The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila

   Aph. 11.* Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible* power imperceptible].

   a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]** something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because, in these two p. 13 instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of germination; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogí, [the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c.

   b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, be rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.:

p. 14

   Aph. 12.* Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage].

   a. The bondage of man is not caused by time; because [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberated; because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men, [and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any].

   Aph. 13.* Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason]

   a. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. Why? 'For the same reason,' i.e., for that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated p. 15 or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated, also.

   Aph. 14.* Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body.

   a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that; because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.

   b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes], he declares:

p. 16

   Aph. 15.* Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.

   a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason; the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned.

   Aph. 16.* Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal,3 [if the case were as you imagine].

p. 17

   a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated, [through some acts of some one else].

   b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate2 [viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, 'and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur [where it does not,] even in such cases as the universal dissolutions [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul].

   c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case, then let the bondage, too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection p. 18 of the mind, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the soul, also? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows]:

   Aph. 17.* If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

   a. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.e., a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and another man's not: [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind, but of soul, that men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]; and this reflexion is of its own attendant [organism] only; so that there is no undue result [deducible from our theory].

p. 19

   b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakṛiti) is directly the cause of bondage:

   Aph. 18.* If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] 'no;' [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.

   a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say 'no;' because that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution, [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

p. 20

   b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhaná1 [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature,' &c.

   c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire; [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

   d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come]:

p. 21

   Aph. 19.* [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

   a. Therefore,1 without the conjunction thereof, i.e., without the conjunction of Nature, there is not, to the soul, any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bondage; but, moreover, just through that [connexion with Nature] does bondage take place.

   b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it, either essentially or adventitiously], he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative, ['not without']. For, if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [in the case of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases, on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflexional, and neither essential [§ 5. b.] nor adventitious [§ 11. b.].

p. 22

   c. In order that there may not be such an error as thot of the Vaiśeshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§ 19]. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneously, [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

   d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows 'As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] p. 23 that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul [is regarded as being affected by pain].'

   e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage, [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].*

   f. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19. c.]. And now enough as to that point.

   g. Now he rejects [§ 18. d.] certain causes of [the soul's] bondage, preferred by others:

p. 24

   Aph. 20.* Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

   a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c., [§ 12, which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in § 19, of the received cause].

   b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one (see Vedánta-sára, § 20. b.)]; because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed.

   c. But, if 'Ignorance' be a reality [as some assert], then he declares [as follows]:

   Aph. 21.* If it ['Ignorance'] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántíc] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

p. 25

   a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma* [see Nyáya Aphorisms I., § 31] of the unreality of Ignorance;' [and so you stultify yourself].

   b. He states another objection:

   Aph. 22.* And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

   a. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Vedánta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind.

p. 26

   Aph. 23.* If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say 'no,' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

   a. The meaning is: if [the Vedántí says that] 'Ignorance' is not real,—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],—and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal, [like Plato's ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν: (see Vedánta-sára, § 21)].

   Aph. 24.* [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal we say] 'no;' because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

   a. That is to say: it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing,' &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. p. 27 For, in the case of a dispute, it is neccssary that there should be an example of the thing [i.e. (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found; [for, where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the import.

   b. Again he ponders a doubt:

p. 28

   Aph. 25.* [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeshikas and others.'

   a. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiśeshikas, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyáyikas, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to people in general], as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see p. 28 Vedánta-sára, § 21]; because this is established by proofs,' [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 35)].

   b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas; for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories [see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 1].

   c. He confutes [this pretence of evading the objection, by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya]:

   Aph. 26.* Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like.

   a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vaiśeshika, § 25]; still, since being and not-being are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to p. 29 admit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness: otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning.

   b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individuaily; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence2 of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows]:

p. 30

   Aph. 27.* [The bondage] thereof moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

   a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned: such is the meaning.

   b. He states the reason of this [impossibility]:

   Aph. 28.* Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra.

   a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscibed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Páṭaliputra: such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vásaná) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth [to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the flower-basket [to which they impart their odour.]

   b. By the word 'also' the absence or conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 10)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected [with the matter of the present aphorism].

p. 32

   c. Srughna and Páṭaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart.

