the Rational Refutation,
&c., p. 57. Ed.
p. 55
1 Dr.
Ballantyne should have taken 'unseen' and 'works' as in apposition,
and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. Ed.
4
Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed.
p. 56
2 Śwetáśwatara
Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed.
p. 58
2 These
words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., were pointed
out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment attached to them,
no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he republished the Sánkhya
Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted them. Hence the
brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the numbering of the
Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. Ed.
[* Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from the
Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. My copy
of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Híránanda Chaube, who
prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what corrpesonds
to pp. 1-183, supra, in which additions, compressions,
interpolations, and other alterations lawlessly made by him, and
scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable
frequency.]
p. 61
* For
another rendering {of the text from § 56 b through § 57 b},
from a text here and there somewhat different, see the Rational
Refutation, & c., pp. 12, 13.
p. 64
1 To
render vásaná, on which see 2, at
p. 29, supra. Ed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 Amṛitabindu
Upanishad, v. 10. See Dr. Albrecht Weber's Indische Studien,
vol. ii., p. 61, note 2. Ed.
[* The verses in question also occur as ii., 32, of Gauḍapáda's
Máṇḍúkyopanishat-káriká. They are quoted and
translated in the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 189, 190,
where they are professedly taken, I cannot now say how tenably, from
the Vivekachúḍámaṇi, which is credulously
affiliated on Śankara Áchárya.]
p. 65
1
Aniruddha has: 'But it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. Ed.
p. 67
1 Here I
have had to make several insertions and other alterations. Dr.
Ballantyne had: 'That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul]
is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving;
just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the
case,' &c. Ed.
p. 71
3 For a
translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational
Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed.
p. 72
1 Balavattwa;
for which I find the variant chalatwa, 'mobility.' Ed.
2 Read:
'Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for
they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and
separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity,
&c.' Vaiśeshiká guṇah́ is equivalent to
the viśesha-guṇáh́ in the original of Book
V., 25. a. For the 'specific qualities,' see the Bháshá-parichchheda,
st. 90. Ed.
3 For 'is
employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (teshu),
[namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed.
5 For a
different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c.,
pp. 43, 44. Ed.
p. 81
2 Here
indicated by the adjective avyakta, 'the indiscrete.' See Aph.
136 of this Book. Ed.
p. 82
3 This
seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root, the root [or radical
principle, in the Sánkhya,] is rootless.'
In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange
reading: 'The root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This
is very like saying that A = A. Ed.
p. 84
2 Read 'in
connexion with.' Ed.
3
Literally, instead of 'Mind,' the principle [termed] the Great one.' Ed.
p. 85
2 This is
Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a remark of Vijnána,
quoted and translated below, in b. The rendering now replaced
runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us], in respect of Nature.'
The side-note was formerly correspondent to a., viz.: 'He meets
a Vedántic objection.' Ed.
* 'This
Ignorance,' &c. The original of this is i., v., 4, of the Vishṉu-puráṉa.
p. 90
2
Paragraph a is taken, with slight alterations at the beginning
and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed.
p. 97
3 It is
the bracketed Aph. 56. at p. 58 supra, that is here referred to
Ed.
p. 99
1
Literally, 'liable to return to mundane existence.' Ed.
4 Compare
the Chhándogya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed.
p. 102
3 Dr.
Ballantyne, on republishing the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca
Indica, adopted the genuine reading, instead of that given above,
which I find, indeed, in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya,
but in no MS. He ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his
translation,
p. 103
which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run
somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all
extinction of bondage is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation
which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most
elegible. Ed.
1 This
is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed.
p. 106
1 So
reads Aniruddha; but Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva
end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. Hence: 'That
which is in the highest degree, productive thereof is proof, of three
kinds.' Ed.
p. 108
3
Aniruddha has 'determined by,' &c., instead of 'being in,' &c.
Ed.
p. 110
4 For
the term atiśaya, again rendered, in the next page, by
'exaltation,' vide infra, p. 115,
note 4. Ed.
p. 112
3
Rather, 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is expressly owing
to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who
denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude which he assumed
is that of suspense of judgment on the point of theism, as against the
positiveness of the professed atheist. Vijnána, here followed, then
goes on to say: 'For, otherwise [i.e., if the aphorist had been
atheistic], it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the
non-existence of a Lord.' Ed.
p. 113
1
Rather, 'the view being accepted' (abhyupagame):
p. 115
3 In
both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' Ed.
4
Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows:
p. 116
According to this, the term íśwara, 'mighty one,' 'lord,'
is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as it were liberated,
or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired transcendent
faculties, that is to say, the Yogí. Resolution, agentship,
and the like, are impredicable of one absolutely liberated; and such a
one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by íśwara,
'a power.' Hence the expression, 'as it were liberated.' Also see, for
atiśaya,—translated, above, 'transcendent faculties,'—Book
IV., Aph. 24. Ed.
p. 118
1 The
translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. Ed.