   d. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as follows]:

   Aph. 29.* [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free].

   a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as likely to come across objects as any other]: such is the meaning.

p. 33

   b. Here he ponders a doubt:

   Aph. 30.* If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

   a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if [this be urged, then we look forward].

   b. This he disputes, [as follows]:

p. 34

   Aph. 31.* They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

   a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see § 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning.

   b. He ponders a doubt:

   Aph. 32.* If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].

   a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that p. 35 the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindu Law,' Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiatc the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning [of the heretic].

   b. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact:

   Aph. 33.* [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

   a. 'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of p. 36 the son, by [means of the performance of]1 the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Bráhman would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one, [on your own theory: it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

   b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunction [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

p. 37

   c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] 'But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,' [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]:

   Aph. 34.* Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].

   a. 'Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism].

   b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]:

p. 38

   c. And [continues the heretic,] this [reason, viz., 'existence'] does not extend unduly1 [as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute; [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, 'since there is no such thing as a permanent result' [§ 34].

   d. He objects [to this heretical view]:

   Aph. 35.* No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

   a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under § 34. b.]. taken from such facts of recognition as, 'what I saw, that same do I touch,' [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz.:

   Aph. 36.* And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

   a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the general principle, that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., '[All] this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this, viz., 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?'

   Aph. 37.* And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact.

p. 40

   a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied; because this momentary churacter does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, (§ 34. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import.

   b. Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect; [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

p. 41

   Aph. 38.* It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists.

   a. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. Nelther is it the last; in regard to which he declares [as follows]:

   Aph. 39.* Because, when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it].

   a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from,] its p. 42 substantial cause, [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it].

   b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]:

   Aph. 40.* Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.3

   a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'4 The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and p. 43 substance,1 are (1) concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,2 that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things [in your opinion,] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent,3 belong to opposite times, [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

   b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] 'let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, p. 44 as it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.' To this he replies:

   Aph. 41.* If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

   a. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence [to the product]; because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes; for, [as we need scarcely remind you], that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning.

   b. Other heretics say: 'Since nothing [really] exists, except Thought, neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. p. 45 Therefore it has no cause; nor it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of these [heretics]:

   Aph. 42.* Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.

   a. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.

   b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects!' To this he replies:

   Aph. 43.* Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all].

p. 46

   a. That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought.

   b. 'Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all:' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition:

   Aph. 44.* The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.

   a. The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only p. 47 truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own nature; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased to perish]: such is the meaning.

   b. He rejects [this heretical view]

   Aph. 45.* This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

   a. 'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-assertion that a thing must needs be perishable, because it p. 48 exists; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.

   b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition as this, that 'the jar has passed away,' it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed away.

   c. He states another objection [to the heretical view]:

   Aph. 46.* Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

p. 49

   a. This view, moreover [§ 44], is not a good one; because it has the same fortune as, i.e., is open to similar reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [§ 26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. b.]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration. viz. [as stated in § 35], the fact of recognition, &c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought. viz. [as stated in § 42], the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the import.

   b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., 'Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing], and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],' this too, can hardly be: so he declares [as follows]:

p. 50

   Aph. 47.* In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

   a. 'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because the [whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, [(see § 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predicable].

   b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causes of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers, and] already rejected, are to be set aside:

   Aph. 48.* Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's bondage result].

p. 51

   a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic [of discussion].

   b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.

   c. He states a reason for this:

   Aph. 49.* Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or in other words without motion]

   a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].

   b. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size p. 52 of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like:1 [but] this conjecture he repels:

   Aph. 50.* [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

   a. That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle, [that the soul is imperishable].*

   b. He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.] referring to the motion [of the soul, by showing that the motion is not really of the soul, but of an accessory]:

p. 53

   Aph. 51.* The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant;1 as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

   a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,'2 the text3 regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, [incapable of being moved]';4 and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. b.),] belongs to Nature [see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. l.], from such maxims3 as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful; p. 54 and it is wilful Nature that] in the three worlds, reaps these': such is the import.2

   b. It has already been denied [§ 16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works] in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover] does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom:

   Aph. 52.* Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.

   a. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned p. 55 by works.1 Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see § 16. a.)] is no property of the soul.