[* The quotation in question is xvi., 3, 4,of the Yoga-vásisṭha.
For a more correct translation of it, see the Rational Refutation,
&c., p. 214.]
p. 121
1
Aniruddha prefixes to 'the internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great
One.' Ed.
p. 134
1 I have
corrected the translator's 'But, since thus,' which rendered an
unwarranted reading, now replaced by one correlative to the end of the
preceding Aphorism. Ed.
p. 141
1 'If
production is occasioned by manifestation, by what is destruction
occasioned?' Aniruddha, here quoted. Ed.
4 'From
the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into its
material cause: by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned. Such is
the meaning of the word [náśa], and [such is] the
particular action [which]
p. 142
it expresses.' This is from Aniruddha. Ed.
p. 143
3
Translating the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica,
Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection anveshaṇá,
inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand, that, successively,'
instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other.'
Vijnána explains anveshaṇá by anudhávana; and
Vedánti Mahádeva has, in definition of it, the synonymons anusaraṇa.
Ed.
p. 162
2 This
lection is that of Aniruddha alone. Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti
Mahádeva necessitate 'and because,' &c. Ed.
p. 163
2 II.,
4, 14,; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 16. The
two sentences quoted are continuous. Ed.
p. 165
1 Bṛihadáraṇyaka
Upanishad, iv., 3, 16; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa,
xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed.
p. 167
3 Vide
supra, p. 53, Aph. 51, &c. Ed.
p. 168
3 Vide
supra, p. 16, note 3.
p. 172
2 Chhándogya
Upanishad, vi., 1. But the word ### does not occur there. Ed.
3 Kaṭha
Upanishad, iv., 11. Instead of ###, however, the correct reading
is ###. Ed.
p. 172
3 All
the commentators but Aniruddha read ###; and they differ widely from
him, as they often do, in their elucidations of the Aphorism. Nágeśa's
explanation of it is as follows: ###
p. 173
The substance of this is, that, only in the eyes of the mistaken man
who is influenced by the notorious cause of bondage, or in other
words, who is unable to discriminate, is the essential condition of
souls multeity, a condition the reverse of the one before referred to,
unity; and that is inconclusive. The Aphorism, thus undertood, must be
assumed to proceed from a Vedántic disputant against the Sánkhya.
Whether as read by Aniruddha, or as read by others, it is susceptible,
with reference to the previous context, of a variety of renderings. Ed.
p. 177
2 Anuyoga,
here rendered 'doubt,' rather signifies 'difficulty raised,'
'question.' Ed.
4 The
source of the stanza here translated I have not ascertained. Ed.
p. 178
3 This
reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, 'Clear of both conditions
[i.e., that of being bound and that of being freed, is Soul,
which is eternally free].'
According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism has
reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is
p. 179
liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or
unchanging fixedness, of essential condition (ekarúpatwa) is
predicable of it.
Also see the commentaries on the Sánkhya-káriká, st. 19;
and § 144. a., at p. 162, supra. Ed.
2 Vide
supra, p. 56, § 54. a., and p. 165, §
148. Ed.
p. 180
5 Vijnána
says that this Aphorism and that next following specify notes of Soul
which establish that its essential condition is neither
p. 181
of those alluded to in Aph. 160.
p. 182
1 The
translator inadvertently omitted the words 'through,' &c. Ed.
4 These
words are taken from Colebrooke: see his Miscellaneous Essays
(Prof. Cowell's edition), vol. i., p. 249. The original is found, as a
quotation, &c., in Váchaspati Miśra's Tattwa-kaumudí,
near the beginning of the comment on st. 2 of the Sánkhya-káriká
. . . .
p. 183
The words ### {?} are obviously a gloss; and I have punctuated
accordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are
followed by another. The source of the first has not been discovered.
For what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chhándogya
Upanishad. Colebrooke's 'thus' is unrepresented in the Sankrit as
I find it. Ed.
[* For emendations of sundry matters, see p.
429, note 4.
1
Aniruddha's is intended, though many passages in the preceding pages
are from other commentaries. Ed.
|
|
|
|
|
Source:
The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila with illustrative extracts from
the commentaries translated by James R. Ballantyne third edition
edited by Fitzedward Hall [London, Trübner & Co.] [1885]
{reduced to HTML and edited by Christopher M. Weimer, January
2003} Reproduced and reformatted from SacredTexts.com.
Disclaimer: While we have made every effort to reproduce
the text correctly, we do not guarantee or accept any
responsibility for any errors or omissions or inaccuracies in
the reproduction of this text. This text has been reproduced for
general reading purposes only and readers are advised to refer
the original text for any research or academic studies and
references. |
|
|
|
